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ABSTRACT 
General average emerged as an independent mechanism in ancient times for the redistribution of 
losses incurred for the safety of the common maritime adventure from peril. Its robustness and 
efficiency as a risk and loss distribution device led to its recognition and incorporation in a 
plethora of medieval codes and the laws of many maritime states. As the concept evolved in 
different maritime states there emerged a divergence in the principles and practice of general 
average. The undesirability of a divergence in such a concept of international import led to the 
adoption of the York-Antwerp Rules by the maritime community as a tool for achieving 
uniformity. 
The York-Antwerp Rules have been amended periodically over the course of more than a 
century with the object of achieving greater uniformity in the law of general average and to keep 
abreast of developments in international trade and the maritime industry. The most recent 
revision of the York-Antwerp Rules adopted in 2004 (York-Antwerp Rules 2004), is the first 
revision adopted without a consensus amongst the majority of interested parties. Nine years after 
their adoption, the York-Antwerp Rules 2004 have failed to gain widespread acceptance and use 
in the maritime industry. An attempt by the Comité Maritime International to resolve the impasse 
on the use of the Rules at its 2012 Beijing Conference was unsuccessful and it was resolved 
instead to work towards the adoption of a new set of Rules at its next Conference in 2016. 
To ensure that the revision of the York-Antwerp Rules presented for acceptance at the 
2016 Conference does not suffer the fate of the York-Antwerp Rules 2004 it is important that the 
mistakes made with regard to the York-Antwerp Rules 2004 are not repeated. Consequently, this 
thesis analyses the substantive revisions made in the York-Antwerp Rules 2004 to ascertain why 
other interested parties, particularly shipowning interests, are opposed to the York-Antwerp 
Rules 2004. This will assist in the recommendations to be made with regard to the substantive 
changes to the York-Antwerp Rules 2004 that could ensure the widespread acceptance of the 
Rules to be adopted in 2016. Furthermore, the factors that led to the periodic revision of the 
Rules are examined and the ingredients of the previous successful revision processes are 
identified as a comparative base to ascertain the flaws, if any, in the process that led to the 
adoption of the York-Antwerp Rules 2004; which culminated in the lack of widespread 
acceptance of the Rules in the maritime industry. This thesis contends, among other things, that 
iii 
the York-Antwerp Rules 2004 failed to gain widespread acceptance in the maritime industry 
because the substantive changes introduced by the Rules did not ensure a measure of equitable 
balance of the interests of all interested parties. Furthermore, the ingredients of the previous 
successful revision processes were disregarded in the process of adopting the 2004 Rules. This 
thesis makes recommendations on the content of the York-Antwerp Rules to be adopted in 2016 
and the process of adopting the new Rules in an attempt to enhance their widespread acceptance 
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At its Vancouver Conference in 2004, the Comité Maritime International (CMI)
1
 revised the 
York-Antwerp Rules (YAR) 1994 and adopted a new set of Rules referred to generally as the 
YAR 2004.
2
 Cargo insurers, led by the International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI), 
tabled a revision of the YAR 1994 at the CMI 2004 Vancouver Conference and despite 
opposition to the proposed revisions by the majority of interested parties, particularly 
shipowning interests,
3




In the period after the adoption of the YAR 2004, it became apparent that this revision 
would not achieve the widespread acceptance hoped for and essential for the value of the 
YAR as a uniform code of general average. Shipowning interests, led by the Baltic and 
International Maritime Council (BIMCO)
5
 declared their rejection of the YAR 2004
6
 and 
thereafter worked towards ensuring that the 2004 Rules were seldom, if ever, used in the 
maritime industry.
7
 To date, the YAR 2004 have failed to gain widespread use in the 
maritime industry as a result of the opposition of shipowning interests.
8
 The general average 
clauses in most standard carriage contracts continue to provide that general average will be 
adjusted according to the YAR 1994.
9
 The YAR 2004 have also not been enacted in any 
country’s domestic law, as the Scandinavian countries had done with the previous versions of 
                                                          
1
 The CMI is a non-governmental international organisation composed of national maritime law associations 
(NMLAs). The CMI since the amendment of the YAR in 1950 has been the custodian of the YAR. For details 
on the CMI, see www.comitemaritime.org, accessed 5 May 2011. 
2




 R Cornah ‘The Changes Introduced by the York-Antwerp Rules 2004’ (2004) 10 JIML 403 at 405. The 
changes are analysed in chap 4 infra. 
5
 See chap 5 § II(b) infra. 
6
 See BIMCO Special Circular, No 1, July 2007, available at 
www.bimco.org/~/media/Documents/Special_Circulars/SC2007_07.ashx, accessed 20 November 2011. 
7
 The reasons for the lack of widespread acceptance and use of the YAR 2004 in the maritime industry are 
examined in chap 5 infra.  
8







 The Rules were also not incorporated in the recently revised standard hull policy 
in the United States market
11




At its Beijing Conference in 2012, the CMI attempted unsuccessfully to resolve this 
impasse over the use of the YAR 2004, but the Conference resolved to work towards a 
general review of the Rules on general average with a view to adopting a new set of Rules at 
the next CMI Conference in 2016.
13
 The CMI has initiated the process of developing a new 
revision of the YAR for 2016.
14
 The question that suggests itself is how the current process 
can avoid or reduce the likelihood of an impasse amongst interested parties on the new Rules 
to be adopted. 
 
II AIM OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis aims to examine the content of the YAR 2004, and the process that led to their 
adoption to identify the factors that led to the impasse amongst interested parties that 
culminated in the lack of widespread acceptance and use of the YAR 2004 in the maritime 
industry. This is with a view to making recommendations that could assist to avoid or reduce 
the likelihood of such an impasse amongst interested parties on the new Rules to be adopted 
in 2016. The recommendations relate broadly to the substantive revisions to the content of the 
Rules that need to be made and the process for reaching agreement on these revisions.  
The recommendations as to the content of the Rules are not aimed at a revision of the 
entire YAR but at the revision of some of the changes introduced by the YAR 2004
15
 to 
ensure a measure of balance of the interests of all parties. This is because shipowning 
interests are not opposed to all the changes introduced by the YAR 2004. With regard to the 
content of the revisions, any proposals in this regard need to take account of not only the 
system of general average in the YAR to ensure that the revisions proposed are consistent 
                                                          
10
 See chap 5 § V(b) infra. 
11
 See the American Institute of Marine Underwriters (AIMU) Hull Clauses 2009, available at 
www.aimu.org/aimuforms/HullClauses2009.pdf, accessed 23 January 2012. 
12
 See the Institute Cargo Clauses (ICC) (A), (B) and (C) (2009). 
13
 See chap 5 § VI(f) infra.  
14
 See chap 5 § VI(g) infra as to the process that has been initiated by the CMI for the general review of the 
Rules on general average. 
15
 See chap 8 § II infra. 
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with that system, but also to the place of general average in the broader allocation of 
maritime risks within the maritime industry. The recommendations as to the process for the 
revision of the YAR 2004 are based on lessons from history, drawing on the ingredients of 
past successful revision processes and avoiding the pitfalls of the 2004 revision process. 
 
III  SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
 
Myriad issues have been raised with regard to general average and the YAR, ranging from 
the need to simplify the Rules to take cognisance of developments in the maritime industry to 
calls by some interested parties for the abolition of general average as an anachronism that 
has outlived its usefulness.
16
 The call for abolition was first made by the Committee of 
Lloyd’s (hereafter ‘Lloyd’s’) in 1877 on the basis that marine insurance could adequately 
provide cover for the various interests at risk in a maritime adventure.
17
 Apart from the 
argument with respect to the adequacy of marine insurance, the preponderance of abolitionist 




Though there may be some merit in the abolitionists’ arguments, consideration of 
possible abolition of general average is beyond the scope of this thesis as it was not the 
IUMI’s objective during the process of the revision of the YAR 1994
19
 and currently, there is 
no clamour by any interest group for the abolition of general average as the focus of all 
interested parties is on the adoption of a new set of Rules in 2016.
20
 Thus, this thesis 
                                                          
16
 K Selmer The Survival of General Average: A Necessity or an Anachronism (1958); W Tetley ‘Maritime Law 
as a Mixed Legal System’ (1999) 23 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 317 at 337.  
17
 See Chap 6 § II(b)(i) infra. See also R Cornah ‘The Road to Vancouver – The Development of the York-
Antwerp Rules’ (2004) 10 JIML 155 at 161. 
18
 P Murkherjee ‘The Anachronism in Maritime Law that is General Average’ (2005) 4 World Journal of 
Maritime Affairs 195; W Tetley ‘General Average Now and in the Future’, 38-39, available at 
www.mcgill.ca/files/maritimelaw/genaverage.pdf, accessed 10 May 2011.  
19
 E Magee ‘General Average: A New Generation of Rules for the Millennium’, 7, paper presented at the IUMI 
Berlin Conference, September, 1999.  
20
 See the Report by the CMI International Working Group (IWG) on the general review of the Rules on general 
average, 2-6, dated 12 August 2013 (updated 13 September 2013); IUMI Position Paper on the CMI 2013 
questionnaire on the general review of the Rules on general average, 1, available at 
www.iumi.com/images/gillian/YAR%20Questionnaire%20-%20IUMI%20Position%20Paper%20-
%20August%202013.pdf, accessed 16 September 2013. 
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examines the substantive changes introduced by the YAR 2004, the level of acceptance and 
use of the YAR 2004 in the maritime industry, the process that led to the adoption of the 
YAR 2004 which resulted in the recent impasse on the Rules and how to avoid a repeat of 
such impasse amongst interested parties with regard to the new set of Rules to be adopted in 
2016. 
 
IV STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
Against this background, chapter two of this thesis examines the nature of the law of general 
average, its historical origin, legal sources, basic principles and the divergence between the 
law of general average under the English common law and continental law. This chapter 
attempts to provide a clear understanding of the law of general average as exemplified in the 
YAR that will provide the basis for the examination of issues on the law of general average in 
this thesis and inform the recommendations to be made with regard to the substantive 
revisions to the YAR 2004. 
Chapter three analyses the place of general average in the broader system of risk 
allocation in the maritime industry. This chapter examines the system of allocation of risk 
between parties to a maritime adventure through general average prior to the emergence of 
marine insurance and the present interaction between general average and marine insurance 
in the re-apportionment of general average risk and loss. The interaction between general 
average and the principles of carriage of goods by sea in the allocation of general average risk 
is also analysed as general average generally applies to carriage of goods by sea. This chapter 
elucidates the active interest of marine insurers in the general average system and provides 
the basis for analysing, in chapter four, what would have been the likely insurance and 
carriage effects of the changes introduced by the YAR 2004 on the general average system if 
the Rules had gained widespread use.  
Chapter four analyses the changes introduced by the YAR 2004 to show their likely 
effects on the general average system. This chapter attempts to provide insight as to why 
shipowning interests were opposed to the changes introduced by the Rules. This insight will 
assist in identifying the particular Rules of the YAR 2004 that could be revised to avoid or 




Chapter five examines the level of acceptance of the YAR 2004 in the maritime 
industry and the recent unsuccessful attempt by the CMI at its 2012 Beijing Conference to 
resolve the impasse on the YAR 2004. The chapter aims to show that the YAR 2004 have 
failed to gain widespread acceptance and use in the maritime industry and to identify the 
factors/forces that led to this. This will inform the recommendations that will be made that 
could assist in ensuring that such pit falls are avoided in the lead up to adopting a new set of 
Rules in 2016. 
Chapter six is an analysis of the evolutionary processes adopted in the previous 
revisions of the YAR prior to 2004. The analysis aims to identify the ingredients of these 
processes that led to the successful revision of the previous sets of YAR and the widespread 
acceptance of the revised Rules in each instance. This provides a comparative base for 
appraising the process that led to the revision of the YAR 1994 to determine if it took 
cognisance of the ingredients of the past successful revision processes and whether any 
disregard of these ingredients caused the YAR 2004’s failure to gain widespread acceptance 
in the maritime industry. 
Chapter seven appraises the entire process that led to the revision of the YAR 1994. 
The process is examined in light of the identified ingredients of the processes that were 
adopted in the successful revisions of the previous versions of the YAR. The IUMI’s 
proposals for the revision of the 1994 Rules and the objections thereto by interested parties 
are also examined to determine whether the objections were justified. A consideration of 
IUMI’s proposals is relevant as the examination of the process adopted in the revision of the 
YAR 1994 is inextricably linked with the contents of the proposals that were made for the 
revision. This chapter attempts to identify the flaws in the IUMI proposals for the substantive 
revision of the YAR 1994 and in the process that led to the revision of the YAR 1994. This is 
with a view to arguing that the substantive revisions to the YAR 1994 proposed by the IUMI 
and the disregard of the ingredients of the previous revision processes contributed to the lack 
of widespread acceptance of the YAR 2004. 
Chapter eight concludes with recommendations aimed at ensuring or at least increasing 
the likelihood of the requisite level of acceptance of the new YAR to be adopted. 
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This chapter aims to provide a clear understanding of the nature of the law of general average 
from its historical origin and evolution which gave rise to the divergence on the law of 
general average under the English common law and continental law, to its present legal 
sources and basic principles. A clear understanding of the nature of general average is 
germane for an understanding of the principles of general average embodied in the YAR
21
 




This understanding of the nature of general average and the YAR is pivotal in the 
analysis of the IUMI’s substantive proposals for the revision of the YAR 1994 and the 
objections of other interested parties to those proposals.
23
 This provides the basis for 
analysing later in this thesis
24
 whether the IUMI’s proposals were consistent with the original 
intention of the maritime community in adopting the YAR as a tool for achieving uniformity 
in the law of general average and balancing the interests of interested parties as exemplified 
in the previous versions of the Rules.
25
 Furthermore, it will inform the recommendations that 
will be made as to the substantive revisions to the YAR 2004 because it will be argued that 
any proposals for the substantive revisions of the YAR 2004, while accommodating 
developments, should be consistent with the existing rules and reflect the original design of 
the YAR as a tool for achieving uniformity in the law of general average.  
 
II HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF GENERAL AVERAGE 
 
Pivotal to an understanding of the nature of general average and the YAR is the history of 
general average because it provides an insight into the emergence of the divergent notions of 
general average which necessitated the adoption of the YAR to achieve uniformity. General 
average has been peculiar to maritime law since antiquity and is believed to date from the 
                                                          
21
 See chap 2 § III(a) infra. 
22
 The unification of the divergent notions of general average in the YAR is analysed in chap 6 § II(a)(i) infra. 
23
 See chap 7 infra. 
24
 Ibid.  
25





 of approximately 800 BC
27
 which stipulated that if a ship was in peril and 
as a consequence cargo was jettisoned to save the ship, then the ship and the remaining cargo 
that were saved were required to make a contribution to the owner of the lost cargo.
28
 From 
the Rhodian sea law, the law of general average was incorporated into Roman law
29
 as 
reflected in the Justinian Digest. The Digest provides that ‘the Rhodian law decrees that, if in 
order to lighten a ship, merchandise has been thrown overboard, that which is thrown 
overboard, that which has been given for all should be replaced by the contribution of all.’
30
 
From the Roman law this notion of general average that restricted it to losses incurred while 
the vessel was in danger was received into the European ius commune and incorporated into 
the subsequent medieval codes
31




                                                          
26
 The authoritative English work on the Rhodian Sea Law is W Ashburner The Rhodian Sea-Law (1909). It 
should be noted that Rhodes was a colony of Phoenicia, as such; it is not inconceivable that the concept of 
general average existed in Phoenician maritime practice which could have influenced the incorporation of the 
concept in the Rhodian Sea Law. 
27
 T Schoenbaum op cit note 2 at 4; L Buglass Marine Insurance and General Average in the United States: An 
Average Adjuster’s Viewpoint 3 ed (1991) 194. 
28
 J Cooke & R Cornah (ed) Lowndes & Rudolf The Law of General Average and the York-Antwerp Rules 13 ed 
(2008) 1; H Abbott (Lord Tenterden) A Treatise of the Law relative to Merchant Ships and Seamen (1802) 273; 
Columbian Insurance Co v Ashby and Stribling 38 US (13 Pet) 331 at 337-338 (1839) (US SCt); Burton v 
English (1883) 12 QBD 218 (CA) at 220-221;  Anderson v Ocean SS Co (1884) 10 App Cas 107 (HL) at 114; 
Strang, Steel & Co v A Scott & Co (1889) 14 App Cas 601 (PC) at 606; Ralli v Troop 157 US 386 at 393 (1895) 
(US SCt); Ultramar Canada v Mutual Marine Office [1995] 1 FC 341 at 358, 1994 AMC 2409 (Fed Can) at 
2417.   
29
 General average was received into Roman law as part of the common lex mercatoria maritama and there it 
received detailed treatment and regulation as the lex Rhodia de iactu. Zimmermann is of the view that based on 
‘the idea of community of risk and emanating from the principle of aequitas, late Republican jurisprudence 
received the Lex Rhodia into Roman law not by way of legal surgery but in a most natural or homeopathic 
manner.’ See R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 
408. See also F Sanborn Origins of the Early English Maritime and Commercial Law (1930, 1989 reprint) 37.  
30
 Digest of Justinian, Book IV, Title 2, Fr 1. 
31
 The codes include the Tabulae Amalfitana (1010), Ordinamenta et Consuetudo Maris (1063), Constitutum 
Usus (1156-1160), Consolatum Trapani (1345) and the Guidon de la Mer (1556). See Schoenbaum op cit note 2 
at 9. 
32
 T Barclay ‘The Definition of General Average’ (1891) 7 Law Quarterly Review 22 at 23; W Gormley ‘The 
Development of the Rhodian-Roman Maritime Law to 1681, with special emphasis on the problem of Collision’ 
(1961) 3 Inter-American Law Review 317 at 320.  
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The Rolls of Oléron is perhaps the most important of these medieval codes as the Rolls, 
for some centuries, held considerable authority over the greater part of Europe.
33
 Article VIII 
of the Rolls of Oléron restated the Rhodian law of general average restricted to sacrifices 
only when a vessel is in peril, by recognising as general average the jettison of cargo for the 
safety of the common maritime adventure and the liability of the parties to make 
contributions towards compensating the party whose cargo was jettisoned for the benefit of 
all. Article IX of the Rolls of Oléron stated the shipowner’s right of lien over cargo for 
general average contribution and the master’s right to sell the cargo to compensate for the 
loss of the party whose cargo was jettisoned to save others.  
Most of the medieval sea codes of Europe that were adopted after the Rolls of Oléron 
copied and reflected the law of general average exemplified in the Rolls of Oléron, albeit 
with less vivacity.
34
 The law of general average stated in the Rolls of Oléron was later 
incorporated into English law and this led to the recognition, as general average in English 
law,
35
 of only sacrifices made or expenses incurred to save the common maritime adventure 
from peril.
36
 The law of general average exemplified in the Rolls of Oléron was also received 
into French civil law
37




However, the Ordonnance of Louis XIV enacted in 1681 (hereafter the ‘Ordonnance’) 
marked the point of divergence on the earlier notion of general average embodied in the 
                                                          
33
 J Cooke & R Cornah op cit note 28 at 3. The Rolls were the basis of the common maritime law of the North 
Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. See T Schoenbaum op cit note 2 at 8.  
34
 J Cooke & R Cornah op cit note 28 at 4; G Paulsen ‘An Historical Overview of the Development of 
Uniformity in International Maritime Law’ (1982-1983) 57 Tulane Law Review 1065 at 1070. Examples of 
these codes include the Law of Flanders, of Catalonia (1243), of Wisby (1288), of Genoa (1313-1314) and of 
the Hanseatic League (1597). See E Benedict The American Admiralty, its Jurisdiction and Practice with 
Practical Forms and Directions (1850, repr 2009) 98-101. 
35
 R Colinvaux Carver’s Carriage by Sea 13 ed Vol 2 (1982) 1347. The Rolls of Oléron became the operating 
maritime law in England at the end of the 12
th
 century. See F Sanborn op cit note 29 at 269. Mukherjee notes 
that the concept of general average ‘became firmly established and embodied in the majority of the European 
maritime codes and the consuetudinary English admiralty law through the Roles d’Oleron.’ See P Mukherjee 
Maritime Legislation (2002) 12. 
36
 See chap 2 § II(a) infra. 
37
 G Paulsen op cit note 34 at 1070. 
38
 See art 42 of the Ordonnance of April 1364 of Charles V. Article 42 granted Castillian merchants the right to 
be judged according to the ‘coutume de la mer et les droiz de layron.’  
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Rhodian Sea Law and gave force to an expanded definition and notion of general average
39
 
that encompassed both sacrifices made while the vessel was in danger and expenses incurred, 
after the vessel had attained safety from peril, to enable the vessel to successfully complete 
the voyage. This definition of general average in the Ordonnance influenced the definition 
and notion of general average in subsequent sea laws in Continental Europe
40
 and ‘provided a 
framework regarding general average that influenced the rest of Europe to set down maritime 
law in this important area.’
41
 The Ordonnance provides that: 
 
‘every “extraordinary expense” … which is made for the ship and merchandise 
conjointly and every damage that shall occur to them from their loading and departure 
until their return and discharge, shall be reputed average … extraordinary expenses 
incurred and damage suffered for the common good and safety for the merchandise and 
the vessel, are gross and common average … and the gross and common shall fall as well 
upon the vessel as upon merchandise, and shall be equalised over the whole at the 




Thus, the Ordonnance extended the concept of general average to every extraordinary 
expense made both for the safety of the vessel and cargo and for the successful completion of 
the voyage. By the provision of the Ordonnance, general average, unlike in the Rhodian Sea 
Law and the Rolls of Oléron, is not restricted to only acts done to save the ship from peril but 
extends to acts done to enable the vessel to successfully complete its voyage, usually from a 
port of refuge. The Ordonnance recognised that there might be instances were subsequent 
expenses may be pertinent, after the vessel was no longer in peril, for a successful completion 
of the voyage. The Ordonnance gave force to the continental notion that every sacrifice made 
or expense incurred both while the vessel was in danger and consequent acts done after the 
adventure was no longer in danger, but necessary for the successful completion of the 
adventure, were to be brought into general average. 
                                                          
39
 J Cooke & R Cornah op cit note 28 at 8. 
40
 Ibid at 9. 
41
 R Cornah op cit note 17 at 156. The principle of general average in the Ordonnance was reflected in 
subsequent sea laws of European states such as the Ordinances of Rotterdam (1721); of Konigsberg (1730); of 
Hamburg (1731); of Bilbao (1737) and of Stockholm (1750). See J Cooke & R Cornah op cit note 28 at 8; R 
Rodiere Droit Maritime 9 ed (1981) 11-12. 
42
 Ordonnance Tit 7, arts 2, 3; 4 Pard 380. 
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 (a) Divergence in the law of general average: Common safety v common benefit 
 
As a consequence of the historical evolution of general average, a divergence exists in the 
respective conceptions of general average under the English common law and continental 
law.
43
 The English common law notion of general average is restricted to sacrifices incurred 
or expenses made to save the common maritime adventure from peril. This is referred to as 
the ‘common safety’ principle and covers sacrifices of property (such as jettisoning of cargo) 
or expenditure (such as salvage) that are made or incurred while the ship and cargo were in 
danger in order to save the common maritime adventure.
44
 This principle was previously the 
only category of general average generally recognised by English law and practice.
45
 
In contrast, the continental notion of general average encompasses both sacrifices made 
and expenses incurred in preserving the common maritime adventure from peril and further 
expenses incurred (mostly at a port of refuge) in ensuring the successful completion of the 
adventure.
46
 This notion of general average sees the successful completion of the adventure 
as the ultimate goal of a general average act and is referred to as the ‘common benefit’ 
principle. This notion of general average is common to European legal systems
47
 and is 
recognised in United States law.
48
 Examples of such expenses include the cost of discharging 
cargo, storing and reloading cargo as necessary to carry out repairs at a port of refuge and 
port charges. 
The common benefit principle is to be preferred to the common safety principle as it 
underlines the very essence of a general average act; which is to ensure the safety of the 
vessel and the successful completion of the voyage because a vessel in some instances might 
                                                          
43
 R Cornah op cit note 4 at 404. See also the comment ‘International Divergences in Marine Insurance Law: 
The Quest for Certainty’ (1951) 64 Harvard Law Review 446 at 452.  
44
 Royal Mail Steam Packet Co v English Bank of Rio De Janeiro Ltd (1887) 19 QBD 362 (DC) at 370-371. The 
term ‘common maritime adventure’ refers to the interests at risk in a sea voyage, ie (primarily) ship, cargo and 
freight. See F Rose General Average: Law and Practice 2 ed (2005) 9. 
45
 It should be noted that later decisions of English courts after the adoption of the York Rules 1864 recognised 
the common benefit principle in English law. See Attwood v Sellar (1880) 5 QBD 286 (CA); Svendsen v 
Wallace [1885] 10 AC 404 (HL). Cf chap 7 § III(b) infra.   
46
 Société Nouvelle d’Armement v Spillers & Bakers Ltd [1971] 1 KB 865 at 869. 
47
 J Cooke & R Cornah op cit note 28 at 43. 
48
 A Parks The Law and Practice of Marine Insurance and General Average Vol 1 (1998) 493; R Cornah op cit 
note 17 at 156. 
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need to put into a port of refuge to carry out repairs or incur other expenses necessary for the 
safety of the vessel or for the successful completion of the voyage. Thus, the saving of the 
common maritime adventure from peril, does not entirely achieve the purpose for 
undertaking a sea voyage which is to ensure that at least part of the interests at risk arrives at 
the port of destination.
49
 Wilmer J aptly notes that ‘for commercial men the objective of a 
voyage is not safety in a port of refuge but safe arrival at destination.’
50
 It is submitted that 
the importance of both principles is the reason they are recognised by the YAR which 




(b) Divergent definitions of general average 
 
The divergence in the notion of general average in the English common law and in 
continental law is reflected in the varied definitions of general average underpinning the 
nature of sacrifices and expenses that would be regarded as general average acts under these 
two legal systems and when such sacrifices and expenses will be regarded as general average 
acts. It is relevant to examine the different definitions of general average in case law, statutes 
and the YAR in order to draw a comparison on their common features and distinctions. This 
will also assist in the analysis, later in this thesis, of IUMI’s proposal for the redefinition of 
general average in Rule A YAR 1994.
52
 
The classic definition of general average given by an English court is that of Lawrence 
J in Birkley v Presgrave: 
 
 ‘All loss which arise in consequence of extraordinary sacrifices made or expenses 
incurred for the preservation of the ship and cargo come within general average and must 




The above definition confines general average to the common safety principle. It lays 
down two conditions for a valid general average act which are that the general average act 
must be extraordinary, and must be done for the safety of the common maritime adventure. 
                                                          
49
 G Paulsen op cit note 34 at 1066. 
50
 The Glaucus (1948) 81 Ll L Rep 263 (Admlty) at 267. 
51
 See chap 6 § II(a)(i) infra. 
52
 See chap 7 § III(b) infra. 
53
 (1801) 1 East 220 at 228; 102 ER 86 (KB).  
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The definition does not explicitly provide that the voluntariness
54
 and the reasonableness
55
 of 
the sacrifice or expenditure are essential criteria for a valid general average act.
56
 
This English common law definition of general average which limits it to the common 
safety principle was codified in the United Kingdom Marine Insurance Act (MIA) 1906 
(hereafter ‘MIA 1906’). Section 66(2)
57
 MIA 1906 provides that ‘there is a general average 
act where any extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure is voluntarily and reasonably made or 
incurred in time of peril for the purpose of preserving property imperilled in the common 
adventure.’ Thus, unlike in the Birkley case, the MIA 1906 explicitly provides that the 
voluntariness and reasonableness of the act are essential criteria for a valid claim in general 
average. 
A similar definition to the English common law definition of general average as 
codified in s 66(2) MIA 1906 is contained in Rule A YAR 2004 which provides that ‘there is 
a general average act when and only when, any extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure is 
intentionally and reasonably made or incurred for the common safety for the purpose of 
preserving from peril the property involved in a common maritime adventure.’ This 
definition seems to suggest that it is only the common safety principle that is recognised by 
the YAR. However, an examination of the entire provisions of the YAR will show that the 
Rules recognise both the common safety and common benefit principles. The numbered 
                                                          
54
 See chap 2 § IV(d) infra. 
55
 See chap 2 § IV(g) infra. 
56
 See Rule Paramount and Rule A YAR 2004. 
57
 There are also similar definitions in s 65(2) Canadian MIA 1993; art 2599 Quebec Civil Code 1991; art 469 
Italian Navigation Code 1942; art 811 Spanish Commercial Code 1885. In Austin Friars SS Co Ltd v Spillers & 
Bakers Ltd [1915] 1 KB 833 (KB) at 835, Bailhache J stated that the statutory definition in the MIA 1906 must 
now prevail in English law, a view doubted by some authors on the ground that the Act is only concerned with 
marine insurance. However, the marine insurance aspects of general average are linked with its other aspects. 
The Act mainly codified the existing common law and states the principle in broad terms. It needs not be 
interpreted restrictively. Moreover, according to s 87 of the Act, the provisions of the Act may generally be 
overridden by agreement or usage and in practice general average is in most cases governed by the YAR. Any 






 in the YAR cover sacrifices and expenses made for the common benefit of the 
common maritime adventure.  
However, the definition of general average in Rule A YAR 2004 differs from the 
English law definition in s 66(2) MIA 1906. Under Rule A YAR 2004 a general average act 
need not necessarily be made when the peril is physically present; provided that the act is 
undertaken for the purpose of preserving the common maritime adventure from peril which 
threatens it, or which would threaten it if the act were not performed.  
In Watson v Firemen’s Fund Insurance Co of San Francisco
59
 which was a claim under 
a cargo insurance policy governed by English law pursuant to the MIA 1906, the court held 
that damage caused to the claimant’s goods by steam applied to the hold of a ship to quench a 
non-existent fire was not a general average loss, since the peril of fire which the master 
thought to exist, was not present. However, for the position under the YAR, the English court 
in Vlassopoulos v British & Foreign Marine Insurance Co (The ‘Makis’)
60
 held that it was 
not necessary for the ship to be actually in the grip or even nearly in the grip of the disaster 
that may arise from the danger. However, the peril must be real and not imaginary and it must 
be substantial and not merely slight.
61
 This decision was based on the YAR 1924 which was 
incorporated by the parties into the carriage contract. 
However, the common benefit principle has been recognised in the definition of general 
average by United States courts. The United States Supreme Court in The Star of Hope
62
 
defined general average as ‘… sacrifices voluntarily made of part of the ship or cargo to save 
the residue and the lives of those on board from an impending peril or … extraordinary 
expenses necessarily incurred by one or more of the parties for the general benefit of all the 
interests embarked in the enterprise.’
63
 This definition recognises both the common safety 
and common benefit principle by regarding as general average sacrifices made and expenses 
incurred for the general (common) benefit of all interests involved in a sea voyage. It 
provides three conditions for a valid general average act, viz, that the general average act 
                                                          
58
 The numbered Rules in the YAR 2004 provide for particular cases in general average regarding loss, damage 
and expense. They are 23 in number (Rules I to XXIII). They have been referred to as the ‘canons of practice of 
the average adjuster.’ See J Hare Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2 ed (2009) 967. 
59
 [1922] 2 KB 355. Cf chap 2 § II(b),  IV(b), VI(c) infra. 
60
 [1929] 1 KB 187.  Cf chap 2 § II(b),  IV(b), chap 7 § III(b), IV(b)(ii) and V(c)(ii)(a) infra. 
61
 Ibid at 199.  
62
 76 US 203 (1869) (US SCt). 
63
 Ibid at 228. 
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must be voluntarily and extraordinarily made and must be for the benefit of all the parties to 
the adventure. However, like the definition in the English case of Birkley, this definition does 
not explicitly provide that the reasonableness of the act is an essential criterion for a valid 
general average act. 
It could be argued that early English and American jurisprudence on general average 
was more concerned with the extraordinary and voluntary nature of a general average act than 
with the reasonableness of the act in the prevailing circumstances. However, it seems that the 
reasonableness of the general average acts was not directly in issue in earlier cases on general 
average in both jurisdictions. 
Despite these divergent definitions of general average, it could be inferred that general 
average, in its broadest formulation, is a doctrine of maritime law that provides for the 
proportionate sharing by all parties to a maritime adventure of losses incurred where cargo is 
sacrificed in the event of a peril or expenses incurred for the common benefit of the parties to 
the adventure. Thus general average could be said to be ‘the legal relationship with which 




Taking cognisance of the divergence in the definition of general average, the question 
arises as to whether a supra-national definition of general average is desirable. The varied 
definitions of general average indicate at least that such a supra-national definition of general 
average may be possible as the essential conditions for a valid general average act in the 
English common law and continental law are admittedly similar; the divergence being only 
the nature of the sacrifice or expense that will be regarded as a general average act. It is 
argued that a supra-national definition of general average is desirable because of the need to 
reflect the intention of the maritime community of achieving uniformity in the law of general 
average.
65
 To achieve this uniformity, it is argued that the definition of general average in 
Rule A YAR 2004 should be amended by substituting the phrase ‘common safety’ with 
‘common benefit’ to explicitly underscore that the YAR embody both the common safety and 
common benefit principles. The minimum features of such a definition should be that the 
general average act should be; (i) extraordinary; (ii) voluntarily and (iii) reasonably made; 
                                                          
64
 J Hare op cit note 58 at 956. 
65
 See chap 6 § II(a)(i) infra. 
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III LEGAL SOURCES OF THE LAW OF GENERAL AVERAGE 
 
Analogous to other branches of maritime law, there are different legal sources of the law of 
general average and these sources supplement one another (where there is a lacuna in any 
source) in most jurisdictions. As such, more than one source of law on general average could 
be relied upon in general average adjustments and by the courts in a general average claim. It 
is therefore relevant to examine these sources to ascertain the circumstances in which they 





The YAR are a uniform code of the principles and practice of general average. The Rules 
unified the divergent notions of general average under the English common law and 
continental law.
67




 and numbered Rules. The 
Rules do not cover the entire principles of general average and all legal questions connected 
with the subject.
70
 They do not have inherent binding force; neither are they a convention nor 
a treaty.
71
 The Rules have to be incorporated into carriage contracts by parties to a maritime 
adventure or enacted in a statute (as in some countries in Scandinavia)
72
 for them to be 
applicable.
73
 Parties who agree to be bound by the YAR are not automatically bound by the 
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latest edition; as parties are at liberty to choose the version of the Rules that will apply to 
their contract of carriage.
74
  
The YAR are presently the primary source of the law of general average
75
 as most 
general average adjustments globally are made pursuant to the YAR as incorporated by 
reference in standard carriage contracts which provide that general average shall be adjusted 
in accordance with a particular version of the YAR.
76
 It is estimated that 99 per cent of 
adjustments
77
 globally are made pursuant to the different versions of the YAR.
78
 Where a 
carriage contract contains a particular version of the YAR, any dispute arising therefrom will 
be adjudicated by the courts based on that particular set of Rules.
79
 
Thus, the examination of the principles of the law of general average in this thesis will 
be primarily based on the YAR because this regime most commonly governs general average 
adjustments;
80
 although it is often supplemented by other sources of the law of general 
average where there are gaps in the Rules.  
 
(b) Law and custom of trade 
 
Prior to the principles and practice of the law of general average being embodied in the YAR, 
general average adjustments were governed by the laws and customs of the place where the 
adventure ended.
81
 The law of a place in this context refers to the principles of general 
average that were embodied in the various medieval maritime laws which governed the 
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adjustment of general average in different maritime states.
82
 The customs of trade in this 




For a practice to be regarded as a custom of trade it must be regarded as so general and 
universal in a particular trade to justify expectations that it will be observed in the particular 
trade.
84
 However, a court of law will be reluctant to apply a custom, no matter how general 
and universal, that seems to be unreasonable or unfair in the eyes of the court.
85
 Most of these 
customs of trade on general average have been embodied in the Rules of Practice of average 
adjusters associations
86
 and such Rules may be applied in adjustments where the YAR are not 
incorporated in a contract of carriage.
87
 However, the Rules of Practice of average adjusters 
associations are not binding but are of persuasive force and will be applied by the court where 
it is not shown that ‘the particular circumstances are such as to render an adherence to the 




(c) Case law 
 
Court decisions are another source of the law of general average. The courts in different 
jurisdictions have expounded the principles of general average. For instance, in the United 
States, as in the United Kingdom, the law of general average is expounded by the courts; 
taking cognisance of the United States common law and the YAR. The requisite conditions 
for a general average act in American law were set out and elucidated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Barnard v Adams.
89
 The principles enunciated in that case constitute the 
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United States law of general average; which supplements the YAR in the United States where 
there is a lacuna in the Rules.  
Thus, where the YAR are silent on any issue in an adjustment in the United States, the 
common law of general average in the United States will apply.
90
 This is also the position in 
English law, where the courts have held that the YAR do not constitute a complete or self-
contained code and need to be supplemented by bringing into the gaps provisions of the 
general law which are applicable to the contract.
91






 In some jurisdictions the law of general average can be found in statutes. Most Scandinavian 
countries have periodically enacted various versions of the YAR into statute which governs 
general average adjustment in their jurisdictions.
93
 The incorporation of a version of the YAR 
in a statute does not necessarily make that version of the Rules mandatorily applicable in 
general average adjustments in a jurisdiction except where it is expressly provided in the 
statute; thereby giving that version of the Rules the force of law in that jurisdiction.
94
 
However, some statutes provide that parties can by contract agree that the general average 
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An examination of the nature of general average will be incomplete without a consideration 
of the essential conditions that are required for a sacrifice or expenditure to be regarded as a 
valid general average act. This is because these essential conditions are the basic principles of 
general average reflected in the lettered Rules of the YAR; particularly in Rule A. Thus, one 
cannot properly analyse the IUMI’s proposals for the substantive revisions to the YAR 1994 
(particularly its proposed amendment of Rule A)
96
 without a thorough grasp of the principles 
of general average reflected in Rule A.  In examining these conditions, the YAR as the major 
source of the law of general average are relied upon as the main framework of reference. 
However, it should be noted that the essential conditions of a general average act stated in 
Rule A YAR 2004 are based on and informed by principles expounded in case law and 
general maritime law. 
 
(b) Danger  
 
There must be a danger common to the whole adventure.
97
 Traditionally this has meant a 
threat to the physical integrity of the property involved. This conforms to the English 
common law notion that general average is concerned with the preservation of property.
98
 
Thus, there must be a danger to the safe prosecution of the common maritime adventure.
99
 
However, the vessel need not be in the grip of a danger which may arise but it is necessary 
that actual peril should in fact exist and not a mere apprehension of danger.
100
 This was 
illustrated in Vlassopoulos v The British & Foreign Marine Ins Co Ltd (The ‘Makis’).
101
 
While the vessel was engaged in loading cargo at Bordeaux, the foremast broke, fell on the 
                                                          
96
 See chap 7 § III(b) infra. 
97
 Dabney v New England Mutual Marine Ins Co (1864) 14 Allen 300 at 310 (Mass). 
98
 Montgomery v Indemnity Mutual Marine Ins Co [1902] 1 KB 734 (AC). 
99
 In The Barge J Whitney (1968) AMC 995 (Arb NY): asphalt which had solidified on a barge and was not 
removable except at enormous expense because of the non-functioning of heating coils, so then of no economic 
value but capable of having value restored, was not in peril for general average purposes. 
100
 Watson v Firemen’s Fund Ins Co of San Francisco [1922] 2 KB 355. 
101
 [1929] 1 KB 187. 
20 
 
main deck and caused a derrick to fall into the hold. The ship was at no time in danger, but 
she was moved into a wet dock for repairs. After the completion of repairs, the vessel put out 
to sea and had accident which rendered it unseaworthy necessitating it to put into Cherbourg 
for necessary repairs for the safety of the adventure. Roche J held that the expenses at 
Bordeaux were not general average expenditure as the ship was at no time in danger. But the 
expenses at Cherbourg were general average expenditure because the interests in the 
adventure were in danger. Elucidating the nature of danger required in the context of general 
average, Roche J opined that; 
 
‘It is not necessary that the ship should be actually in the grip or even nearly in the grip 
of the disaster that may arise from a danger. It is sufficient to say that the ship must be in 
danger, or that the act must be done in order to preserve her from peril. It means, of 
course, that the peril must be real and not imaginary. It means that it must be substantial 




What amounts to danger was illustrated in Corrie v Coulthard.
103
 There was real danger 
of the main mast, being loose, working through the vessel’s bottom. Although the court found 
that the possibility of this happening was minimal, it was held that the loss incurred in 
averting that peril was a general average loss. In other words, though the danger was not 
imminent, it was existent. 
Hand J in affirming the necessity for the existence of a danger in the American case of 
Navigazione Generale Italiana v Spencer Kellogg & Sons,
104
 observed that while 
‘imminency’ of the peril is not a critical test in determining whether a general average act has 
occurred, there nevertheless ‘must be a fair reason to regard a vessel in peril in order to 
require contribution in general average.’
105
  
It is argued that the ‘fair reason’ must be based on the facts known to the master in each 
case. What should be considered is the potential peril rather than the present circumstances 
the vessel finds herself in, though it has to be stressed in the words of Roche J that the peril 
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‘must be real and not imaginary … it must be substantial and not merely slight or nugatory.’ 
The cardinal point is the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the prevailing circumstances 
in which a ship finds herself. The act must also be specifically designed to secure the safety 





Generally, in a contract of carriage a shipowner has a duty to do all that is required, in the 
ordinary course of the voyage, for the safe carriage of the cargo to the port of destination
107
 
and by doing so is entitled to be remunerated by the agreed freight and nothing more. A party 
can only claim contributions for general average sacrifices and expenditures if made or 
incurred for something over and beyond the ordinary duties and expenses of navigation.
108
 
Thus, a general average sacrifice or expenditure must be made or incurred in order to avoid 




What will amount to an extraordinary expenditure in general average was illustrated in 
Société Nouvelle d’Armement v Spillers & Bakers Ltd.
110
 A captain had hired a tug to tow his 
sailing ship quickly between two ports during wartime to avoid submarine attacks which 
were likely to occur and from which he wished to take measures to preserve the ship and 
cargo. It was usual to hire a tug to take the vessel in and out of port, but the general average 
was claimed in respect of the intervening voyage. The claim was disallowed by the court on 
the basis that the expenditure was not extraordinary.  
It is submitted that the question to be asked is: was the sacrifice or expenditure truly 
extraordinary and out of the usual course taking cognisance of the prevailing circumstances 
or was it within the shipowner’s obligation as contemplated under the contract of carriage? 
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The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary expenses was also illustrated in 
Harrison v Bank of Australasia.
111
 The vessel sprang a leak in a cyclone on a voyage from 
Melbourne to Great Britain. The vessel was fitted with a donkey-engine for loading and 
unloading cargo, hoisting sails and for pumping the ship. To save the vessel from foundering, 
the donkey engine was used continuously throughout the voyage and when the existing 
supply for bunkers was exhausted, the master was obliged to burn spare spars and ship’s 
stores and to purchase additional bunkers from a passing steamer. Further, the donkey-engine 
needed repairs by reason of its excessive use. A claim by the shipowner for general average 
contribution from cargo was allowed in respect of the ship’s spars and stores, which truly 
constituted an extraordinary sacrifice for those items, but not for the cost of the coals 
consumed or for repairing the donkey engine. 
It is argued that presently under the English common law the cost of the additional 
bunkers purchased would be allowed in general average as it was purchased for the 
successful completion of the common maritime adventure.
112
  
Furthermore, it is argued that an expenditure or sacrifice which has been incurred or 
made in the fulfilment of a shipowner’s contractual obligation could, in appropriate cases, be 
considered general average expenditure or sacrifice. The common benefit principle relates to 
mostly expenses incurred by the shipowner at a port of refuge which ordinarily could be said 
to be expenses incurred by the shipowner based on his obligation to ensure the safe transport 
of the cargo to the port of destination pursuant to the carriage contract. However, the 
numbered Rules of the YAR provide instances in which those expenses at a port of refuge 
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The sacrifice or expenditure should be with intent and for the purpose, causa et mente, of the 
preservation of the common maritime adventure.
114
 Thus, there must be the will and agency 
of the person making it. 
In Kemp v Halliday,
115
 Blackburn J remarked that ‘in order to give rise to a charge as 
general average, it is essential that there should be a voluntary sacrifice to preserve more 
subjects than one exposed to a common jeopardy ….’
116
  
What is regarded as an intentional expenditure was illustrated in Athel Line Ltd v 
Liverpool and London War Risks Insurance Association.
117
 Two ships sailed in convoy from 
Bermuda to the United Kingdom but had to sail back to Bermuda under the order of the 
Commodore of the convoy. Consequently, the two ships consumed extra fuel and stores, 
additional wages were paid, and the cost of maintaining masters, officers and crews was 
incurred, together with the expense of entering and leaving Bermuda. The owner’s claim for 
cargo’s contribution in general average for these expenses under the YAR 1924 was 
disallowed by the court as it held that the expenses were as a result of a blind obedience to 
the lawful orders of a superior authority. Tucker J stated that a general average act must ‘be 
the result of the exercise of reasoning power and discretion, intentionally directed to the 
particular problem with the freedom of choice in acting in one or two ways.’
118
 
It is pertinent to note that Rule A YAR 2004 uses the word ‘intentional’ while English 
law and the statutory definition of general average in the MIA 1906 use the word 
‘voluntary.’
119
 The delegates at the 1924 Stockholm Conference
120
 argued that the word 
‘voluntarily’ was prone to several interpretations that did not imply quite the same 
decisiveness as ‘intentionally.’ After careful deliberation, the Conference elected to adopt the 
word ‘intentionally’ in the YAR 1924 to emphasise more clearly the idea of deliberate 
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 This was also to avoid arguments that an act was not voluntary when it resulted 
from the overwhelming pressure of the circumstances.
122
 
However, it is argued that though the word ‘voluntary’ may not imply the same 
decisiveness as ‘intentional’, the cardinal point is that from a pragmatic point of view, the use 
of either of the words will distinguish the resultant loss as a result of a general average act 
from a loss that is entirely accidental in origin which is the fundamental distinction. It would 
appear that Tucker J in the Athel case referred to both intention and voluntariness of the act as 
intention would be the ‘exercise by someone of his reasoning powers’ whereas voluntariness 
would be the ‘freedom of choice to decide to act’ in one way or another. 
(e) Success 
 
Only where the venture as such had been saved by some sacrifice or expenditure short of 
breaking up the whole venture does the sacrifice or expenditure give rise to a general average 
claim.
123
 The essence of general average is sacrifice or expenditure by one party to preserve 
all. In Kemp v Halliday,
124
 Blackburn J noted that ‘it is essential that there should be a 
voluntary sacrifice to preserve more subjects than one.’
125
  
The essence of the success of the general average act was illustrated in Chellew v Royal 
Commission on the Sugar Supply.
126
 The ship sustained damage to her hull and engines, so 
the master put into a port of refuge, thereby incurring expenses. After leaving the port of 
refuge, fire broke out and the ship and its cargo were lost. The shipowner’s claim, from the 
cargo consignees, for contributions for the port of refuge expenses failed as the entire 
interests at stake were lost.
127
 
The decision in the Chellew case was premised on the fact that if some property is not 
saved, there will be no fund from which the contributions can be made and also no 
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contributory value will exist upon which adjustment can be made.
128
 Therefore, no liability to 
contribute in general average will arise. Thus, there must be a saving of at least some of the 
property in peril.  
Of note is that Rule A YAR 2004 does not specify that success is a criterion for a valid 
general average act. It refers to any extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure that is intentionally 
and reasonably made or incurred for ‘the common safety for the purpose of preserving from 
peril the property involved in a common maritime adventure.’ However, it is submitted that 
the essence of general average act is the preservation of the common maritime adventure, 
whether as a whole or in part.
129
 Although Rule A YAR 2004 does not explicitly provide for 
the success of the general average act as a criterion for a valid general average act; it is 
argued that the requirement for success of the general average act is implied by a combined 
reading of Rules A and XVII YAR 2004. Rule XVII of the YAR 2004 provides that the 
contributory value of the parties in general average will be determined based on the values of 
the various interests at the port of destination. In other words, where no part of the common 
maritime adventure arrives at the port of destination, there can be no assessment of the 
contributory values of the parties as there will be no interest to assess its value and thus, no 




(f) Common maritime adventure 
 
The loss or expenditure must be made or incurred for the general safety and the preservation 
of the entire common maritime adventure. Losses incurred or expenses made for the benefit 
of only one interest in the adventure are not general average.
131
 For example, the expenses of 
lightening a vessel by the removal of cargo to enable her to refloat are general average. 
However, if in order to secure only the safety of cargo, cargo is removed from a vessel and 
forwarded to its destination by another vessel, this expense is not allowed as general average.  
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In Australian Shipping Commission v Green,
132
 Lord Denning remarked that ‘general 
average arises when the master of a vessel gives something for the sake of all ….’
133
 
In Nesbitt v Lushington,
134
 a stranded ship was in the possession of a mob that would 
not leave her until they had compelled the master to sell at about three-fourths of its price a 
quantity of the cargo on board. Lord Kenyon held that ‘… this is not general average, because 





 the vessel was outward bound in ballast to her loading port, so that 
the only interest at stake was that of the shipowner; the port of refuge expenses on this 
voyage was held not to be general average as they were made for the benefit of only the 
shipowner.   
However, under English law a general average situation can arise when a vessel is in 
ballast if she is under a time charter. In such instance, the charterer’s bunkers constitute a 
second interest.
137
 Additionally, a vessel sailing in ballast to load cargo under an existing 
voyage charterparty has the freight at risk under the charterparty. The freight is treated as if it 
is a physical property and will contribute in general average.
138
 It is submitted that in The 
Brigella, the shipowners could not validly claim general average contribution for the cost of 
repairs at the port of refuge as the repairs were carried out on the vessel’s outward voyage 
while the chartered freight was for the homeward voyage only. Thus, the ship during the 
outward voyage was the only interest at risk. 
American law, in contrast to English law, provides that general average is payable 
although there had been no cargo on board and only one interest involved in the adventure
139
 
as ‘expenses may be said to have been incurred as much for the interest of the 
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 This view has been cited with approval in an English case,
141
 although it has 
not been followed in any subsequent decisions of English courts.
142
 
The author agrees that a maritime adventure does consist of the insurer’s interest
143
 as 
well as other interests. However, it should be noted that in mercantile language the elements 
of a marine adventure are referred to as ‘the interests’ while in the case of marine insurance 
the subjects insured are referred to as ‘the interests insured.’ In terms of s 66(2) MIA 1906, a 
general average act must be made ‘for the purpose of preserving property imperilled in the 
common adventure’ and not ‘for preserving the interests imperilled in the common 
adventure.’ It would be more tenable if a common carriage adventure is considered as 
consisting of three ‘properties’; ship, cargo and freight. Each of these properties may have 
parties interested in it (such as insurers); nevertheless, for general average purposes each one 
is meant to be one property. Thus, it is argued that considering the interests interested in a 
maritime property, such as insurers, for the purposes of general average is a misconception of 




The sacrifice or expenditure must be reasonable and any sacrifice must be advisable or 
prudent with respect to the prevailing circumstances. Rule A of the YAR 2004 provides that 
the sacrifice or expenditure must be ‘reasonably made or incurred.’
144
 The requirement of the 
reasonableness of the general average act is also provided in s 66(2) MIA 1906. 
The requirement for the reasonableness of the general average act was stated by Tucker 
J in Athel Line v Liverpool & London War Risks Association Ltd.
145
 Expense was incurred for 
bunkers and victuals on a voyage where the ship sailing in convoy from Bermuda to Great 
Britain had been ordered by the Commodore in command to return to her sailing port because 
another convoy, ahead and also homeward bound, was attacked by an enemy raider and their 
escort vessel and others sunk. Tucker J held that the expenditure had been incurred as a result 
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of the master’s blind and unreasoning obedience to the lawful orders of a superior authority 
and was thus not recoverable as general average. In construing the wording of Rule A YAR 
1924 in the above case, Tucker J was of the view that ‘the language is quite inappropriate to 




However, in Corfu Navigation Co v Mobil Shipping Co Ltd (The ‘Alpha’),
147
 Hobhouse 
J assessed the master’s conduct based on the master’s knowledge of the prevailing 
circumstances. Commenting on the unreasonable act of the master, Hobhouse J noted that the 
master did not direct his refloating attempts having regard to what ‘he knew about the 
position of the vessel.’
148
 He further stressed that the master ‘had obtained tidal information 
over the radio’
149




In determining what is reasonable, it is argued that it is the conduct of the master in all 
the circumstances and pressures of the casualty which must be considered. It is further argued 
that Tucker J in his decision in the Athel Line case overstretched the requirement of 
reasonableness as the master at the time of obeying the lawful order (as confirmed by the 
court) had ‘no means of assessing the degree of risk’
151
 inherent in obeying the said order and 
had no practical alternative than to obey the order of a superior authority.
152
 It is argued that 
the master’s conduct was not assessed by Tucker J based on facts within the master’s 
knowledge or of which he ought to have had knowledge of at the material time. 
The Rule Paramount YAR 2004 in emphasising the requirement for the reasonableness 
of the general average act provides that ‘in no case shall there be any allowance for sacrifice 
or expenditure unless reasonably made or incurred.’ It could be argued that the Rule 
Paramount by using the wording ‘in no case’ has made the reasonableness of the act the 
paramount requirement for a valid general average claim under the YAR.  
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 In The Gratitudine (1801) 3 C Rob 240 (HL), the master hypothecated ship and cargo to a money lender on 
most onerous terms. The loss under the contract was held to be general average since the master had no practical 
alternative than to accept the contract.  
29 
 
V THE BASIS OF GENERAL AVERAGE AND THE NATURE OF THE CAUSE 
OF ACTION ARISING FROM THE OBLIGATION TO CONTRIBUTE IN 
GENERAL AVERAGE 
 
In analysing the nature of general average, a pertinent question arises as to the basis of 
general average. What underlying principle of law or policy underpins the obligation to 
contribute in general average and what is the nature of the cause of action that arises from 
such an obligation to contribute in general average? It seems that there is no all-
encompassing answer to this question. Several explanations have been suggested in this 
regard by jurists and scholars alike but a universally accepted view on the subject still 
remains elusive.
153
 However, this research will only analyse a few of the suggestions (as they 
numerous) of the basis of general average.  
Schoenbaum asserts that the basis of contribution in general average was to avoid the 
unjust enrichment of the party whose interest was saved by the general average act.
154
 This 
assertion is supported by Rose who argues that ‘general average appears to be part of the law 
of restitution for unjust enrichment although with its own specialised rules.’
155
 It could be 
argued that by sacrificing a certain part of a community of interest to save the rest, a benefit 
has been conferred on the part saved;
156
 as such the part saved has to contribute towards 
restoring the value of the benefit to the owners of the sacrificed part. However, this assertion 
of the basis of general average is flawed because unlike in the law of restitution for unjust 
enrichment,
157
 the measure of a contributor’s liability in general average is not the amount of 
benefit he has received from the claimant but a proportion of the claimant’s loss. 
Furthermore, the law of unjust enrichment is primarily concerned with corrective justice by 
restoring economic benefits for the retention of which there is no legal justification, to the 
person or institution at whose expense they were obtained.
158
 However, the law of general 
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average embodied in the Rhodian Sea Law
159
 does not lead to such a conclusion as the basis 
of general average contribution. Rather, contribution seems to be on the basis of equity and 
fairness, as the losses were incurred by the parties for the benefit of all.
160
 The contribution in 
general average is not primarily intended to correct any unjust enrichment on the part of the 
party who benefitted from the losses of others, but for a measure of equitable equalisation of 
the loss suffered in the preservation of the adventure.
161
  
The contribution in general average is also not based on tort as compensation in general 
average to make good the loss of a party is not based on the wrongdoing of any party
162
 and 
therefore does not give rise to a tortious claim. It has long been established that questions of 
alleged fault are kept outside the right to general average contribution.
163
 The issue of fault 
only arises after the adjustment process with respect to any remedies or defences that may be 
available to a party who was not at fault.
164
  
Could it then be said that general average is based on the principle of agency between 
the master and the interests at risk? In the circumstance when the vessel is in danger, it could 
be argued that the master being the authorised agent of the shipowner has a duty and an 
extended authority in perilous circumstances
165
 to act to safeguard the shipowner’s interest in 
the vessel
166
 and to fulfil the terms of the shipowner’s carriage contract with the cargo 
owners. The master could also be presumed, in perilous circumstances, to be an agent of 
necessity on behalf of cargo owners to protect their cargo though there is no contractual 
relationship between the master and the cargo owners.
167
 Alluding to this agency relationship 
as the basis of general average, Lord Stowell in The Gratitudine
168
 referred to the master in 
circumstances of danger to the common maritime adventure as ‘an agent and supercargo.’
169
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In The John Perkins,
170
 Curtis J stated that he considered that ‘… the master, in case of 
necessary voluntary sacrifice to escape peril, was acting as the authorised agent of all 
concerned in the common adventure.’
171
 Articles VIII and IX of the Rolls of Oléron seem to 
suggest that the master is bound as an agent to act on behalf of the parties to the adventure to 
safeguard their interests in times of peril to the adventure. Article VIII, in particular, uses the 
wording ‘it being in this case my duty’, connoting a duty on the master, coupled with the 
requisite authority, to perform a general average act in perilous circumstances on behalf of 
the interests at risk. However, it is argued that even if the agency theory is accepted to 
explain the basis of a general average act by a master, it does not explain the basis of general 
average contribution amongst co-adventurers for the re-distribution of risk and losses.  
It has also been suggested that contribution in general average arises from an implied 
contract to contribute by the parties to the adventure.
172
 Parties could be said to have implied 
in their carriage contract, in the absence of express terms, for the obligation on them to 
contribute in general average as the general average act was done to protect their interests. In 
Wright v Marwood,
173
 Bramwell J remarked that from the way general average is claimed ‘it 
would seem to arise from an implied contract inter se to contribute by those interested.’
174
 
However, it is argued that this is a flawed proposition as to the basis of general average. 
Again an examination of the Rhodian Sea Law and the subsequent sea codes
175
 that embody 
the law of general average does not support the notion that contribution is based on an 
implied contract between the parties but seems to be based on equity as a result of the 
exigency of the perilous circumstance the vessel finds herself in.
176
 Even if an implied 
agreement can be read into a contract of carriage, it merely explains the relationship between 
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the master (on behalf of the shipowner) and the cargo owners and does not explain the 
contribution in general average between the cargo owners.
177
  
However, in contemporary practice, it is argued that the basis of general average and 
the nature of the cause of action that arises for a general average contribution is contractual; 
as contribution is mostly based on general average clauses in contracts of carriage 
incorporating a version of the YAR. In Alma Shipping Corporation v Union of India,
178
 
where the YAR 1950 were incorporated into the charterparty, the court held that since the 
YAR were incorporated by contract, the claim was clearly a dispute arising under the 
charterparty and therefore contractual. This decision was subsequently approved by the 
House of Lords in Union of India v EB Aaby’s Rederi A/S.
179
  
Based on the foregoing, it is argued that in the absence of express contractual 
provisions governing the adjustment of general average in the contract of carriage, a claim for 
general average contribution is not based on an implied contract, tort, agency or unjustified 
enrichment, but seems to be based on equity
180
 and to give rise to a claim that is sui 
generis.
181
 However, if the contract of carriage between the parties incorporates the YAR or 
makes other provision relating to general average, the claim for contribution will be 
contractual.  
 





Though a unique feature of maritime law, certain characteristics of general average as a 
concept that pertains, among other things, to peril at sea and as a distributing device for 
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maritime risk and loss suggest that it may be similar or related to certain other legal concepts. 
Distinguishing general average from some of these related concepts, such as particular 
average and salvage, is apposite in this thesis with regard to analysing what sacrifices and 
expenses would be regarded as particular average or as general average under the YAR 2004 
by virtue of the changes introduced by the Rules
182
 and for the analysis of the IUMI’s 
proposal for the revision of Rule VI YAR 1994 on salvage remuneration respectively.
183
  
(b) General average and particular average  
 
Particular average loss is a partial loss of the subject matter insured caused by a peril insured 
against
184
 and concerns only the owner of the property concerned. It has been described as a 
loss arising from damage accidentally and proximately caused by the perils insured against to 
some particular interest, as the ship alone or the cargo alone.
185
 Common examples of 
particular average on a ship are collision damage,
186





 Particular average damage to cargo includes damage by sea water 
entering the vessel in heavy weather.
189
 Under a freight policy, particular average damage can 
arise when there is a partial loss of the freight brought about by failure to deliver part of the 
cargo; where the freight is to be earned on delivery of the cargo at the port of destination.
190
 
General average loss differs from particular average loss in that general average loss is 
incurred for the interests of all the parties in a sea adventure and contribution is made by all 
the parties to make good the loss. Particular average instead of being contributed by all the 
parties interested in the adventure falls entirely upon the particular owner of the property 
which has suffered damage. Where such owner is insured, he has a claim against his insurers 
in proportion, first, to the degree by which the value to him of the property insured has been 
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diminished by the damage and second, to the sum which the insurer has agreed to insure the 
property under the policy.
191
  
General average is, therefore, an exception to the principle of particular average that 
losses lie where they fall as the losses are distributed rateably among parties involved in a 
maritime adventure. 
(c) General average and salvage 
 
Salvage, though a concept that is distinct from general average shares certain similarities with 
general average; as such an examination of the similarities and differences between both 
concepts is appropriate in understanding the divergence in the English common law and the 
law of most maritime states on the re-apportionment of salvage expenditure in general 
average.
192
 For the purposes of this discussion, salvage could be stated to be a voluntary
193
 
assistance rendered to a maritime adventure
194








The primary similarity between the two concepts is that for a property to be a subject of 
both general average and salvage, it must be in danger. Though this is a similarity, there is 
however a distinction in the meaning of danger under the law of general average and the law 
of salvage. Commenting on the requirement of danger in salvage, Dr Lushington in The 
Charlotte
198
 stated that ‘all services rendered at sea to a vessel in danger or distress are 
salvage services … it will be sufficient if, at the time the assistance is rendered, the ship has 
encountered any damage or misfortune which might possibly expose her to destruction if the 
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services were not rendered.’
199





 ‘ … It is sufficient if there is a state of difficulty and reasonable apprehension … I think 
the removing of a vessel from apprehended danger and real danger, does partake of the 




However, in general average, as pointed out in Watson v Firemen’s Fund Insurance Co 
of San Francisco,
202
 the mere apprehension of danger by a master of a ship where no danger 
existed does not give rise to a general average claim. Such apprehension of danger would 
however suffice in a claim for salvage
203
 if the master of the vessel had received salvage 
services based on his reasonable apprehension of danger.
204
  
Another similarity between salvage and general average is that the property in peril 
must be saved for there to be a reward or a contribution respectively. In relation to salvage, 
Dr Lushington in The India
205
 noted that ‘unless the salvors by their services conferred actual 
benefit on the salved property they are not entitled to salvage remuneration.’
206
 Thus, the 
property which is in danger must be saved by the exertions of the persons engaged in the 
salvage for there to be a salvage reward. The International Convention on Salvage 1989 
(hereafter ‘Salvage Convention 1989’) also provides that only ‘salvage operations which 
have had a useful result give rise to a reward.’
207
 Similarly in general average, there must also 
be at least a partial saving of the interests in danger for there to be a general average 
contribution. In Fletcher v Alexander,
208
 Bovill J stated that ‘if after the jettison … the 
                                                          
199
 The Charlotte (1848) 3 W Rob 68 (Admlty) at 72.  
200
 (1866) LR 1 A & E 58 (Admlty). 
201
 Ibid at 60. 
202
 [1922] 2 KB 355 (KB). Cf chap 2 § II(b), IV(b) supra. 
203
 J van Niekerk ‘Salvage and Negotiorum Gestio: Exploratory Reflections on the Jurisprudential Foundation 
and Classification of the South African Law of Salvage’ (1992) Acta Juridica 148 at 156. 
204
 In the American case of The Pendragon Castle 5 Fed Rep 56 (2
nd
 Cir 1924) a salvage award was made when 
the only danger was an incompetent and apprehensive master. 
205
 (1842) 1 Wm Rob 406 (Admlty).  
206
 Lord Philimore in The Melanie v The San Onofre [1925] AC 246 (HL) at 251, referred to ‘meritorious 
contributions towards success’ as a prerequisite for a salvage reward.   
207
 Article 12 Salvage Convention 1989.  
208
 (1868) LR 3 CP 375 (CCP).  
36 
 
remainder of the goods are totally lost and so no benefit accrues to the owners of the other 
goods from the jettison, no contribution can be claimed.’
209
 Thus, there must be a successful 
outcome of both the salvage and general average act for there to be a fund from which the 
successful act would be rewarded or contributions made respectively. Another similarity is 
that, if successful, the exertions made to save the property in danger create a legal right to 
charge the saved property to pay a reward to the salvor or make a contribution in general 
average.  
However, the similarities between the two concepts end here as the nature of the right 
and time at which the right can be exercised differ. In salvage, the exertions to be rewarded 
are those of persons who are volunteers (strangers) to the common venture. This is because 
the equitable basis of salvage is to encourage ‘disinterested outsiders without any particular 
relation to a ship in distress.’
210
 In contrast, in general average it is the duty of those on board 
the ship to exert themselves for the safety of the interests involved in the common maritime 
adventure. Another distinction between the two concepts is that the time and place of 
assessment of the values of the interests which have been saved differ under salvage and 
general average. In salvage, the values of the interests that were at risk are assessed at the 
time and place where the salvage services end,
211
 whereas in general average the values are 




(d) General average and maritime partnership  
 
The communal risk sharing characteristic of general average suggests that general average 
may bear comparison with communal risk sharing device of maritime partnership. The notion 
of maritime partnership was employed in medieval maritime trade.
213
 The earliest forms of 
maritime partnership that existed during the medieval period were the commenda and its later 
variation known as the De societas marias.
214
 The commenda usually involved an investing 
partner (the commendator) providing investment capital for a managing or travelling partner 
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(the commendatorius) for a maritime adventure to be undertaken by the latter.
215
 The 
travelling partner contributed labour and skill and was obligated by the commenda agreement 
to repay the invested capital together with a certain percentage of the profit only upon the 
successful completion of the adventure.
216
 The investing partner alone bore the risk of the 
loss of the invested capital though such partner shared in a pre-determined fixed share of the 
profits of the adventure if successful. The travelling partner did not share in the loss of the 
capital but was entitled to a share of the profit.
217
 The later variation of the commenda known 
as the De societas marias involved two or more partners pooling resources
218
 for a venture 
with one or more of the partners continuing to provide skill and labour.
219
 Unlike the 
commenda, both or all partners bore the risk of the loss of the invested capital.
220
  
General average is akin to the De societas marias in that they are not primarily risk 
transferring devices as they involve the spreading of risk amongst co-adventurers and not an 
independent transfer of risk to an uninvolved third party. Furthermore, both involve the 
communal sharing of risk amongst parties to a common maritime adventure. However, the 
communal sharing of risk in De societas marais was based on a pre-existing contract as the 
parties could ‘agree amongst themselves as to the proportion of risk and profit each person 
would assume vis-à-vis the other parties.’
221
 Whilst in general average the communal liability 
to share the risk of the adventure arises automatically by the exposure of the various interests 
in a ship to a common risk and the parties contribute rateably for losses or damages suffered 
on the basis of the value of their interests at the end of the adventure and not on the basis of a 
pre-existing agreement between the parties.  
Furthermore, general average, unlike the De societas marais, generally does not 
involve the sharing of profit amongst the parties to the venture but the sharing of risk of the 
loss of a certain part of the community for the preservation of the rest of the community. 
However, it could be argued that the sacrifice of cargo or the incurring of expenses to ensure 
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the suffering of less damage to the common maritime adventure could be seen as a form of 
profit in general average. 
VII CONCLUSION   
 
At its inception, general average as a device for spreading maritime risk and loss amongst co-
adventurers
222
 was restricted to sacrifices made for the safety of the common maritime 
adventure and this notion of general average became the basis of the common safety principle 
in English law. As the concept of general average evolved it was extended in continental law 
to include acts done for the successful completion of the voyage, thus giving rise to the 
common benefit principle. This extended notion of general average is exemplified in the 
YAR which are presently the major source of the law of general average as they govern most 
general average adjustments globally.
223
  
Several explanations have been advanced as to the jurisprudential basis of general 
average and consequently the nature of the cause of action that may arise for a contribution in 
general average, but a universally accepted and satisfactory explanation remains elusive.
224
 
Despite the divergence of opinions, the preponderance of judicial decisions seems to suggest 
that where the contract of carriage incorporates any version of the YAR, contribution in 
general average will be based on contract.  
Though general average is a unique feature of maritime law that is independent of other 
areas of maritime law, it shares certain similarities with other legal concepts; although it 
arises automatically as a result of the community of risk that exists between parties to a 
maritime adventure.  
Presently, though general average is an independent branch of maritime law, there is an 
interaction between it and marine insurance in the re-apportionment of general average risk 
and loss where parties are insured against general average loss and where there liabilities to 
contribute in general average are insured. This interaction ‘drives’ the present general 
average system. Thus, a clear understanding of the interaction between general average and 
marine insurance is relevant for a proper analysis of what would have been the likely effects 
of the changes introduced by the YAR 2004 on the general average system if the Rules had 
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gained widespread use in the industry. It also explains the reason for the seeming tension 
between cargo insurers and shipowning interests on what should be allowed in general 
average as epitomised in IUMI’s proposals for the revision of the YAR 1994. This interaction 









This chapter examines the allocation of risk of general average in the maritime industry prior 
to the existence of marine insurance and the present interaction between general average and 
marine insurance in the re-allocation of general average risk and loss. This is to show the 
pivotal role marine insurers play in the re-allocation of the general average risk and loss of an 
insured party in the general average system. It is also to show that marine insurers by insuring 
the general average risk of parties and taking the assured’s place, with regard to any rights it 
may have against third parties, by the doctrine of subrogation have an active interest in the 
general average system and any proposed revision of the YAR.  
The interaction between general average and the principles of carriage of goods by sea 
is also examined to show how the principles of carriage of goods impact on the re-allocation 
of general average risk and loss because general average mostly applies to carriage of goods 
by sea and the carriage contract is the vehicle by which the YAR apply. This chapter aims to 
provide the basis for analysing, later in the thesis, what would have been the likely insurance 
and carriage implications/effects of the changes introduced by the YAR 2004
225
 on the 
general average system, particularly with regard to the transference of risk and cost of general 
average amongst cargo insurers, shipowning interests and hull insurers, if the Rules had 
gained widespread use in the maritime industry. This will provide the basis for showing 
which interest is more favoured by those changes and why shipowning interests are opposed 
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II THE INTERACTION BETWEEN GENERAL AVERAGE AND THE 
PRINCIPLES OF CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA IN THE RE-ALLOCATION OF 




Carriage of goods by sea is, and always has been the most significant maritime venture in 
which general average principles find application,
227
 and it is also that contracts of carriage 
by sea are generally the setting for agreement that the YAR,
228
 and the specific revision of 
those Rules will apply to most general average adjustments. Aside from these links between 
general average and the carriage of goods by sea, there is a further link that is relevant to a 
consideration of the allocation of risk of general average loss and that is that breach of the 
contract of carriage may have implications for claims in general average. It is this link that 
falls to be considered as follows. 
 




As noted by leading commentators, the importance of carriage principles in the context of 
general average is that the question may arise whether the incident that gave rise to the 
sacrifice or expenditure was caused by a party’s actionable fault.
229
 Another question which 
also frequently arises is whether the adventure has been or might be frustrated by damage to 
the ship or cargo or by delay.
230
 This chapter will consider the first question as it plays a 
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pivotal role in determining the re-apportionment of risk and cost of general average amongst 
co-adventurers through general average contributions.
231
  
The relevant fault is that of a party to the common maritime adventure in causing the 
peril that necessitates the general average sacrifice or expenditure. A common example 
would be the failure of a carrier to provide a seaworthy vessel at the commencement of the 
carrying voyage and that unseaworthiness causes the vessel to get into difficulty that 
threatens the safety of the common venture during the voyage necessitating making a general 
average sacrifice or incurring a general average expense. In this scenario the question that 
falls to be considered is whether the fact that a party’s fault brought about a threat to the 
safety of the common venture has any implications for general average claims that might be 




Rule D of the YAR 2004 makes it clear that any general average act necessitated by a threat 
to the safety of the common maritime venture, whether that threat to safety of the common 
venture was caused by the act of a party to the venture or not, retains its character as a general 
average act. It follows that such general average act is the basis for a declaration of general 
average and adjustment of claims for contributions by the parties to the venture would 
generally follow the normal course.
232
  
The Rule further provides, however, that the fact that a general average sacrifice or 
expenditure retains its general average character as such does not affect claims against the 
party at fault in causing the threat necessitating the general average sacrifice or the defences 




(iii) Effect of Rule D 
 
What Rule D seeks to achieve is to separate questions of fault from general average 
adjustment but to allow such questions of fault to be considered specifically in relation to 
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claims for contributions following the adjustment.
234
 In other words, the loss or expense of a 
party whose fault causes the common adventure to be in peril necessitating the general 
average act is included in the general average adjustment, but that party is precluded from 
recovering any claim to a contribution from any participant in the general average adjustment 
who has an action, whether in contract or tort, against such first party at the time of the 
general average act for recovery of loss attributable to the first party’s fault.
235
 Thus, under 
Rule D each party’s general average contribution is calculated without considering fault, but 
the existence of fault affects a party’s obligation to obtain the calculated contribution towards 
the redistribution of its general average loss or expenditure amongst the co-adventurers. 
So the general average adjustment and recovery process proceeds as usual subject only 
to the difference that the party whose fault brought about the threat to the safety of the 
common venture necessitating the general average act is not entitled to a contribution to its 
general average losses suffered or expenses incurred from any other party to the common 
venture who at the time the general average act was done, had a claim for damages against 
such party based on the party’s fault, whether in contract or in tort. 
  
(iv) Implications for allocation of risk 
 
The implications of this Rule for the allocation of risk are restricted to any rights to 
contribution the party at fault has against any person involved in the common maritime 
adventure who has an action for recovery of damages based on the fault of the person who 
would otherwise be entitled to contribution for its personal losses. Barring the party at fault 
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from claiming a contribution from such persons, results in such party having to bear the loss 
it suffered from its general average sacrifice, unless it can recover same from its insurer.
236
  
Furthermore, other parties involved in the adventure are entitled to any remedies they 
might have in law against the party who was at fault. 
 




The relevance of the carriage contract is that its breach may provide the basis for fault based 
action for recovery and as pointed out earlier, the YAR only have effect through their 
incorporation by reference in carriage contracts.
237
 Thus, it is relevant to consider the 
contractual obligations that may arise under a carriage contract, the breach of which might 
have an impact on the redistribution of general average risk and loss. 
 
(ii) Contractual obligations 
 
Most carriage contracts contain express terms agreed by the parties that specify their 
obligations under the carriage contract, breach of which will result in a breach of the carriage 
contract. For example, such obligations include the carrier’s obligation to provide a 
seaworthy vessel at the commencement of the voyage and the cargo owner’s obligation not to 
load undeclared dangerous cargo. However, every carriage contract is negotiated against a 
background of custom and commercial usage from which certain obligations are implied 




In contracts of carriage which are governed by any of the international carriage regimes 
(the Hague, Hague-Visby, Hamburg and Rotterdam Rules) the scope and application of some 
of these implied obligations have been modified and extended in some respects while the 
ability of the parties to exclude or limit their liability by mutual consent has been restricted 
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considerably. It is pertinent to examine the interaction between general average and the 
principles of carriage stated in these regimes to show the extent by which the redistribution of 
the general average risk of a party at fault has been restricted under each regime. This is 
because most national carriage of goods by sea legislation are modelled after these 
international carriage regimes. 
(iii) Recognition of general average under the international carriage regimes 
 
Article V of the Hague Rules
239
 and Hague-Visby Rules (HVR)
240
 merely provides that 
‘nothing in these Rules shall be held to prevent the insertion in a bill of lading of any lawful 
provision regarding general average.’ The pertinent question then is what does ‘lawful 
provision’ mean? Tetley
241
 rightly argues that lawful in the above context must necessarily 
mean any provision which is not prohibited by law and this would certainly include a 
prohibition of the Hague Rules and HVR.  It should be noted that Article III r 8 Hague Rules 
and HVR prohibits ‘any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract relieving the carrier or 
the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with goods, arising from 
negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this article or lessening 
such liability otherwise than as provided in this Convention ….’ 
Thus, article III r 8 invalidates any clause or provision that derogates from any of the 
provisions of the Hague Rules and HVR.
242
 This provision would invalidate any clause in a 
bill of lading which gives the carrier the right to contribution in general average from cargo to 




Article 24 r 1 of the Hamburg Rules
244
 provides that the Rules do not prevent the 
adjustment of general average under the contract of carriage or municipal laws. In terms of 
article 24 r 2, the right of the cargo owner to refuse contribution in general average is not 
affected as a result of a general average adjustment or the liability of the carrier who is 
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responsible for cargo loss or damage under the Rules to indemnify the cargo owner in respect 
of such contribution. 
Article 16 of the Rotterdam Rules
245
 recognises as general average sacrifice made to 
preserve the common maritime adventure. Article 16 provides further restriction on the 
redistribution of the parties’ risk and cost of general average loss by providing that the parties 
to an adventure will only be liable to contribute in general average were the general average 
act was reasonable in the circumstances.
246
 There is no such provision in the Hague Rules, 





 of the YAR 2004. 
 
(iv) Carrier’s obligations – Due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel 
 
The carrier’s fault under the Hague Rules and HVR is restricted to where he fails to exercise 
due diligence to provide a seaworthy ship before and at the commencement of the voyage
249
 
and such fault was causative of the damage to the vessel.
250
  
This was illustrated in Guinomar of Conakry v Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co 
Ltd.
251
 The vessel was in the course of a voyage with a part cargo of soybeans shipped at 
Reserve & Westwego, Louisiana, under five bills of lading. The contract of carriage 
evidenced by the bills of lading included a Clause Paramount incorporating the United States 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) 1936 with the consequence that the Hague Rules 
became terms of the contract. The contract further provided by a ‘clause 5’ that general 
average shall be payable according to the YAR 1974 as amended in 1990, if the owner shall 
have exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy at the commencement of the 
voyage. There was damage to the vessel during the voyage, the owners declared general 
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average and claimed the balance of cargo interest’s proportion said to be due under a general 
average adjustment made in London. The defendant insurer resisted the claim on the grounds 
that the general average expenditure was caused by the actionable fault of the owners in 
failing to exercise due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy at the commencement of the 
voyage. The damage to the engine of the vessel was actually caused by an incompatible spare 
piston supplied the owners. Dean J held that the shipowners could not recover cargo’s 
proportion of general average contribution because the general average expenditure was 
caused by the actionable fault of the shipowners by their failure to exercise due diligence to 
make the vessel seaworthy at the commencement of the voyage as a result of the 
incompatible spare piston that put the vessel in danger necessitating incurring of expenses to 
save the common venture.
252
 
Thus, under the Hague Rules and HVR, where a carrier has failed in his obligation to 
provide a seaworthy vessel before and at the commencement of the voyage and such failure is 
causative of loss or damage to the vessel; such failure would be treated as actionable fault and 




The Hamburg Rules has increased the level of responsibility on the part of the carrier 
and has imposed a greater restriction on the redistribution of its general average risk and loss 
than under the Hague Rules and HVR.
254
 This is because the Rules provide that the carrier is 
responsible for the goods from the period during which the carrier is in charge of the goods at 
the port of loading, during the carriage and at the port of discharge
255
 and also by virtue of the 
presumption of the fault of the carrier where a loss has been suffered by the common 
maritime adventure.
256
 The onus is then placed on the carrier to rebut such presumption of 
fault in order not to be held liable for such loss. 
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Article 1 of the Rotterdam Rules extends the carrier’s obligation with regard to 
exercising due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel beyond just the commencement of the 
voyage to an obligation that runs throughout the entire duration of the voyage. Extending this 
obligation increases the instances in which the carrier might be in breach and therefore the 
instances in which such breaches might endanger the common venture necessitating general 
average acts. Where the Rotterdam Rules apply to a carriage contract, the instances in which 
the carrier might be barred from claiming general average contributions are potentially 
greater in number. 
 
(v) Exceptions to liability for breach of obligations 
 
Under the Hague Rules and HVR, the carrier will be entitled to the redistribution of its 
general average loss and cost where the general average act was as a consequence of the 
negligence of its servants in the navigation or management of the vessel;
257
 provided it 




Art 5 r 1 of the Hamburg Rules however brought about a major change in the re-
apportionment of the carrier’s general average risk and loss by the abolition of the nautical 
fault defence.
259
 Unlike the Hague Rules and HVR that restricted the issue of fault on the part 
of the carrier to mainly cases of accidents as a result of unseaworthiness of the vessel, the 
omission of the defence of nautical fault in the Hamburg Rules has increased the level of 
responsibility and liability on the part of the carrier by making it liable for error in navigation 
or management of the vessel by his servants or agents. The carrier under the Hamburg Rules 
can only re-distribute his general average loss where he proves that he and his servants/agents 
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took all steps reasonably required in the prevailing circumstances to avoid circumstances 
necessitating a general average act and the consequent loss or damage.
260
  
The requirements for the carrier to take ‘all measures’ that could be ‘reasonably’ 
expected places a high onus on the carrier and it is argued that ‘reasonableness’ under the 
Hamburg Rules should be interpreted in light of the Rule Paramount where a version of the 
YAR is incorporated in the contract of carriage. Where a version of the YAR is not 
incorporated in the contract of carriage, it is argued that the test should be based on the 
carrier’s knowledge in the circumstances and of facts which he ought to have had knowledge 
of. It is argued that ‘all measures’ in this context includes measures required by sound 
shipping practices and requirements of safety and seaworthiness under any national laws and 
international instruments.  
As in the Hamburg Rules, the defence of nautical fault as an exculpation from liability 
has been omitted in the Rotterdam Rules as one of the defences available to the carrier.
261
 
The Rotterdam Rules, therefore, provide a greater level and period of responsibility by the 
carrier than the Hague Rules, HVR and Hamburg Rules.  
 
(vi) Jason and New Jason Clauses 
 
Despite the nautical fault defence provided in the Hague Rules,
262
 in The Irrawaddy,
263
 the 
United States Supreme Court held that the shipowner is not entitled to the redistribution of its 
general average cost where the general average act was as a consequence of its fault, even 
where such fault is statutorily exculpated. This decision led to clauses
264
 being added to bills 
of lading in United States trade asserting the carrier’s right to claim general average 
notwithstanding its excepted fault. The validity of such clauses was affirmed in The Jason
265
 
where the United States Supreme Court held that contractual exceptions in a bill of lading 
will allow a carrier who was at fault to claim general average from the cargo interests 
notwithstanding that the act was caused by the carrier’s contractually excused fault. Thus, 
without such clauses in a bill of lading in United States trade, a carrier who was at fault 




 Article 17 r 3 Rotterdam Rules.  
262
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cannot redistribute his general average loss amongst his co-adventurers even where such fault 
is statutorily excused.  
As a result of the decision in The Jason, such a clause inserted in a bill of lading was 
titled a ‘Jason Clause.’ This Clause has been expanded into the ‘New Jason Clause’ in the 
United States COGSA 1936.
266
 The carrier’s right to the redistribution of his loss in general 
average under the Jason Clause is subject to the condition that he had exercised due diligence 
to make the vessel seaworthy; if he had not, it mattered not that there was no causal nexus 
between his failure and the casualty.
267
 However, unlike the Jason Clause, the carrier’s right 
under the New Jason Clause is subject only to the condition that the casualty shall not have 




The question arises whether Rule D YAR obviates the need to include a Jason or New 
Jason Clause in contracts of carriage in the United States. It is argued that based on the 
decisions in the Irrawaddy and the Jason cases, Rule D YAR does not obviate the necessity 
for the inclusion of a Jason Clause or a New Jason Clause in a contract of carriage where the 
cargo is to be shipped to or from a port in the United States. In the absence of such a Clause, 
there will be a valid defence to an attempt by the carrier to redistribute its loss in general 
average on the basis that the need for the general average act arose from its fault, though the 




(vii) Cargo’s Obligations 
 
Cargo, under the various international carriage regimes, owes certain obligations to the 
carrier, breach of which will be considered actionable fault where such breach endangered the 
safety of the common venture necessitating the general average act.  
Under the Hague Rules and HVR the cargo has an obligation to the carrier to ensure 
that the cargo is sufficiently packed
270
 and that it is sufficiently and adequately marked.
271
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Thus, under both Rules the cargo will not be entitled to redistribute its general average risk 
and loss where it is in breach of these obligations and such breach endangered the carriage 
venture.
272
 Furthermore, cargo will be barred from redistributing its general average losses 
and cost where the claim arises from any act,
273
 fault or neglect of the shipper, his agents or 
his servants
274




 defects in the cargo or from failure to 
adequately declare dangerous cargo.
277
 This is the same position under the Hamburg Rules
278
 
and the Rotterdam Rules.
279
  
In addition, under the Rotterdam Rules, cargo will be barred from redistributing its 
general average loss where the loss arises as a result of the cargo’s failure to deliver the cargo 
in such a condition that they will withstand the intended carriage
280
 or where the cargo failed 
to provide information for the proper handling and carriage of the goods and for compliance 







The rights and liabilities of parties to a carriage contract are circumscribed by their express 
and implied obligations under the carriage contract and any applicable legislation. Breach of 
such obligations by a party to the contract will be considered as fault on the part of the party 
and such fault will be a bar to the redistribution of the loss of the party at fault where such 
fault endangered the common adventure necessitating the general average act.  
Such implied obligations have been stated and extended in the existing international 
carriage regimes. However, the Rotterdam Rules will have more impact on the redistribution 
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of risk and cost of general average loss
282
 than the Hague Rules, HVR and Hamburg Rules, as 
there will be less redistribution of general average losses and expenditure under the Rules, 
particularly the carrier’s loss. This is because of the continuing obligation on the carrier under 
the Rotterdam Rules to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel throughout the 
voyage, the exemption of nautical fault as a defence from liability by the carrier and the 
requirement for the reasonableness of the general average act.   
 
III THE INTERACTION BETWEEN GENERAL AVERAGE AND MARINE 




General average at its inception had no interaction with marine insurance as it predated 
marine insurance.
283
 It is, therefore, not part of the law of marine insurance.
284
 The parties to 
a maritime adventure remain bound by the principles of general average regardless of 
whether they are insured or not.
285
 A marine insurance contract by being a contract for full 
indemnity
286
 with the primary function of transferring
287
 and spreading the risk by an 
uninvolved third party (the insurer) amongst a community that shares the same interest is 
different to general average because general average only provides a form of partial 
indemnity for loss suffered by a party by redistributing the loss among his co-adventurers.
288
  
However, in contemporary practice there exists an interaction between general average 
and marine insurance in the redistribution of general average risk and loss. Thus, it is relevant 
to examine how maritime risk and loss was redistributed by the mechanism of general 
average prior to the advent of marine insurance and the present pivotal role played by marine 
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insurance in the re-allocation of maritime risk in general average. This provides the basis for 
understanding the active interest of marine insurers in the general average system and in any 
revision of the YAR. 
(b) General average as a mechanism for redistributing maritime risk prior to the advent of 
marine insurance 
 
 As pointed out earlier
289
 maritime venture in ancient times was fraught with dangers, 
especially in the Mediterranean Sea,
290
 were shipwrecks, usually caused by storms, were a 
frequent occurrence.
291
 This necessitated making sacrifices or incurring expenses by the 
master to save the interests involved in the common venture
292
 because of their common 
interest in the safe arrival of the vessel at destination.
293
 However, such sacrifices or 
expenditure gave rise to a practical need for a mechanism for redistributing such loss and 
expenditure amongst the parties upon arrival at their destination.
294
 Thus, general average 
emerged as the innovative and independent mechanism that was used for the spreading of the 
risk and losses suffered by parties in a maritime adventure.
295
  
 The question arises as to how the mechanism of general average functioned in the 
redistribution of maritime risk and loss prior to the emergence of marine insurance. 
The mechanism of general average in the spreading of losses and expenditure amongst 
parties to a common venture was applied by parties on the spot after a general average act.
296
 
Subsequently, upon the attainment of safety at the port of destination, the parties contributed 
rateably based on the values of their interests to redistribute the losses suffered or expenses 
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incurred for the common good.
297
 This loss redistribution mechanism of general average that 
applied on the spot was facilitated by the fact that merchants often travelled with their cargo 
in medieval times and constituted what could be termed a ‘pool of mutual insurers’ for the 
protection of their interests.
298
 Thus, there was no transference and spreading of risk by an 
uninvolved third party to a community with the same shared interest as the risk was spread by 
the maritime adventurers amongst themselves. General average, therefore, ensured a measure 
of equitable redistribution of risk and indemnification of the losses suffered by parties to an 
adventure as the parties themselves were the administrators of the system and decided what 




(c) The interaction between general average and marine insurance in the re-allocation of 




Though general average was an independent mechanism for the redistribution of maritime 
risk and losses, with the emergence of marine insurance, the mechanism of general average in 
the redistribution of maritime risk and losses ‘metamorphosed’ in its application as an 
interaction between general average and marine insurance emerged with respect to the re-
allocation of the risk of general average where the parties insured themselves against general 
average losses or liabilities to contribute in general average 
Thus, for an understanding of the present general average system, the active interest 
and relevance of marine insurers in the system, there is a need for a proper examination of 
this interaction that exists between general average and marine insurance in the re-
apportionment of risk of general average amongst co-adventurers.
300
 This examination is 
what follows. 
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 (ii) Allocation of general average in marine insurance 
 
In modern commerce there exists an interaction between general average and marine 
insurance because marine insurers
301
 presently insure parties against general average loss or 
expense and their liabilities to contribute in general average.
302
 This explains the statutory 
definition of general average in most national marine insurance legislation such as the MIA 
1906, though general average in not a branch of marine insurance.
303
 In practice general 
average costs are re-allocated on the insurer that pays for a party’s contribution to general 
average subject to the insurer’s subrogated rights with respect to remedies that may be 
available to the assured party against third parties in the circumstance.
304
 This explains the 
active interest of marine insurers in the general average system because of the involvement of 
their insured in the system.  
In reality, by providing cover for general average losses and expenses, insuring the 
liability of a party to make general average contributions and by taking the place of an 
indemnified insured by the doctrine of subrogation; marine insurers ultimately bear the 
burden of the cost of general average. Thus, questions of what should be allowed and 
contributed to in general average essentially have more impact on marine insurers as the 
paymasters of the general average system and such questions are frequently fought out 
between the respective insurers of the interests that were are risk. This explains the tension 
between cargo insurers (represented by IUMI) and shipowning interests (and ultimately their 
hull insurers) on what should be allowed in general average; particularly under the common 
benefit principle.
305
 Thus, it could be argued that the tension between these interests on the 
general average system is centred on the economics of the system in terms of the cost of 
general average each interest ultimately bears.  
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The basic principles of general average in a marine insurance contract are set out by 
national legislation in most jurisdictions
306
 but the parties may vary them by the terms of the
contract itself.
307
 Most national insurance legislation have similar wording with respect to
general average.
308
 Thus, there is a measure of widespread uniformity globally in the way that
marine insurance takes away the burden of contributing to general average from the insured 
interests at risk in a maritime adventure. The same approach is also followed in the standard 
marine insurance policies in the insurance market.  
However, the examination of the interaction between general average and marine 
insurance in the allocation of risk of general average will be primarily based on the MIA 
1906 and English case law. This is because the principles of marine insurance are well- 
developed in English law and most marine insurance policies that provide cover for general 
average losses and expenditure in the maritime industry are subject to English law and 
practice.
309
The question arises as to the basis for which the insurer could be held liable to 
indemnify the assured for general average expenses incurred or losses suffered by an assured. 
The principle which underlines the right of the assured to be indemnified by his insurer in 
respect of general average loss and contribution is that the general average act was incurred 
to avert or minimise a loss insured under the policy and which the insurer would have been 
liable for under the insurance policy.
310
 The assured is, therefore, only entitled to be
reimbursed for general average losses and contributions if the general average was caused by 
an insured peril.
311
 Where an assured has insured its liability to make general average
contributions and has paid or is liable to pay such a contribution in respect of the subject 
matter insured it is entitled to recover such contribution from its insurer.
312
 However, the
measure of what the assured can recover from the insurer differs in relation to general 
average expenditure and general average sacrifice. Thus, it is relevant to examine the extent 
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of the assured’s recovery for general average sacrifice and expenditure to determine the 
extent of the insurer’s liability in each case. 
(a) The extent of the insurer’s liability for general average sacrifice and expenditure 
 
Where there has been a general average sacrifice as a result of an insured peril, the insurer is 
liable to its assured as owner of the sacrificed interest for the full amount of such a sacrifice, 
not merely the proportion of the loss which falls upon the assured. 
313
 
In contrast to general average sacrifice, where there is a general average expenditure, 
the insurer is only liable for the assured’s proportion of the general average contribution,
314
 
unless there is a contrary provision in the policy, such as a General Average Absorption 
Clause.
315
 The amount of that proportion is however determined without regard to any 
question of insurance and as it would have been determined between the co-adventurers.
316
  
This raises the question as to the effect of the doctrine of subrogation on the incidence 
of loss in general average. By paying in respect of a general average loss the insurer is 
subrogated to the rights and remedies of the assured against any third parties with respect to 
the subject matter insured.
317
 But what is the insurer’s subrogated right in general average? Is 
the insurer’s subrogated right the same with respect to both general average sacrifice and 
expenditure?  
Where the insurer has reimbursed the assured for a general average sacrifice the insurer 
may exercise the assured’s right to contribution from the other parties to the adventure. This 
was exemplified in Dickenson v Jardine.
318
 The plaintiff insured goods under a policy which 
included jettison amongst the perils insured against. The goods were jettisoned to save the 
vessel from danger. The plaintiff sued the insurers for the whole amount insured without first 
collecting contributions from the ship and other cargo interests. The insurers contended that 
the plaintiff must first have recourse to its co-adventurers for contributions. Bovill CJ held 
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover from the insurers without first having recourse to the 
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co-adventurers and that the insurers having paid him would then be subrogated in his place 
with respect to general average contribution from the co-adventurers.
319
 
However, in the case of expenditure and contribution, since the insurer is only obliged 
to reimburse the assured’s rateable proportion, the insurer acquires no rights in general 
average against the co-adventurers
320
 but may acquire rights against co-adventurers for 
breach of contract or in tort.
321
 This was aptly stated by Barnes J: 
 
‘the proposition which is found in Dickenson v Jardine is wholly inapplicable to the case 
of expenditure … the captain who at this time, under ordinary circumstances, acts as 
agent for the person whose property is at risk, spends the money on behalf of all who are 
interested and all who are interested must contribute to it and therefore the shipowner 
ought only to contribute so much and then the underwriters, who have indemnified him, 




Thus, the principle in the Dickenson case will only apply to general average sacrifices 
as Bovill CJ in his decision specifically applied the principle to general average sacrifice and 
not to ‘a general average act’ which would have encompassed both general average sacrifice 
and expenditure. Also, s 79(1) MIA 1906 refers to the right of subrogation of the insurer 
‘where he pays for … loss’, alluding, in our context, to loss as a result of a general average 
sacrifice.  
It could be said that the doctrine of the insurer’s subrogated right in the context of 
general average, whether for general average sacrifice or expenses, is the vehicle by which 
insurers become active stakeholders in the general average system. Particularly, with respect 
to general average expenses where the insurer reimburses the general average expenses of the 
insured without having any right in general average against a co-adventurer whose actionable 
fault may have necessitated incurring the general average expense; it becomes in the best 
interests of insurers that there should be a restriction of expenses that are allowable in general 
average. This explains why cargo insurers are actively interested in restricting the expenses 
allowed in general average under the common benefit principle, particularly port of refuge 
                                                          
319
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expenses, as cargo insurers ultimately bear the bulk of the contribution in general average for 
such expenses as opposed to shipowning interests who usually incur such expenses at the port 
of refuge and in whose best interest it would be for most of those expenses to be allowed in 
general average and be contributed to by the other interests to the common venture. 
However, it should be noted that in determining the amount of indemnity for which the 
insurer is liable the provisions of the policy become relevant. In relation to a general average 
sacrifice, that amount is determined by the provisions of the policy and the general principles 
of insurance.
323
 For example, where the sacrifice leads to the total loss of property insured 
under a valued policy, the insurer is only liable to pay the policy value and it is irrelevant that 
the value on which the general average allowance is based is different.
324
 This is similar to 
the rule with respect to expenditure or contribution because under section 73 MIA 1906, 
insurers are not necessarily liable to reimburse the full amount of the expenditure or of the 
contribution, even where the property is fully insured, but only that proportion of it which the 






 have stated that a different rule has been laid down in the 
United States by virtue of the decision in International Navigation Co v Atlantic Mutual 
Insurance Co,
327
 where the court held that the insurers were liable for the full amount, 
irrespective of the valuations in the policies.
328
 Though a different rule was laid down in the 
International Navigation case, there is no uniform law in the United States
329
 on the subject 
                                                          
323




 The rule is that whatever is paid in contribution, by the excess of the contributory value over the value in the 
policy, is paid by the assured; but for whatever is paid on a contributory value not exceeding the value in the 
policy, the assured is indemnified on the proportion insured. However, although s 73(1) is only expressed in 
terms of contribution, in practice it is treated as applying also to expenditure. This is fully justifiable by virtue of 
the provisions of s 75(1) MIA 1906.  It is instructive to note that s 73(1) MIA 1906 merely codified the English 
law on the subject as stated in SS Balmoral Co v Marten [1900] 2 QB 748; [1901] 2 KB 896 (CA); [1902] AC 
511 (HL). See also Rule B 33 Rules of Practice, AAA. 
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as there are variations in the law on the subject in different states. Brown J’s decision in the 
International Navigation case was based on the New York rule on the subject. In 
distinguishing the New York rule from English law on the subject, Brown J remarked: 
 
‘The rule on this point in England and in the Massachusetts appears to be as the 
defendants contend. If the policy value of the ship is less than her contributory value … 
the same proportionate rebate is made upon the average assessment against the ship when 




In taking cognisance of the variation between New York and Massachusetts laws, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court in Gulf Refining Co v Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co
331
 
followed the English law as laid down in the Balmoral case. The Court held that the insurer is 
only liable to pay the policy value and it is irrelevant that the value in which the general 
average allowance is based is different. Thus, it was apposite for the learned authors to have 
explicitly stated that the decision in the International Navigation case stated a different rule 
on the subject only in the state of New York.  
However, in practice in the London market, the provision of section 73(1) is frequently 
varied by brokers’ clauses which provide that ‘for the purposes of claims for General 
Average Contributions and Salvage Charges recoverable hereunder the subject matter shall 
be deemed to be insured for its full contributory value ….’
332
 This clause makes the insurer 
liable to pay the assured’s general average contribution in full where the vessel is 
underinsured; thereby making the practice in the British market to be analogous to the New 
York rule on the subject. It is debatable how sound this practice is as the valuation of the 
subject matter insured under a valued policy would normally be the indemnity paid regardless 
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(b) When does the liability of the insurer to indemnify the assured arise in general 
average? 
 
A relevant question that arises in the examination of the interaction between general average 
and marine insurance in the re-allocation of maritime risk is: when does the liability of the 
insurer to indemnify the assured arise? This is more so, to show later in this thesis,
334
 why the 
time-bar provision in the YAR 2004
335
 does not apply to claims in general average by an 
assured against its insurer. Does liability arise when the general average act is done or when 
the proportion of the assured’s contribution is determined by an adjustment? 
This question was answered in the English case of Chandris v Argo Insurance Co 
Ltd.
336
 The plaintiff’s vessel on a voyage from St John to London suffered damage by an 
insured peril. Whilst loading ballast at London she suffered a further damage by an insured 
peril which necessitated the plaintiff making sacrifices and incurring expenses to preserve the 
imperilled vessel. On the question as to when the cause of action in general average accrued, 
Megaw J held that the assured’s right to be reimbursed by the insurer arises as soon as the 
expenditure is incurred,
337
 though the proportion of contribution which falls on him and the 
extent of his right to indemnity, depending on values at the end of the common maritime 
adventure, is subject to fluctuation until the end of the voyage and is usually not quantified 
until the publication of the general average adjustment.  
In Schothorst and Schuitema v Franz Dauter G.m.b.H,
338
 Kerr J in relying on the 
Chandris decision held that Megaw J’s reasoning applied equally to a claim for general 
average contribution made by one party to the adventure against another party. In Chandris, 
Megaw J appeared to take the view that the inclusion of the words ‘liable to pay’ in s 66(5) 
MIA 1906 had the effect that the cause of action against insurers for indemnity against 
liability to contribute in general average arose as soon as the sacrifice was made or the 
expenditure incurred.  
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However, in the recent case of Bradley v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd,
339
 Lord Brandon 
held that the right to indemnity under a liability policy does not arise until the assured’s 
liability has been established by the judgment of a competent court or tribunal or by the 
agreement of the parties. Lord Brandon in his decision in the Bradley case referred with 
approval Denning MR’s decision in Post Office v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Co,
340
 
where he held that the liability of the insurer to the assured under a liability policy ‘must be 
ascertained and determined to exist, either by judgment of the court or by award in arbitration 
or by agreement. Until that is done, the right to indemnity does not arise.’
341
 Thus, the 
Chandris decision, at present, may not be the correct legal position on the subject anymore in 
English law based on the above recent English Court of Appeal and House of Lords’ 
decisions on liability policies which would be deemed to have overruled Megaw J’s decision. 
The insurer’s liability in general average will only arise after the adjustment process and only 
where such liability is determined to exist by a court judgment, arbitral award or by 
agreement of the parties.  
 




Based on the above stated interaction between general average and marine insurance, in 
practice, cover for general average sacrifices and expenditure for the ship, cargo and freight 
are provided in marine insurance policies available in the insurance market. It is relevant to 
examine these policies to determine the extent of cover provided for general average losses 
and expenses of the various interests involved in a maritime adventure. This is because the 
practical insurance implications/effects of the changes introduced by the YAR 2004 on the 
various interested parties in the general average system and ultimately their insurers cannot 
be properly examined without an understanding of what is covered in general average under 
such policies and the extent of the liabilities of the various marine insurers under such 
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policies. However, the examination will be based on the wordings of the policies because 
there is no case law on the general average clauses in these policies.  
 
(ii) Cargo insurance  
 
There are three standard marine insurance policies under which cargo can be insured in the 
English market. They are the ICC (A)
342
 known as the ‘All Risk Policy’ which covers the 
cargo from virtually all risk with certain exceptions.
343
 The ICC (B), which provides less 
cover than the ‘All Risk Policy’ and the ICC (C) which provides the least cover to cargo. ICC 
(B) and (C) provide cover against only named perils.
344
 The ICC cover general average and 
salvage charges if incurred by cargo to avoid loss from any cause except those specifically 
excluded from the contract of insurance. For example, the ICC (A) provides: 
 
‘This insurance covers general average and salvage charges ... incurred to avoid or in 
connection with the avoidance of loss from any cause except those excluded in Clauses 








 In all these policies the 
general average to be covered is that incurred to avoid or in connection with the avoidance of 
loss from any cause whatsoever except those specifically excluded in the General Exclusions 
Clause,
348
 the Unseaworthiness and Unfitness Exclusion Clause,
349
 the War Exclusions 
Clause,
350
 and the Strikes Exclusion Clause.
351
 In other words, except where there is an 
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exception in the policy the cargo insurer is liable to pay for cargo’s contribution for general 
average even if the general average is not as a result of an insured peril as long as it is not 
caused by a specifically excluded peril. 
The wording ‘incurred to avoid or in connection with the avoidance of loss from any 
cause’ is an extension of the English common law position on general average with respect to 
marine insurance policies. Generally, in English law an insurer’s liability in respect of 
general average is limited to the subject matter insured by the policy and losses caused by the 
perils against which the subject matter is insured.
352
  
Furthermore, the ICC (B) and (C) cover losses caused by jettison.
353
 However, does the 
provision contemplate a claim in general average for every jettison of cargo, no matter the 
reason for such jettison? It is submitted that for there to be a claim in general average for 
jettison under these Clauses, such jettison of property must be made for the preservation of 
the common maritime adventure from peril.
354
 The requisite intent to save the common 
maritime adventure from danger is of the essence. The jettisoning of cargo without the 
intention of saving the common venture, even where it saves the adventure from peril, will 
not suffice. Furthermore such jettisoning must be directed at saving the common venture 
from peril because it is unlikely that the insurer will pay in general average for loss 
occasioned by such jettison unless the jettison is considered a necessary action in the 
presence of imminent danger.
355
 Where the jettison is of deck cargo, such cargo must have 
been carried in accordance with the recognised custom of trade for the loss to be allowable in 
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(iii) Hull insurance 
 
The standard hull cover available in the insurance market provides cover to the ship for 
general average and salvage where loss is incurred to avoid an insured loss.
357
 Unlike the 
ICC, there is no extension of English law in allowing losses caused by any cause except by 
the insured perils
358
 in the ITCH and IVCH. In hull policies, if there has been a sacrifice of 
the vessel the shipowner shall be able to recover in respect of the whole loss without first 
enforcing his right of contribution from other parties to the adventure.
359
 This frees the 
shipowner from the practical necessity of pursuing the recovery.  
Where the vessel is under-insured the insurer is only liable for a reduced proportion of 
the general average contribution.
360
 However, in cases of under-insurance the shipowner will 




It should be noted that the position with regards to cover for general average with 
respect to freight insurance is similar to that of hull insurance but what is covered in freight 




(iv) P&I insurance 
 
Unrecovered general average contributions from cargo are met in many circumstances by the 
shipowner’s liability insurer through a P&I cover. Cover under P&I Club
363
 rules include any 
proportion of general average contribution from cargo which is not recoverable by reason of 
the carrier’s breach of the carriage contract.
364
 P&I Clubs also cover the ship’s proportion of 
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general average contribution in case of under-insurance.
365
 However, in cases of under-
insurance most P&I cover stipulates that the shipowner is entitled to collect from its P&I 
Club the difference between the insured and contributory values, provided that sufficient 
periodic review of the market value of the ship was undertaken according to the Club’s 
rules.
366
 Under the YAR, P&I Clubs also cover the parties’ contribution for cost of measures 
taken to prevent or minimise damage to the environment
367
 referred to as the ‘pollution 









 where a shipowner has incurred general average expenditure he is entitled 
to recover only the ship’s proportion of that expenditure under a standard hull policy. The 
shipowner would then have to recover the balance from cargo interests, which in practice will 
involve the collection of a general average security and the preparation of a full general 
average adjustment by an average adjuster. In practice, collecting general average security 
from hundreds of cargo interests, especially with respect to container vessels, can be costly 
and time-consuming for all the parties concerned.
370
 If the general average expenses are 
relatively small, the process of contribution by all parties becomes uneconomic and highly 
undesirable for all the parties involved.  
The solution to this has been the inclusion of what is termed ‘General Average 
Absorption Clause’ in hull policies by which the hull insurer agrees to absorb or pay general 
average expenditure in full up to a specified amount, rather than just the ship’s proportion.
371
 
By so doing the shipowner recovers certain types of expenditure from his hull insurer 
according to the framework of the YAR, without the commercial and insurance community 
being involved in the collection of general average security and statements for cargo’s 
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contribution in the general average process.
372
 The effect of the Clause is that it limits the 
number of instances in which general average would be declared by the shipowner and 
ensures that only general averages that are considered to be high enough and economical 
would be adjusted. Thus, General Average Absorption Clauses remove the effort, time and 
expenses involved in the adjustment process for any general average considered to be too 
small for that expense or effort and therefore not economically worthwhile.  
Until recently, there existed different wordings of General Average Absorption Clauses 
in the market.
373
 However, in 2002, BIMCO recommended a wording for a standard General 
Average Absorption Clause.
374
 The BIMCO model of General Average Absorption Clause 
has been generally welcomed in the industry
375
 and many of the features of its wording have 
been incorporated in the IHC 2002. The IHC were revised in 2003 with amendments to the 
General Average Absorption Clause
376




However, the usefulness of Absorption Clauses can only be measured based on their 
impact in the reduction of general average declarations and the adjustment of uneconomic 
general averages. Could the Clause be said to be achieving the purpose for which it was 
formulated? This question becomes relevant in this thesis because most interested parties 
during the process of revising the YAR 1994 argued that there was no need for a 
consideration of the IUMI’s proposals as most of the problems referred to by IUMI about the 
general average system were being solved by the adoption of General Average Absorption 
Clauses in most hull policies in the market. 
378
 
It is argued that Absorption Clauses have had a positive impact in the maritime 
industry. As at 2003, it was estimated that about 60 per cent of hull policies globally 
contained General Average Absorption Clauses and this had helped to significantly reduce 
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the number of occasions general average was declared by shipowners.
379
 Though there are no 
current statistics on the subject, presently it is an exception to see a hull policy for an ocean 
going vessel of any kind that does not have a General Average Absorption Clause of some 
kind.
380
 It is further argued that the effectiveness of the Clause seems to be the reason general 






General average as an independent risk and loss redistribution device was administered in 
ancient times by the interests at risk in a maritime adventure for the spreading of losses 
suffered for the good of the common venture when the vessel arrived safely at the port of 
discharge. However, in modern times there exists an interaction between general average and 
marine insurance in the spreading of risk of general average where parties to the common 
venture are insured against general average loss or where their liabilities to make general 
average contribution are insured.
382
 By insuring parties against general average losses and 
their liabilities to contribute in general average,
383
 marine insurers play a crucial role in the 
continued relevance and efficiency of the general average system. Thus, a measure of 
equalisation of the insurance implications/effects of any changes in the YAR on the main 
competing interests (cargo insurers and shipowning interests and ultimately hull insurers) in 
the general average system is critical in ensuring the widespread acceptance and use of any 
version of the Rules as will be shown in the analysis of the changes introduced by the YAR 
2004 in the next chapter. 
General Average Absorption Clause in hull policies seems to have become the most 
innovative device in recent years in reducing the number of general average declarations by 
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shipowners and the cost of general average to insurers, particularly cargo insurers.
384
 The 
effectiveness of the Clause attests to the need for the Clause to be inserted in every hull 
policy in the market.
385
  
In a carriage contract, the breach of a party’s obligations under the contract will amount 
to actionable fault where such fault endangered the common venture necessitating a general 
average act to be done to save the venture. Such fault as a bar to general average contribution 
plays a pivotal role in determining the redistribution of general average risk and loss of the 
party at fault amongst parties to the carriage contract. Under the international carriage 
regimes, the extent of the parties’ carriage obligations and the breach of those obligations 
determine fault on their part and consequently, the effect of their fault on the redistribution of 
their risk and loss in general average.  
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The six changes introduced by the YAR 2004 may be reconsidered in the process of 
consultation leading to the formulation of proposals for the revision of the YAR 2004 to be 
considered at the next CMI Conference in 2016. The consideration of the effects these 
changes, as currently formulated may have on the general average system may provide 
insight into the objections to some of them raised by those interests that were opposed to their 
adoption in 2004 and particularly why shipowning interests are opposed to the incorporation 
of the YAR 2004 in carriage contracts. This insight may inform recommendations as to 
whether any substantive revisions to the YAR 2004 are necessary and if so, what form those 
might take. 
 
II ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGES 
 
Each of the changes are considered to show what was the position under those Rules prior to 
the adoption of the YAR 2004, the changes that were introduced by the Rules and what 
would have been the likely impact/effect of the changes on the general average system if the 
YAR 2004 had gained widespread use in the maritime industry. 
 
(a) Rule VI – Salvage remuneration 
 
(i) Background  
 
Generally, salvage expenditure has been treated as a general average expense in all maritime 
states except in the United Kingdom and has always been apportioned, together with other 
general average losses, over the values of the interests of parties to the common venture at the 
end of the venture.
386
 The divergence of practice in the United Kingdom occurred during the 
latter part of the 19
th
 century when British adjusters started to distinguish between salvage 
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and general average and treated them differently with salvage being apportioned over values 
at the place where the salvage services ended.
387
 This practice, it is argued, correctly 
underscored the legal distinction between general average and salvage.
388
  
In 1926, a Rule of Practice was adopted by the AAA, United Kingdom, which 
permitted the allowance of commission and interest on salvage awards. But this Rule of 
Practice still did not permit the re-apportionment of salvage expenditure in general average in 
the United Kingdom. It was not until 1943 that the divergence in practice in the United 
Kingdom regarding the inclusion of salvage awards in general average was finally resolved 
by a Rule of Practice.
389
 To ensure uniformity of international practice on the subject the old 
Rule VI was removed in the revision of YAR 1950 and a new Rule VI was introduced in the 
YAR 1974 which provided for the re-apportionment of salvage expenditure in general 
average, whether the salvage was performed under contract or not. This was retained under 
the YAR 1994. 
 
(ii) The change 
 
Under Rule VI(a) YAR 1994, expenditure incurred by the parties to a common venture in the 
nature of salvage, whether under contract or otherwise, is re-apportioned in general average 
provided that the salvage operations were carried out for the purpose of preserving from peril 
the property involved in the common maritime adventure. This has been changed in the YAR 
2004. Rule VI(a) was amended in the YAR 2004 to the effect that salvage payments will be 
re-apportioned in general average only if one party to the salvage shall have paid all or any of 
the proportion of salvage due from another party.
390
 The change effected is the replacement 
of the word ‘expenditure’ in the YAR 1994, with its accompanying explanation of 
‘expenditure’ that made it clear what was included in general average, with the word 
‘payments’ and the proviso that allows the re-apportionment of salvage expenditure in 
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general average only where a party to the salvage has paid all or any of the proportion of 




(iii) Interpretation difficulties 
 
The word ‘payments’ in the 2004 version of Rule VI is not defined nor is there any indication 
in the report of the proceedings at the CMI 2004 Vancouver Conference or in the CMI ISC’s 
report
392
 prior to the Vancouver Conference as to what the term means. This lack of 
definition raises a concern that the word ‘payments’ may be interpreted to extend to 
extraordinary expenditure such as towage or similar services incurred by a party to the 
adventure. This would have the effect of disallowing the re-apportionment of such 
expenditure in general average except where a party to such towage or similar services has 
paid all or any of the proportion of towage or similar services due from another party. 
Despite the difficulty in defining the term ‘salvage payments’, it is at least arguable that 
the term may refer to payments where the amount payable in respect of each interest is 
separately calculated, based on the value of the services rendered to that interest and would 
not extend to payment for salvage services where the remuneration is calculated on a time 
basis or fixed lump sum where only one interest is liable for the payment. Furthermore, it is 
arguable that the term would not extend to contract towage or similar services as the IUMI in 
its papers distributed before the Vancouver Conference was not concerned about contract 
towage as it was about ‘salvage payments’ and moreover, contract towage is mostly paid in 
full by one party to the adventure.
393
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 (iv) Effect of the change  
 
Thus, the extent to which salvage is re-apportioned in general average is now on very limited 
terms under the YAR 2004. It is however purely an accounting transaction, so that credit is 
given without the amount being considered as general average.
394
 However, the question that 
arises is what would be the likely impact/effect of the change in Rule VI YAR 2004 on the 
general average system. 
 
(v) Wider impact of the change 
 
(a) Favours cargo and its insurers 
 
Economically, the change introduced in Rule VI YAR 2004 will in many cases favour cargo 
and their insurers. This is because cargo and their insurers will save the additional cost and 
time required to re-apportion salvage expenditure in general average as they will have to 
cover only salvage charges. This will amount to reasonable savings to cargo insurers, 
especially where a container vessel is salved; as thousands of cargo interests may be involved 
in such cases.
395
 It is submitted that this change is the most significant change in the YAR 
2004 with respect to the interest of cargo interests and their insurers as it is estimated that it 
would be worth about 10 to 12 per cent of all sums shifted in general average from cargo to 
shipowning interests.
396
 Thus, cargo insurers will benefit the most from the change 
introduced by Rule VI YAR 2004. 
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(b) Favourable for hull insurers 
 
Hull insurers will also save the additional cost of re-apportioning salvage expenditure in 
general average. There will be a reduction in adjuster’s fees as the adjuster will spend less 
time on the adjustment due to the restricted number of salvages that will be included in 
general average claims
397
 and this will result in the reduction of the total general average cost 
to both cargo and hull insurers.  
(c) Both cargo and hull insurers 
 
Despite the huge benefit that will accrue to cargo and the minimal benefit to hull insurers by 
the change in Rule VI YAR 2004, both insurers may either benefit or lose as unfavourable 
differential salvage settlements (where parties settle their contribution to the salvage award 
separately with the salvor)
398
 or disproportionate legal costs will not be shared by the parties 
to the adventure. 
(d) Effect on salvage arrangements 
 
Based on the above stated effect of the change to Rule VI, shipowners may choose a Lloyd’s 
Open Form (LOF)
399
 type of salvage agreement (where each party is separately liable) rather 
than initially funding the whole salvage operation themselves. However, based on Rule XVII 
YAR 2004 the average adjuster will still have to ascertain the amount of salvage paid and 
deduct it from the contributory values as a special charge. Thus, it is submitted that the 
savings in procedural cost in the adjustment process expected by cargo insurers as a result of 
the change to Rule VI may be marginal. 
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(e) Further effects 
 
A further effect of this change is that shipowners may be reluctant in the future to make 
payment on behalf of cargo interests for their proportion of salvage remuneration taking 
cognisance of the fact that there will be no allowance of interest for the period that the paying 
party is out of pocket and also because of the abolition of a commission of 2 per cent
400
 on 
general average disbursements allowed under the YAR 1994.
401
 This would result in few 
cases where salvage expenses will be reapportioned in general average under the YAR 2004 
(except in some countries were the law mandates the shipowner to fully pay for salvage 
expenses and to recoup it from the other interests in general average)
402
 as the expenses 
would have been paid by all the parties to the contract. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the change in Rule VI YAR 2004 might 
enhance the use and effectiveness of General Average Absorption Clauses in hull policies.
403
 
It is argued that this view is tenable because the limit in General Average Absorption Clauses 
in hull policies was exhausted in the past in salvage cases by an actual payment for contract 
salvage or by anticipated award under LOF, necessitating the need to collect general average 
security to recover other items of expenditure.
404
 Thus, the limit to the re-apportionment of 
salvage expenditure in general average under the YAR 2004 could enable the full amount of 
General Average Absorption Clauses in hull policies to be available to pay the remaining 
general average costs in some cases, obviating the need to collect general average security. 
This would be invaluable to shipowners in determining whether it would be economical and 
necessary to collect general average security from cargo owners.  
It is argued that the limit to the re-apportionment of salvage expenditure in general 
average under Rule VI YAR 2004 could lead to a reduction in the number of declarations of 
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general average by shipowners as General Average Absorption Clauses in hull policies may 
in certain instances be sufficient to cover the cost of general average. 
(b) Rule XI – Wages and maintenance of crew 
 
The second change that falls to be considered is the change introduced in Rule XI YAR 2004. 
 
(i) Background  
 
Wages and maintenance of crew during the detention of a vessel at a port of refuge was 
generally allowable as general average in most jurisdictions; some of which admitted the 
wages and maintenance of crew whilst at sea, bearing up for a port of refuge and regaining 
position after leaving the port.
405
  
(a) American law 
 
In American law the wages and maintenance of master and crew while the vessel was at sea, 
during its detention at a port of refuge to effect necessary repairs and up to the point of 
regaining its normal course are allowed in general average. American law views such 
expenditure as having been incurred for the safe prosecution and completion of the voyage.
406
   
 
(b) English law 
 
English law did not allow the costs of crew wages and maintenance in general average. Under 
English law, general average was considered terminated as soon as the port of refuge was 
reached, so that the expenses in question were not considered to form part of the cost of the 
general average operation. Such costs were considered to arise from delay in a port of refuge 
in order to effect repairs, which, in the case of at least of accidental damage were costs to be 
borne by the shipowner under the carriage contract. In Power v Whitmore,
407
 Lord 
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Ellenborough in dismissing a claim in general average for a master’s wages at a port of 
refuge held that ‘general average must lay its foundation in a sacrifice of a part for the sake of 
the rest; but here there was no sacrifice of any part by the master, but only of his time and 
patience.’
408




In the efforts at achieving uniformity in the law of general average, the allowance of crew 
wages and maintenance was recognised in the Glasgow Resolutions 1860
409
 and the York 
Rules 1864.
410
 Subsequently, Rule XX YAR 1924 provided for the allowance in general 
average of crew wages and maintenance whilst at sea, bearing for the port of refuge and 
regaining position after leaving the port. This provision was included in Rule XI of the 
subsequent sets of YAR up to the 1994 Rules. 
 
(ii) The change 
 
In the change introduced by the YAR 2004, the provision of Rule XI(a) YAR 1994 is 
unchanged, but all reference to wages is now removed from the new Rule XI(c) YAR 2004 
which was previously Rule XI(b) YAR 1994; the paragraphs having been re-ordered. The 
allowance of crew wages and maintenance in general average while the vessel is detained at a 
port of refuge has been omitted under the amended Rule XI(c) YAR 2004. 
 
(iii) Effect of the change  
 
Under this amended Rule XI(c) YAR 2004, wages of master, officers and crew during 
detention of the ship at the port of refuge which was payable under the earlier Rules, would 
not be allowed in general average under the 2004 Rules.
411
 What is allowed under the YAR 
2004 is the wages and maintenance of the master and crew during the prolongation of the 
voyage while entering or leaving a port of refuge. ‘Prolongation’ in general average parlance 
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relates to the extra period spent at sea during a vessel’s resort to and from a port of refuge. 
The period commences from the moment the vessel deviates from the intended route, ceases 
temporarily on the vessel’s arrival at the port of refuge, resumes when she leaves the port and 
ends finally when the vessel regains its original point of deviation or course.
412
 Thus, what is 
allowed is the cost of the over-time in deviating and entering a port of refuge and departing 
from the port of refuge and regaining the point of deviation or regaining normal course. 
  
(iv) Broader implications 
 
With regard to the broader implications this change might have, Browne is of the view that it 
is difficult to estimate how much the change in Rule XI YAR 2004 is likely to save 
insurers.
413
 He estimates that much of the savings will be adjusters’ fees and administrative 
costs.
414
 However, Marshall estimates that because a substantial proportion of engine and 
mechanical failure general averages are built round crew wages, savings to insurers may be 




(a) Shipowners and hull insurers 
 
Though the percentage of savings to insurers cannot be stated with certainty, this change may 
cause shipowners to incur additional costs as the wages and maintenance of master and crew 
while a vessel is detained at a port of refuge (which might be for an extended period) will not 
be recoverable in general average. This is because ordinarily, crew wages and maintenance 
allowable as general average is covered under the shipowner’s hull policy together with the 
vessel without the payment of additional premium.
416
 Where such costs are not allowable as 
general average, the cost will not be recoverable under the hull policy and shipowners will 
have to find alternative insurance cover for such cost. This involves the payment of premium 
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for such alternative cover in addition to the premium paid under their existing hull policy.
417
 
Furthermore, shipowners will continue to pay the crew during the period of general average 
detention at a port of refuge, though the value of the crew’s services, in terms of contributing 
to the earnings of the ship, is lost to them. Hull insurers may also indirectly benefit as 
shipowners will have to take out a special insurance cover from hull insurers to cover 
separately the cost of crew wages and maintenance during the detention of the vessel at a port 
of refuge in addition to the existing hull cover for the vessel. This will result to more 
premiums being paid to hull insurers.  
Presently, it appears that no existing insurance cover in the insurance market can 
adequately provide cover for the cost of crew wages and maintenance incurred at a port of 
refuge. Loss of Hire insurance would not be the appropriate cover for such costs as Loss of 
Hire policies are usually subject to at least 14 days deductible,
418
 which means that if the 
period of detention of the ship at the port of refuge is less than 14 days, there will be no 
recovery by the shipowner of the cost of crew wages and maintenance. It therefore seems 
likely that shipowners would need to negotiate with their hull insurers for a special cover for 
the cost of crew wages and maintenance that would provide cover for the entire duration of 
the vessel’s detention at a port of refuge. Such a policy will be interpreted by the courts based 
on the terms of each policy. However, it is difficult to ascertain whether the cost (in terms of 
the premium paid) of such an alternative cover will be greater than the loss that will be 
incurred by shipowners as a result of the change in Rule XI. This is because the actual loss to 
shipowners as a result of the change cannot be ascertained as a result of the lack of 
widespread use of the YAR 2004 in the market and the dearth of adjustments based on the 
YAR 2004. 
Thus, the change in Rule XI places the burden of the cost of crew wages and 
maintenance at a port of refuge solely on the shipowner and ultimately on his hull insurer.   
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(b) Cargo insurers 
 
Cargo insurers will benefit from this change as the removal of cost of crew wages and 
maintenance will lead to a reduction in the total general average cost and consequently a 
reduction in the proportion of the contribution to be made by cargo owners to general 
average. Usually, where a vessel is detained for an extended period at a port of refuge, the 





(c) Legal implication 
 
It is instructive to note that the change introduced in Rule XI YAR 2004 is in contrast to the 
laws of most maritime states as the allowance in general average of crew wages and 
maintenance incurred during a vessel’s detention at a port of refuge has always been admitted 
as general average under the laws of all Civil law countries
420
 and the United States.
421
 After 
a period of uncertainty, it is argued that it is now also allowed in English law.
422
 The 
allowance of crew wages and maintenance during the period of detention of a vessel at a port 
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of refuge was also recognised at the beginning of the efforts to achieve uniformity in the 
principles and practice of general average.
423
  




Under the YAR 1994 the cost of temporary repairs to a ship at a port of refuge relating to 
damage suffered for the common safety or caused by a general average sacrifice is allowed in 
general average.
424
 Such temporary repairs to accidental damage effected for the safe 
prosecution of the voyage at a port of refuge are allowed up to the savings in general average 
realised thereby.
425
 The following example illustrates this: where the cost of temporary 
repairs at a port of refuge is US$100 000; if the cost of handling the cargo is US$60 000 and 
the cost of detention at the port of refuge if permanent repairs are effected is US$30 000, the 
general average allowance would be US$90 000. The excess of US10 000 is not allowed in 
general average.  
Furthermore, under the YAR 1994, the cost of temporary repairs at a port of refuge for 





(ii) The change 
 
The position under the YAR 1994 with regard to the cost of temporary repairs to a ship at a 
port of refuge relating to damage suffered for the common safety or caused by a general 
average sacrifice is unchanged in the YAR 2004.
427
 However, temporary repairs of accidental 
damage effected at a port of refuge for the purpose of safely prosecuting the voyage from the 
port of refuge are treated differently under the YAR 2004. Under the YAR 1994 they are 
allowed ‘without regard to the savings, if any, to other interests but only up to the saving in 
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 Rule XIV(a) YAR 2004.  
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expense which would have been incurred and allowed in general average, if such repairs had 
not been effected thereto.’ This provision of Rule XIV YAR 1994 has been added a proviso 
in the amended Rule XIV YAR 2004 that changes the calculation of temporary repairs of 




(iii) Effect of the change 
 
The effect of the amendment in Rule XIV YAR 2004 is that recovery of the cost of 
temporary repairs to accidental damage for the safe prosecution of the common maritime 
adventure at a port of refuge is limited to the amount by which the cost of the temporary 
repairs plus the cost of permanent repairs actually carried out but not at the port of refuge (or 
if no permanent repairs are carried out, the depreciated value of the vessel at the completion 
of the voyage) exceeds the cost of permanent repairs that would have been carried out at the 
port of refuge.
429
 The change in the Rule could be expressed as follows: 
 
TRPR + PR (DV) – PRPR = allowance in general average 
 
Where TRPR is the cost of temporary repairs at port of refuge and PR is the cost of 
permanent repairs actually carried out. DV is the depreciated value of the vessel at the 
completion of the voyage and PRPR is the cost of permanent repairs that would have been 
carried out at a port of refuge. 
The following example illustrates the effect of the change: A bulk carrier laden with 
coal from Saldanha to Lagos develops serious leaks in no 3 hold and enters a port in Angola 
as a port of refuge. Effecting permanent repairs at Angola would have cost US$1m. 
Temporary repairs are effected in Angola at the cost of US$200 000 and the voyage 
continues to Lagos where permanent repairs are effected at the cost of US$600 000. Under 
the YAR 1994 the US$200 000 is allowed in general average, under the YAR 2004 they are 
not. However, if the temporary repairs effected in Angola had cost US$500 000; US$100 000 
of those repairs cost would be allowed under the YAR 2004. 
The capping in this manner ensures that in the case of temporary repairs to accidental 
damage, the savings to the shipowner is brought into account before allowance in general 
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average. By this capping on the amount of temporary repairs in this manner shipowners may 
not recover the full cost of temporary repairs to accidental damage effected for the safe 
prosecution of the voyage.  Browne is of the view that there may not be very many cases 
when the proviso will come into operation but in a few cases each year there will be a 
significant redistribution of money.
430
 However, it appears that it is difficult to quantify how 
significant such a redistribution of money will be, especially as the YAR have not been 
widely used in carriage contracts and many adjustments have not been made based on the 
Rules.  
 
(iv) Wider implications of the change 
 
(a) Cargo insurer 
 
The change in Rule XIV YAR 2004 leans more in favour of cargo insurers as the shipowner 
in some cases may not be able to recover in general average the cost of temporary repairs 
effected for the safe prosecution of the voyage from a port of refuge and cargo owners will 
not have to contribute to make good such costs in general average. Even where a recovery of 
temporary repairs cost is possible under Rule XIV YAR 2004; the shipowner may not recover 
the total cost of the repairs effected.  Economically, this will result in lower costs and savings 
to cargo insurers in most cases. Shipowners will bear the financial burden of temporary 
repairs for the prosecution of the adventure that are not recoverable under Rule XIV and 
ultimately such costs will be borne by hull insurers as a particular average claim under the 
shipowner’s existing hull policy, where the shipowner is able to prove that the damage to the 
vessel was caused by an insured peril.
431
 Thus, the change will lead to an increase in 
particular average claims on hull insurers. Rule XIV YAR 2004, therefore, substantially 
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places the burden of the cost of temporary repairs effected for the safe prosecution of a 
voyage from a port of refuge on the hull insurer.  
(b) Cargo, shipowners and their respective insurers 
 
It is argued that the change will ensure a measure of equity between cargo and shipowning 
interests (and ultimately hull insurers). This is because shipowners will no longer be able to 
charge on the other interests a cost which at the end of the voyage, without cargo, allows the 
shipowner to choose the place for permanent repairs on the basis of individual economic 
considerations (such as cheaper repair cost at another port). This usually gives rise to large 
savings to the shipowner compared to costs which the shipowner (and ultimately its hull 
insurer) could have met had it, in the absence of Rule XIV YAR 1994, been obliged to incur 
by carrying out permanent repairs at the port of refuge. Thus, in contracts of carriage 
incorporating the YAR 2004, shipowners would likely not choose the place for permanent 
repairs of the vessel on the basis of the economic benefit that may accrue only to them.                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
(v) Further impact of the change 
 
The change in Rule XIV YAR 2004 may also lead to shipowners carrying out permanent 
repairs at the port of refuge (where there are facilities to do so), to the detriment of cargo 
owners who will have to bear the brunt of the delay with regard to the delivery of their 
cargoes. The delay could be avoided by the transhipment of cargo under the ‘Non-Separation’ 
principle in Rule G.
432
 It is argued that the change in Rule XIV YAR 2004 will curtail the 
activities of unscrupulous shipowners who might want to abuse the provision as a 
maintenance system for their substandard vessels as the full cost of temporary repairs 
effected for the safe prosecution of a voyage may not be recoverable in most cases.  
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 is charged on general average expenditure, 
sacrifices and allowances at the rate of 7 per cent per annum. In preparation for the 
Vancouver Conference, the CMI ISC on General Average identified two problems: 
 
(a) the variation of bank and other prime rates of interest over periods of time (the time 
factor), and 
 





For the first problem, the ISC proposed a partial solution, namely the provision of an annual 
review of the rate of interest fixed by Rule XXI. However, no proposal was made by the ISC 
for the second problem. This had the result of leaving the second problem unresolved.
436
 
With respect to the second problem, the predominance of the United States dollar as an 
international commercial currency had led to its acceptance as the currency most frequently 
adopted for general average adjustments. However, there are instances when general average 
settlements have to be made in other currencies that are subject to widely varying interest 
rates and severe inflation. The International Association of European Adjusters – AIDE (now 
International Association of Average Adjusters – Association Mondiale de Dispacheurs 
(AMD)) in its Position Paper submitted for the Vancouver Conference proposed the 
employment of Special Drawing Rights (SDR)
437
 or alternatively by the selection of ‘such 
                                                          
433








 SDR means Special Drawing Rights. SDR are supplementary foreign exchange reserve assets defined and 
maintained by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). SDRs represent a claim to currency held by IMF member 
countries for which they may be exchanged. The SDR’s value is defined by weighted currency basket of the 
four major currencies: the Euro, the US Dollar, the British Pound and the Japanese Yen.  As at 31 January 2014, 
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currency or currencies as may be equitable in the interests of the parties, having regard to the 
currencies in which the major claimants in general average have sustained financial loss.’
438
 
To solve these problems (the ‘time and currency factors’), the CMI ISC in the 
Conference proceedings voted to abolish the fixed interest rate of 7 per cent per annum in 
favour of a rate to be fixed annually by the CMI. It was considered by the majority of the 
delegates that the fixed interest of 7 per cent was too inflexible and that a system that was 
more responsive to changing economic conditions should be adopted.
439
 Rule XXII of the 
YAR 1994 was therefore amended to reflect the views of the majority of the delegates.   
  
(ii) The change 
 
The fixed rate of interest of 7 per cent on general average disbursements in Rule XXII YAR 
1994 has been removed in the YAR 2004. The amended Rule XXII YAR 2004 provides that 
the rate of interest on general average disbursements will be based on a rate to be fixed 
annually by the CMI Assembly; taking cognisance of certain guidelines to be published by 
the CMI. The CMI has subsequently published these guidelines which can only be amended 




(iii) Effect of the change 
 
(a) Shipowners, cargo and hull insurers 
 
The amendment in Rule XXII YAR 2004 will result in likely benefits to cargo and hull 
insurers as interest on general average disbursements (based on the rate to be set by the CMI 
annually) will be based on prevailing commercial rates and not on a fixed rate that may be 
arbitrarily high.
441
 It is argued that the change could result in losses to shipowners as the 7 per 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the value of one SDR was equal to 0.423 euros, 12.1 yen, 0.111 pounds and 0.66 dollars. See 
www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_sdrv.aspx, accessed 23 July 2003.  
438
 G Hudson & M Harvey op cit note 299 at 265. 
439
 R Cornah op cit note 4 at 11.  
440
 For a full text of these guidelines, see CMI Yearbook 2004 (Vancouver II) 363-364. 
441
 The rate of interest as fixed by CMI was 4.5 per cent for 2006, 5.5 per cent for 2007, 5.75 per cent for 2008, 
6 per cent for 2009, 4 per cent for 2010, 3 per cent for 2011, 3 per cent for 2012 and 2.5 per cent for 2013, 
available at www.comitemaritime.org/York-Antwerp-Rules/0,2754,15432,00.html, accessed 10 April 2013. 
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cent rate in the YAR 1994 was in some instances higher than the prevailing commercial rates 
thereby resulting in shipowners obtaining increased general average contributions for their 
general average disbursements as a result of the accrued amount of interest.
442
 Furthermore, 
shipowners could incur losses based on the fact that the financing costs of a shipowner’s 
business (and hence his general average disbursements) are most times considerably higher 
than bank based rates.
443
  
Economically, shipowners under the 2004 Rules will no longer enjoy a windfall as a 
result of the prevailing bank rates being lower than the fixed interest rate in the Rules as was 
the case in some instances in adjustments under the 1994 Rules. This amendment, it is 
argued, equitably balances the interest of cargo owners and shipowners with respect to 
interest on general average disbursements. 
 
(b) Further effect 
 
It is argued that the amendment would lead to fairer settlements and help avoid the situation 
witnessed when bank rates climbed into double figures for much of the 1970’s and 1980’s
444
 
after the interest rate was put at 7 per cent in the YAR 1974 (though the 7 per cent interest 
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 Between January 2005 and December 2013 the rate has varied between 2.75 per cent (2013) and 6 per cent 
(2009) averaging 4.3125 per cent. Accordingly, this represents an average saving by marine insurers of 2.6875 
per cent each year between 2005 and 2013 on sums moved in general average under the YAR 2004. See the 
Position Paper by IUMI to CMI questionnaire on the review of the Rules on general average, 36, dated 30 
August 2013. 
443
 AAA ‘General Average Interest’ (2012) 1, available at www.average-adjusters.com/GA%20Interest.pdf, 
accessed 10 May 2011. 
444
 Ibid.  
445
 The principle of a variable rate of interest reflecting market forces is compelling; the AAA United States 
addressed this question in 2002 by adopting the following Rule of Practice: ‘When allowance, sacrifices or 
expenditures are charged or made good in general average, interest shall be allowed thereon at the prime rate 
prevailing on the last day of discharge, plus 2 %, and continue until three months after the issue date of the 
general average statement.’ See Rule II Rules of Practice, AAA, United States. 
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Historically, commission was introduced in the YAR 1924 to act as an incentive to 
shipowners to put up money for general average disbursements.
446
 Interest on general average 
disbursements was also introduced in the YAR 1924 and this also serves as an incentive to 
shipowners to provide funds for general average disbursements at a port of refuge.
447
 Thus, 
both allowances served an identical purpose in the YAR 1924 up to the YAR 1994. With the 
practice of allowing administrative costs in general average adjustments in addition to 
interest, it was felt by the maritime community that commission could be abolished without 




(ii) The change 
 
In terms of Rule XX(a) YAR 1994, parties are entitled to a commission of 2 per cent on 
general average disbursements except crew wages and maintenance, fuel and stores not 
replaced during the voyage. However, commission on general average disbursements allowed 




(ii) Effect of the change 
 
(a) Cargo, shipowner and their respective insurers 
 
Economically, the abolition of commission on general average disbursements in the YAR 
2004 will be of benefit to cargo insurers as there will be a reduction in the total cost of 
general average to cargo owners. However, this will result in some loss to shipowners as they 
usually incur the port of refuge expenses and the existence of both commission and interest in 
the YAR 1994 led to an increase in the amount that could be recovered by shipowners in 
                                                          
446
 J Cooke & R Cornah op cit note 28 at 548.  
447
 Rule XXII YAR 1924. 
448
 G Hudson & M Harvey op cit note 299 at 263; R Cornah op cit note 4 at 409. 
449
 Rule XXI YAR 2004.  
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general average. The impact of this change may be that shipowners will be reluctant in the 
future to make payments on behalf of cargo interests such as for their proportion of salvage 
remuneration as the abolition of allowance of commission in general average reduces the 
shipowner’s total recoverable general average cost.
450
 However, it is argued that the abolition 
of commission is equitable as the existence of interest in the YAR 2004 is sufficient to fully 
compensate the shipowner for general average disbursements made by it for the benefit of the 
common maritime adventure; because interest accrues, under the YAR 2004, on general 
average disbursements up to three months after the issue of the adjustment.
451
 
(b) Position in American law 
 
Despite the abolition of commission in the YAR 2004, adjusters in the United States will, 
under their Rules of Practice, continue to make allowance for reasonable out of pocket 
expenses relating to general average.
452
 However, it is argued that this Rule of Practice is 
only applicable to claims adjusted in accordance with United States law and practice, in the 
absence of the YAR. If a contract of carriage incorporates a particular set of YAR, this Rule 








The YAR 2004 is the first set of Rules to introduce a time-bar provision. IUMI had proposed 
a time bar provision in the YAR to speed up the adjustment process which it criticised for 
taking too long.
454
 This is because hull and cargo insurance is a ‘short-tail’ business and 
insurers are always anxious to have a speedy closure of cases.
455
 Thus, a new Rule (Rule 
XXIII) was introduced in the YAR 2004 providing a time-bar for contributions in general 
average.  
                                                          
450
 B Browne op cit note 395 at 15. 
451
 Rule XXI YAR 2004. 
452
 Rule A2 Rules of Practice, AAA, United States.  
453
 See Cia Atlantica Pacifica SA v Humble Oil & Refining Co 274 F Supp 884 (DC Md 1967). 
454
 See chap 7 § III(f) infra.  
455
 G Hudson & M Harvey op cit note 299 at 270. 
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(ii) Provisions of the Rule 
 
(a) Issue of conflict 
 
Paragraph (a) of the Rule makes the provisions of the Rule subject to any mandatory rule on 
limitation contained in any applicable law. This takes cognisance of the fact that certain 
jurisdictions have mandatory limitation laws
456
 that apply to general average claims and that 
parties cannot by contract derogate from such mandatory limitation laws as the courts in 
those jurisdictions will not give effect to such a contractual provision. Thus, a litigant in a 
general average claim where the YAR 2004 apply has to first determine if there is any 
mandatory limitation law that applies in the jurisdiction where the action is commenced. If 
there is, then Rule XXIII will not apply as the national law on time-bar in that jurisdiction 
will apply. This ensures that there is no conflict between the YAR and national laws. 
 
(b) Extinction of rights of action 
 
Paragraph (a) extinguishes all rights of action in general average after one year from the date 
upon which the general average adjustment was issued.
457
 This provision is analogous to art 
III r 6 HVR which provides that all rights of actions where the HVR are applicable will be 
extinguished one year after the end of the adventure. However, a cause of action in general 
average under Rule XXIII is extinguished after six years from the date of the termination of 
the common maritime adventure.
458
 Thus, where an action is commenced within one year 
after the adjustment was issued, if the adjustment was issued after six years from the date of 
the termination of the adventure, the action will be time-barred. The fact that it was 
commenced within one year after the adjustment was issued becomes irrelevant. Succinctly 
put, all rights of action in general average under the YAR 2004 are extinguished after six 
years from the date of the termination of the adventure. It is argued that this provision is 
substantive and not procedural because it extinguishes the cause of action and not merely the 
remedy.  
                                                          
456
 For eg, art 263 Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China 1993 provides for a limitation period of one 
year for claims with regard to contribution in general average counting from the day on which the adjustment 
was finished. See also art 833 Maritime Code of Croatia 1994.  
457





(c) Calculation of time period 
 
Paragraph (a) of Rule XXIII adopted the English limitation period of six years.
459
 However, 
under English law time begins to run from the date of the general average sacrifice or 
expenditure,
460
 while under the Rule time does not start to run until the date of the 
termination of the adventure. The important feature of this provision is that it contains a time 
limit that will apply to all claims in general average, including claims under general average 
bonds and guarantees, irrespective of the issue of the adjustment and even if no adjustment is 
made.
461
 Also the periods in the Rule may be extended by the agreement of the parties after 
the termination of the adventure.
462
 It is argued that the purpose of this provision seems to be 
to prevent the parties from agreeing to extend the time limits before the termination of the 
adventure in order to discourage the parties from inserting provisions that lay down longer 
periods in their bills of lading or charterparties. However, since the effect of the YAR is 
contractual, the parties have the liberty to incorporate, vary or exclude any parts of the Rules 
as they wish. 
(d) Scope of the application 
 
The time-bar provision in the YAR 2004 does not apply between parties and their insurers.
463
  
This provision appears to be based on the English court decision in Chandris v Argo 
Insurance Co Ltd,
464
 where it was held that a general average claim under insurance policies 
arises when sacrifices were made and expenditure incurred and not at the time when the 
claims were quantified by issuance of an adjustment. However, it is argued that if the issue 
were to come before the English courts today, the courts might be inclined to follow the 
approach adopted in recent English judicial decisions on liability insurance which have held 
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 Section 5 Limitation Act 1980, United Kingdom. 
460
 See Schothorst and Schuitema v Franz Dauter GmbH [1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 91 (QB); Castle Insurance Co v 
Hong Kong Shipping Co [1984] 1 AC 226 (HL). 
461
 Rule XXIII(a)(i) YAR 2004. 
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 Rule XXIII(a)(ii) YAR 2004. 
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 Rule XXIII(b) YAR 2004. 
464
 [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 65 (QB). Cf chap 3 § III(c)(ii)(b) supra. The decision in the case was based in part on 
Noreuro Traders v E Hardy & Co (1923) 16 Ll L Rep 320 (QB) and dicta in Tate & Lyle Ltd v Hain SS Co Ltd 
(1934) 151 LT 249 (CA) and Morrison SS Co Ltd v Greystoke Castle [1947] AC 265 (HL) at 283, 312, and in 
part on s 66(3) MIA 1906.  
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that unless the policy provides otherwise, the cause of action is not treated as having arisen 
until the insurer’s liability to the assured is established by judgment, arbitral award or 
agreement.
465
 This is because those decisions would be deemed to have overruled the 
decision in the Chandris case. 
(e) Impact of the change 
 
It is argued that the time bar provision in the YAR 2004 is a laudable provision as it seeks to 
ensure that adjustments are carried out without undue delay and that claims are not left open 
indefinitely. Economically, this is to the advantage of insurers; particularly cargo insurers, as 
it reduces the cost of the adjustment process especially as there will be a reduction in the 
adjuster’s fees and the interest accruing on disbursements by shipowners where the 
adjustment is not unduly delayed.
466
 Furthermore, the subservience of the Rule to national 
laws on time-bars is in the best interest of the maritime community as confusion and 
unnecessary litigation will be avoided in determining what law on time-bar will be applicable 




The changes introduced by the YAR 2004 were a significant step in the reallocation of risk 
and cost of general average from cargo insurers to hull insurers. These changes were the most 
significant step since the emergence of the YAR towards the reduction of the sums paid in 
general average as a risk and loss redistribution mechanism. With this reduction in the sums 
paid in general average, particularly by cargo insurers, it appears that the changes introduced 
by the 2004 Rules intend to favour cargo insurers instead of achieving a compromise that 
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 See Post Office v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society [1967] 2 QB 363 (CA) and Bradley v Eagle Star 
Insurance Co [1989] AC 957 (HL), in neither of which was the Chandris case cited to the court or referred in 
the courts’ judgments. Even though the decision in the Chandris case was approved by the Privy Council in 
Castle Insurance Co v Hong Kong Shipping Co Ltd [1984] AC 226 (PC) at 236-238, that was a case under an 
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 Under Rule XXII YAR 1994 interest is allowed at the rate of 7 per cent per annum on expenditure, sacrifices 
and allowances charged to general average until three months after the date of the general average adjustment. 
Thus the shorter the period taken in the adjustment, the lower will be the amount of interest that will accrue. 
This will lower the total general average costs and the contributions to be made by cargo interests. See H 
Myerson ‘General Average - A Working Adjuster’s View’ (1995) 26 JMLC 465 at 473.  
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ensures a measure of equitable balance of all commercial interests in the general average 
system. Browne remarks that; 
 
‘The principal gainers under the 2004 Rules will be the cargo underwriters. It is 
estimated that the effect on hull underwriters will be but less pronounced. The effect on 




The above effect of the changes introduced by the YAR 2004 highlights the reason 
shipowning interests are opposed to the Rules as the Rules do not provide a measure of 
equitable balance of the interests of shipowning and insurance interests. It appears that these 
changes would primarily result in the transference of cost in general average from cargo to 
hull insurers. Despite the highlighted equitable aspects of the changes introduced by the YAR 
2004, the huge benefits cargo insurers would have by virtue of the changes introduced by the 
Rules in contrast to the marginal benefits to shipowning interests and their hull insurers 
depicts the YAR 2004 as a set of Rules that primarily serves the interest of cargo insurers. 
This explains the opposition of shipowning interests to the incorporation of the YAR 2004 in 
carriage contracts which militated against the widespread acceptance and use of the Rules in 
the maritime industry as is shown in the next chapter. This reinforces the need for the review 
of the changes introduced by the YAR 2004 by the present CMI IWG on general average in 
the current efforts at reviewing the Rules on general average. This is to identify the changes 
in the YAR 2004 that could be carried forward, as presently formulated, in the new Rules to 
be adopted and those that could be revised to ensure that the new Rules to be adopted would 
be accepted by all interested parties as a set of Rules that balances all commercial interests in 
the general average system.  
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  B Browne ‘New York-Antwerp Rules Agreed’ (2004) 18 Maritime Risk International 7 at 10. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE LACK OF WIDESPREAD USE OF THE YAR 2004 AND THE 




This chapter aims to show that the YAR 2004 Rules have failed to gain widespread use in 
carriage contracts in the maritime industry and that the Rules have not been enacted into 
legislation in maritime states; particularly in the Scandinavian countries that had enacted 
previous versions of the YAR in national legislation.
468
 The examination will provide a broad 
overview of post-Vancouver developments in the maritime industry and in maritime states 
with regard to the YAR 2004 to determine the factors and forces that influenced the lack of 
widespread use of the Rules in the maritime industry and national positions on the Rules. 
This is aimed at determining the reasons for the low level of acceptance and use of the YAR 
2004 globally; to determine whether those reasons have substance or not and whether they 
should be taken into account or disregarded in the process going forward.  
The chapter also aims to identify the reasons for the abortive efforts by the CMI in 
2012 at achieving widespread use of the Rules in carriage contracts which resulted in the 
current efforts towards adopting a new set of Rules in 2016. This will assist in identifying 
why the proposals that were made for the substantive revision of the YAR 2004 were not 
adopted. In providing a broad and analytical overview of post-Vancouver developments with 
regard to the YAR 2004, this chapter assists in informing the recommendations that will be 
made as regard the substantive changes to the YAR 2004 to ensure that proposals would be 
made that may be acceptable to all interests in the general average system towards enhancing 
the requisite level of acceptance and use of the new Rules to be adopted. 
 




The YAR 2004 were approved at the CMI Vancouver Conference in 2004 despite strong 
                                                          
468
 Some of the information in this chapter is based on communications the author had with various stakeholders 
and experts in the industry on the YAR 2004 as a result of the dearth of published works on some of the topics 
discussed in this chapter. The communications are contained in a file. 
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opposition by shipowning interests represented by the ICS, BIMCO, International 
Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) and International Association 
of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO).
469
 These interests were of the view that 
significant change was not justified at the time as the 1994 Rules had just been introduced in 
the market and that a number of the problems which had caused concern to the IUMI had 
been remedied by developments such as the introduction of General Average Absorption 
Clauses in hull policies.
470
 It is relevant to examine the post-Vancouver reaction to the YAR 
2004 by some of these shipowning interests and other interested parties to determine the 





BIMCO was the first shipowning interest to fire a salvo against the incorporation of the YAR 
2004 into contracts of carriage having vehemently opposed the revision of the YAR 1994 
prior to the Vancouver Conference. BIMCO through all its post-Vancouver documents has 
tried to ensure that the YAR 2004 are not incorporated into carriage contracts. Its influence 
amongst shipowning interests globally is significant
471
 and plays a huge part in the 
acceptance or rejection of any version of the YAR amongst shipowning interests and 
ultimately in most maritime states. This is because most shipowning interests are members of 
BIMCO and most standard carriage documents that are used in the market are published by 
or in collaboration with BIMCO.
472
 Presently, ‘BIMCO’s level of acceptance of the YAR 
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 R Cornah op cit note 4 at 4. 
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 See chap 7 § V(c)(ii)(c) infra. 
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(2012) Zentra Working Papers in Transnational Studies No 03, 1 at 5. 
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(i) BIMCO Special Circular No 1, July 2007 
 
BIMCO in reaction to the changes introduced by the YAR 2004 issued a Special Circular in 
2005, which was updated in 2007, urging its members not to incorporate the YAR 2004 in 
their contracts of carriage on the ground that the Rules are less favourable to shipowners and 
will lead to the transfer of certain cost from cargo insurers to hull insurers.
474
  
Prior to 2005, BIMCO’s charterparties and other standard documents contained general 
average clauses that referred either to the YAR 1974 or the YAR 1994. While general 
average is still adjusted in a number of cases in accordance with the YAR 1974, BIMCO 
recommended to its members that general average should be adjusted in accordance with the 
YAR 1994 in respect of new and revised charterparties.
475
 It stated that the previously used 
additional text to the effect of ‘or any subsequent modification thereto’ will no longer be used 
in its documents.
476
 It was of the view that the removal of the wording ‘or any subsequent 
modification thereto’ was to prevent the YAR 2004 from being used in its standard 
documents as an amendment to the YAR 1994.  
This raises the question as to whether there was a need for the removal of the wording 
‘or any subsequent modification thereto’ in BIMCO’s standard carriage documents. There are 
divergent views on the status of the YAR 2004 as to whether they are a new set of Rules or 
an amendment of the YAR 1994. Browne argues that the YAR are an amendment of the 
YAR 1994 and not a new set of Rules.
477
 In contrast, Cornah asserts that it was agreed in both 
the ISC and plenary sessions at the Vancouver Conference that the new Rules should be 
given the title of ‘YAR 2004’ to make it clear that these were not simply an amendment to or 
modification of the YAR 1994 but a new set of Rules.
478
 Lending credence to Cornah’s 
assertion, Bent Nielsen (Chairman of the then CMI ISC on General Average) in his 
presentation on the 2004 Rules stated: 
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 See BIMCO Special Circular op cit note 6. See also chap 4 supra on the likely effects of the changes 
introduced by the YAR 2004. 
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 B Browne op cit note 396 at 1. 
478
 R Cornah op cit note 4 at 4. See also J Spencer ‘Hull Insurance and General Average – Some Current Issues’ 
(2009) 83 Tulane Law Review 1227 at 1247. 
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‘The CMI at its Conference held in Vancouver 31 May – 4 June 2004 has completed a 
revision of the YAR 1994 and approved a new text to be referred to as YAR 2004. The 
new rules are set out below … The CMI will publish a printed version of the new Rules 
….’
479
 (Emphasis added) 
 
From the above extract, it is argued that the word ‘amended’ used in the first paragraph 
of the Resolution
480
 adopting the 2004 Rules at the plenary session in Vancouver was a 
wrong choice of word as what was done at the Conference was not an amendment of the 
YAR 1994 but the approval of a new set of Rules. The intention of the ISC and the delegates 
at the Conference is clear from the above extract. It is argued that paragraph one of the 
Resolution adopting the Rules at the plenary session read with the preamble to Bent Nielsen’s 
presentation on the YAR 2004 leads to the inexorable conclusion that the YAR 2004 are a 
new set of Rules.
481
 Thus, there was no need for the removal of the phrase ‘any subsequent 






The crux of BIMCO’s opposition to the 2004 Rules is that the recovery of allowances in 
general average by shipowners has been curtailed under Rules VI, XI, XIV and XX of the 
2004 Rules
483
 despite the laudable provisions in Rules XXI and XXIII which shipowning 
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interests are not particularly opposed to. The Special Circular
484
 shows that BIMCO’s main 
reason for opposing the changes introduced by the YAR 2004 is that they will lead to the 
transfer of certain cost from cargo insurers to hull insurers. This is because shipowners (and 
ultimately their hull insurers) alone will bear the cost of certain expenses (particularly port of 
refuge expenses) in general average and pay additional premium for special cover in some 
instances as shown earlier in this thesis.
485
 It is argued that instead of entirely rejecting the 
2004 Rules, BIMCO could have encouraged its members to use the Rules and replace the 
provisions they are opposed to with the provisions of the YAR 1994 that are acceptable to 
shipowners; since parties who agree to be bound by the YAR are not automatically bound by 
the latest edition
486
 and have the contractual right to merge the provisions of two or more 




(c) INTERTANKO  
 
INTERTANKO adopted the same approach as other shipowning interests in opposing the 
revision of the YAR 1994 and supported the submission of the ICS to the CMI on the 
proposed revision of the YAR 1994.
488
 However, unlike BIMCO, INTERTANKO since the 
Vancouver Conference has neither officially expressed its opposition to the YAR 2004 nor 
advised its members against the incorporation of the 2004 Rules in their contracts of carriage. 
Presently, the only charterparty form in the market that makes reference to the YAR 2004 is 
the EMVOY 2005
489
 issued by INTERTANKO. Clause 27(iii) EMVOY 2005 provides: 
 
‘General average shall be adjusted, stated, and settled according to the York-Antwerp 
Rules 1994 2004 (‘Rules’) and, as to matters not provided for by those Rules, according 
to the laws and usages at the port of New York ….’ 
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However, other INTERTANKO post-Vancouver charterparty forms such as 
SHELLVOY 2006
490
 provides that general average shall be settled according to the YAR 
1994. It is argued that the failure by INTERTANKO to issue any official statement to date of 
its acceptance or rejection of the YAR 2004 seems to suggest that it has relaxed its opposition 
to the Rules as the EMVOY 2005 is being used by charterers of the vessels of its members in 
the United States.
491
 However, the non-incorporation of the 2004 Rules in its other post-2004 




ICS as stated above was the only shipping organisation that made a submission to the CMI 
(supported by BIMCO, INTERTANKO and INTERCARGO) and argued against the revision 
of the YAR 1994.
492
 After the Vancouver Conference, the ICS issued a report on the outcome 
of the Vancouver Conference.
493
 In the report, the ICS reiterated its earlier position that the 
shipping industry (especially shipowning/chartering interests) still remained unconvinced 
about the need for change at the time and that the changes produced would only result to 
some extent in the transference of costs between insurers.
494 
It further stated that there would 
likely be uncertainty and resulting questions of interpretation about the new provisions.
495
 
The ICS then advised shipowners ‘to review the new provisions, probably guided by whether 
existing more comprehensive cover can be maintained at no additional cost, before taking a 




The tenor of the report and particularly the above advice shows a ‘diplomatic’ approach 
to the new Rules, as ICS (unlike BIMCO) did not unequivocally advise shipowners against 
the use of the YAR 2004. However, it could be evinced from the advice the expectation of 
the ICS that shipowners after reviewing the benefits accruing to them under the YAR 1994, 
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which have been curtailed by the changes introduced by the YAR 2004 and the additional 
cost of insurance cover for some of the expenses that will not be recoverable under the 2004 
Rules,
497
 would opt to continue incorporating the YAR 1994 or even the YAR 1974 in their 
carriage contracts. 
 
(e) Shipping companies 
 
General average has been stated to be mostly declared by container-shipping companies 
annually.
498
 Thus the acceptance of the YAR 2004 by shipping companies (particularly 
container-shipping companies) is critical to the use of the Rules in the market; hence, 
Nielsen’s advice to IUMI to lobby for the development of a new BOXTIME.
499
 The largest 
shipping companies in the world,
500
 as carriers, have their standard bills of lading which they 
use in contracts of carriage and which contain general average clauses.  
The 2004 Rules to date have not found favour with these shipping companies as the 
Rules have not been incorporated into their bills of lading.
501
 The bill of lading terms of these 
companies continue to provide that general average shall be adjusted in accordance with the 
YAR 1994.
502
 The bill of lading terms of these shipping companies underline the continued 
opposition by the shipowning community to the incorporation of the YAR 2004 in standard 
carriage contracts as a result of its opposition to the changes introduced by the Rules. 
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IUMI achieved a partial success in its call for the revision of the YAR 1994 as a result of the 
changes introduced by the YAR 2004.
503
 Shortly after the Vancouver Conference, IUMI held 
its Annual Conference in Singapore in September 2004.
504
 At the Conference, presentations 
on general average and the YAR 2004 were made by Bent Nielsen
505
 and IUMI’s members 
who had been at the vanguard of its call for the revision of the YAR 1994.
506
  
Nielsen stated that it was doubtful if the YAR 2004 were generally accepted. Taking 
cognisance of the fact that other interested parties were averse to the YAR 2004, he advised 
that IUMI should, among other things, use all influence towards shipowners and their 
organisations and provide possible incentives towards hull insurers’ clients to use YAR 
2004.
507
 He also advised IUMI to lobby lawmakers in countries, like in Scandinavia where 
the YAR are made part of legislation by reference in maritime Codes, and strive for the 
amendment of hull insurers’ own documents,
508
 at least with respect to ballast general 
average where modern hull conditions make reference to the YAR 1994.
509
 He further stated 
that a new BOXTIME charterparty
510
 was urgently needed.
511
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 See clause 10.3 ITCH; clause 8.3 IVCH. 
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 Recognising the possibility of the YAR 2004 not gaining widespread use in the 
industry because of the influence of shipowning interests in the general average system, 
Nielsen concluded:  
 
‘The changes [brought about by the 2004 Rules] were not supported by the 
representatives of shipowners' interests … These interests are very influential with 
respect to the use of the Rules, as they mainly come into use via clauses in charterparties 
and bills of lading. One has to realise, therefore, that the application of the YAR 2004 
will not be wide-spread unless and until owners in general, and their organisations, have 




Nielsen’s comments underscore the influence shipowners have in the general average 
system as carriers who determine the version of the YAR that will be incorporated in their 
standard carriage contracts. His comments allude to the truism that no version of the YAR 
will gain widespread use in the market without their acceptance by the shipowning 
community.  
Gooding in his presentation stated that a new clause was desirable for hull policies that 
will incorporate the YAR 2004. His suggested wording for the new clause was: 
 
 ‘Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary this policy will only respond 





The incorporation of the above clause in the standard hull policies in the market could 
have had the effect of making shipowning interests to rethink their positions on the YAR 
2004 and to incorporate the provisions of the Rules in their standard carriage contracts in 
order to be able to recover general average costs under their hull policies.  
However, the IUMI failed to proactively engage in general lobbying of interested 
parties in the industry (particularly shipowners) and law makers in countries, as the CMI is 
the only body that officially lobbied shipowning interests (particularly BIMCO) to accept the 
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 In Scandinavia, where the YAR are made part of legislation by reference in 
maritime Codes,
515
 no country has enacted the YAR 2004 in her maritime Code. Current hull 
policies still make reference to YAR 1994 and amendments to hull policies after the 
Vancouver Conference failed to make reference to the YAR 2004.
516
 Also, BOXTIME 
2004
517
 published after the Vancouver Conference makes no reference to the YAR 2004.
518
 
These developments are a major encumbrance to the acceptance and use of the YAR 2004 in 
the maritime industry. Wikborg aptly notes that; 
 
‘The chances of finding the 2004 Rules in bills of lading are slim, since it is the carrier 
who has to agree and change the forms. The status is that most of them will not. I believe 
that BIMCO is a better place to seek an answer as to the question on their actual use as 




Wikborg’s statement affirms that IUMI did not carry out a vigorous lobbying campaign 
to reach out to shipowners, lawmakers and other interested parties to reach a compromise that 
could have ensured the widespread use of the YAR 2004 in the market. It is argued that IUMI 
after the Vancouver Conference clearly rested on its oars and this torpor contributed to the 
lack of widespread acceptance and use of the 2004 Rules globally. Remarkably, the lack of 
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(b) P&I Clubs 
 
P&I Clubs are independent, non-profit making mutual insurance associations providing cover 
for its shipowner and charterer members against third party liabilities relating to the use and 
operation of ships.
521
 The 13 largest P&I Clubs in the world have grouped together to form 
the ‘International Group of P&I Clubs’ (the ‘International Group’)
522
 providing cover for 
approximately 90 per cent of the world’s ocean going tonnage.
523
 The International Group did 
not make any submissions to the CMI prior to the Vancouver Conference on IUMI’s 
proposals for the revision of the YAR 1994; presumably because the proposed amendments 
did not affect the liability of P&I Clubs under the YAR 1994. By Rule XI(d) YAR 1994, P&I 
Clubs cover claims in general average for measures taken to prevent or minimise pollution 
damage.
524
 The changes introduced by the YAR 2004 did not change this.  
Presently, P&I Clubs remain largely neutral on the differences between the 1994 Rules 
and the 2004 Rules, since the ‘pollution compromise’ reflected in Rules C and XI(d) YAR 








Average adjusters are experts in law and practice of marine insurance and general average 
who may be appointed by a party in a marine claim or dispute. They provide professional and 
independent view on claims arising from marine casualties.
526
 Average adjusters are expected 
to be neutral and fair in general average adjustments as equity is the foundation of the general 
average system.
527
 The AAA was founded in 1869 with the prime object of promoting correct 
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principles in the adjustment of marine insurance claims and general average, uniformity of 
practice amongst average adjusters and the maintenance of good professional conduct.
528
  
Though the AAA did not submit a Position Paper to the CMI on IUMI’s proposals for 
the revision of the YAR 1994, Fellows of AAA played an active part in formulating the 
Working Party Report and in the discussions at Vancouver.
529
 AAA after the Vancouver 
Conference gave assurance that its Fellows would play their usual role in helping to make the 
2004 Rules, where applicable, work fairly and commercially in practice.
530
 Average adjusters 
are expected to be neutral in the discharge of their duties
531
 and to take no official position on 
any set of Rules; as such the AAA to date has not taken any official position on the YAR 
2004.
532
 However, it is argued that it is not inconceivable that if shipowners were to seek 
advice from average adjusters on the YAR 2004 that average adjusters would not advise them 
that they are entitled to more allowances and a broader protection under the YAR 1994.  
 
(b) Association Mondiale de Dispacheurs (AMD - International Association of Average 
Adjusters)  
 
Though AMD submitted a Position Paper to the CMI cautioning against the revision of the 
YAR 1994 at the time in accordance with IUMI’s proposals,
533
 AMD did not recommend to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
nor the underwriter have either time, training or inclination for, in such a manner as to expedite settlements 
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shipowners against the incorporation of YAR 2004 in their carriage contracts. It could be 
argued that this is because average adjusters are expected to be ‘neutral’ parties in the general 
average system.
534
 Presently, AMD has been very active in the current efforts by the CMI to 








An examination of the lack of widespread acceptance and use of the YAR 2004 will not be 
complete without examining the acceptance and use of the Rules in maritime states bearing in 
mind that the law of the place where the adventure ends will apply where no version of the 
YAR is incorporated in a carriage contract.
536
 Particularly, some states (especially in 
Scandinavia) had enacted previous versions of the YAR in their national legislation; thereby 
making those versions applicable to adjustments in those states in the absence of agreement 
to the contrary by the parties. Thus, it is relevant to understand the factors and forces that 
influenced the failure of these states to enact the YAR 2004 into legislation to take them into 
consideration in the recommendations on how the widespread acceptance and use of the new 
Rules to be adopted may be achieved. 
 
(b) Scandinavian countries - Norway and Netherlands 
 
(i) The position before the adoption of YAR 2004 
 
Norway is one of the Scandinavian countries that had enacted previous versions of the YAR 
into domestic law by making reference to the Rules in her Maritime Code.
537
 The Norwegian 
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Maritime Code makes reference to the YAR 1994 (the Code was enacted after the adoption 
of the YAR 1994 at the CMI Sydney Conference).
538
 In terms of section 461 of the 
Norwegian Maritime Code, the YAR 1994 are mandatory in general average adjustments in 
Norway except the parties agree otherwise. The Netherlands, like Norway, enacted previous 
versions of the YAR into Dutch law. Article 613, Book 8
539
 of the Dutch Civil Code 1992 
incorporates the YAR 1994 into Dutch law. 
(ii) Post-Vancouver developments 
 
After the adoption of the YAR 2004 in Vancouver, a comment period was set by the 
Norwegian Department of Justice on whether the YAR 2004 would be incorporated into the 
Norwegian Maritime Code. Prior to receiving comments, the Norwegian Department of 
Justice had suggested that the YAR 2004 should replace the YAR 1994 (just as the YAR 
1994 replaced the YAR 1974 in the Code).
540
 
During the comment period, the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association pointed out that 
the YAR 2004 reduce shipowners’ prospects of receiving allowances from cargo interests in 
general average and referred to BIMCO’s Circular
541
 recommending against general average 
adjustments pursuant to the YAR 2004. Based on this, the Norwegian Shipowners’ 
Association urged the Norwegian Department of Justice to wait until the YAR 2004 are 
accepted by the shipping market before incorporating them into Norwegian law.
542
  
Similarly, in the Netherlands, the Dutch Shipowners’ Association,
543
 like their 
Norwegian counterpart, also advised Dutch shipowners against the use of the YAR 2004 at 
the same time warning against the use of clauses like ‘general average shall be stated, 
adjusted and settled in accordance with the YAR 1994 or any modification thereof (or … as 
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(iii) Present position on the YAR 2004 
 
Presently, the Norwegian Department of Justice has not taken any official position on the 
YAR 2004. However, there are strong indications that it will heed the advice of the 
Norwegian Shipowners’ Association and postpone the incorporation of the YAR 2004 in the 
Norwegian Maritime Code.
546
 It is argued that, from recent developments, the Norwegian 
Department of Justice seem to have suspended moves to amend the general average 
provisions in the Norwegian Maritime Code to make reference to the YAR 2004. This 
conclusion is reached because the Norwegian Maritime Code was amended in 2010 and the 
section on general average was not amended to make reference to the YAR 2004.
547
 It could 
be inferred from these developments that reference to the YAR 2004 may only be made in the 
Norwegian Maritime Code when they gain widespread acceptance and use in the market. 
However, with the recent efforts towards adopting a new set of Rules in 2016,
548
 it is argued 
that reference to the YAR 2004 may no longer be made in the Norwegian Maritime Code. 
Similarly, the YAR 2004 have not received any relevant acceptance in the Netherlands. 
Shipowners, cargo interests and insurers within the Netherlands Maritime and Transport Law 
Association, are not in favour of the YAR 2004 as they are of the view that the YAR 1994 
were still trying to gain widespread acceptance in the market at the time of their revision.
549
 
Presently, reference in Dutch statute law
550
 to the YAR remains a reference to the YAR 1994 
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as incorporated into Dutch law by means of the Royal Decree of 5 February 2000, official 
Gazette 111 and there is no discussion within the Dutch government to have the Royal 
Decree amended to make reference to the YAR 2004.
551
 
Thus, in both Norway and the Netherlands, the national position on the YAR 2004 
seems to have been influenced by the opposition of the shipowning community to the Rules. 
It is axiomatic that the position of the national shipowning associations on the Rules was 
influenced by BIMCO’s opposition to the YAR 2004. It would appear that the non-enactment 
of the YAR 2004 in domestic legislation by the governments of these states was not to 
alienate shipowning interests who are important stakeholders in the maritime industry in 
these states. However, unlike in Norway, the Netherlands Maritime and Transport Law 
Association also played a significant role in the rejection of the YAR 2004 in the 
Netherlands.  




Unlike the Scandinavian countries, the YAR are not enacted into legislation in most maritime 
states but only apply in adjustments in those states where a version of the YAR has been 
incorporated into the contract of carriage. Thus, it is pertinent to examine the level of 
acceptance and use of the YAR 2004 in some of these states. 
The YAR are not enacted in statute in the United States as they apply to adjustments in 
the United States through their incorporation in carriage contracts.
552
 The United States 
COGSA 1936 provides for the insertion in a bill of lading of any lawful provision regarding 
general average.
553
 A number of contracts of carriage and particularly those employed by 
United States’ carriers provide for the YAR to be supplemented by United States law and 
practice.
554
 Similarly, the YAR are not enacted into statute in the United Kingdom though 
during the early years of the efforts at achieving uniformity in general average suggestions 
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554
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were made to have legislation on general average in England.
555
 The Rules also apply to 
adjustments in Hong Kong - China only through their incorporation in carriage contracts. 
 
(ii) Post Vancouver developments  
 
In the United States, as a common law country, there are various legal decisions on the 
previous versions of the YAR and on general average
556
 and none so far on the YAR 2004. 
There are relatively few United States-based shipowners and none has incorporated the 2004 
Rules in their charterparties and bills of lading. However, some of the oil companies as 
charterers, not owners, have adopted the YAR 2004 in their current charterparty forms.
557
 
The YAR 2004 have also been adopted in contracts of carriage that fall under the auspices of 
the United States government General Accounting Office.
558
 Insurers have taken so little 




Thus, the YAR 2004 have only found favour with charterers and not shipowners in the 
United States. It is argued that hull insurers were not proactive in ensuring that the YAR 2004 
gained widespread use in the United States market. The incorporation of the 2004 Rules in 
the AIMU Hull Clauses 2009 could have been a major stride in making shipowners in the 
United States to reconsider their position on the Rules taking cognisance of the fact that most 
hull policies in the United States market will make reference to the YAR 2004. However, it 
could be argued that the incorporation of the Rules in the AIMU Hull Clauses 2009 may not 
have necessarily had any major impact on shipowners in the United States, as they would 
have recourse to hull policies in other markets, especially in the English market.  
Similarly, in the United Kingdom, since the adoption of the YAR 2004, practitioners 
have seen a small number of cases where YAR 2004 have been specified in non-standard 
voyage charterparty wordings, usually on the basis of a misunderstanding that using the YAR 
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 The increasing use of General Average Absorption Clauses in hull 
policies has had a much greater impact in reducing the number of uneconomic/unnecessary 
collections of general average contributions from cargo.
561
 Some operators and charterers of 
large container ships also take out special insurances to cover cargo’s proportion of salvage 
and general average, but insurers have found such policies difficult to rate. On the one hand 
major casualties are rare but on the other hand, when they do happen the exposure is very 
high with LOF salvage award in excess of US$20m becoming common place.
562
 
Thus, with the exception of the EMVOY 2005, the YAR 2004 are not been 
incorporated in most contracts of carriage in the United States nor in the United Kingdom.   
The Position with respect to the YAR 2004 in the above two countries is the same in 
Hong Kong – China. During the debate on the revision of the YAR 1994, Hong Kong 
Shipowners Association's (HKSOA) Insurance and Liability Sub-committee discussed the 
issue and decided that it would be better to keep the 1994 Rules in line with the 
recommendations of IUMI at the time.
563
 The Asian Shipowners Forum also discussed the 
issue of the revision of the YAR 1994 and came to the same conclusion as that of the 
HKSOA.
564
 However, presently, it seems that no Hong Kong shipowner as recommended by 
BIMCO would proactively choose to incorporate the YAR 2004 in its contract of carriage 





has also not made any recommendations to its members to incorporate the YAR 2004 in their 
contracts of carriage. Such a recommendation has not also been made by the Hong Kong 
Maritime Law Association (HKMLA) to the maritime community in Hong Kong.  
Thus, as in the Scandinavian countries, BIMCO’s position on the YAR 2004 seems to 
have influenced the position of the HKSOA on the YAR 2004. The non-recommendation of 
the use of the 2004 Rules by the HKMLA could limit the incorporation of the 2004 Rules by 
Hong Kong shipowners in their contracts of carriage. Furthermore, the non-recommendation 
by the HKSOA to its members to incorporate the YAR 2004 in their carriage contracts could 
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 E-mail communication with Raymond Wong, average adjuster, dated 31 May 2011. 
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play a pivotal role in the acceptance or rejection of the YAR 2004 in the Asian region as the 
HKSOA ‘has long been regarded as a knowledgeable, proactive and a very respected voice of 
Asian shipping’
567
 and ‘as a balancing influence to harmonise the regulatory demands that 






Countries that had enacted previous versions of the YAR into legislation have failed to 
update their laws to include the provisions of the YAR 2004 and no efforts are being made to 
enact the YAR 2004 in domestic legislation by other countries who had not enacted earlier 
versions of the YAR into domestic legislation. It is evident that BIMCO’s opposition to the 
2004 Rules played a pivotal role in the opposition by national shipowners’ associations to the 
adoption of the 2004 Rules in maritime states, particularly in Scandinavia. This opposition of 
national shipowners’ associations appear to have influenced national positions on the YAR 
2004. Proactive steps were also not taken by NMLAs in different states to canvass for the 
acceptance of the 2004 Rules in the market; while in the Netherlands, the Netherlands 
Maritime and Transport Law Association played an active part in the rejection of the Rules. 
Significantly, the insurance market failed to take proactive steps to ensure the 
widespread use of the 2004 Rules in the market; which led to hull insurers disregarding the 
YAR 2004 in the AIMU Hull Clauses 2009. It is argued that these militating factors 
contributed to the failure of the YAR 2004 to gain widespread acceptance and use in most 
maritime states and in the maritime industry.  
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In 2012 the CMI, as the custodian of the YAR, made an unsuccessful attempt at ensuring that 
shipowning interests (especially BIMCO) compromised on their position on the YAR 2004. 
The efforts started in 2011, when the CMI representatives met with representatives of 
BIMCO
569
 to discuss the fact that the YAR 2004 are rarely being used in the market and 
whether a compromise could be found to rectify this. This discussion was because BIMCO is 
an influential shipowning organisation and also considering the fact that BIMCO has been at 
the vanguard of the opposition by shipowning interests to the YAR 2004.
570
 It is relevant to 
examine the reasons for this abortive effort by the CMI to take them into consideration, in 
proceeding towards adopting a new set of Rules, with respect to the substantive changes that 
could be made to the Rules. 
 
(b) Joint Working Group (JWG) 
 
At a further meeting in 2012 between the CMI and BIMCO representatives, there were 
discussions on the possible amendment of the YAR 2004 and the promulgation of a new 
‘YAR 2012’
571
 at the CMI Conference to be held in Beijing in October 2012. Following 
subsequent conversations by both parties’ representatives, a JWG was formed to consider the 
                                                          
569
 The meeting was held on 12 September 2011 between Karl-Johan Gombrii (former CMI President) and Bent 
Nielsen for CMI and Torben Skaanild and Soren Larsen of BIMCO. Another meeting was held on 28 September 
2011 between the same persons except that Karel Stes, the chairman of BIMCO Documentary Committee, 
attended in the place of Torben Skaanild. 
570
 Mr Gombrii noted in his report at the CMI Executive Council Meeting held on 25 September 2011 that 
BIMCO’s main reason for opposing the incorporation of the YAR 2004 in carriage contracts is because of the 
restriction on the allowance of salvage expenditure in general average under the YAR 2004. See CMI 
Newsletter No 3 October/December 2011; chap 4 § II(a) supra. 
571
 B Browne op cit note 396 at 1. 
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matter further and try to agree on ‘a solution/wording which could form the basis for general 
agreement and acceptance by all interested parties.’
572
  
At the meeting of the JWG, possible amendments to the YAR 2004 were debated.
573
 
There was agreement at the meeting in principle to support a solution relating to salvage 
(including a new Rule of Application).
574
 However, CMI representatives could not support 
BIMCO’s proposal to reinstate Rule XI YAR 1994 regarding the allowance in general 
average of crew wages and maintenance in a port of refuge. CMI’s opposition to BIMCO’s 
proposal was based on CMI’s view that the proposed change to Rule XI
575
 would not attract 
general support and would be opposed in particular by cargo interests.
576
 However, a decision 





Based on the discussions between the CMI and various interested parties, the CMI decided to 
include the revision of the YAR 2004 on the agenda for its Beijing 2012 Conference and to 
establish an IWG to consider the proposed amendments further, particularly the drafting.
578
 
The IWG had its meeting on 21 March 2012 that was attended by representatives of the 
various interest groups
579
 and reached a definite agreement regarding the principles and 
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 See the CMI IWG’s Report on the proposals for the amendment of the YAR 2004, available at 
www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/YAR/CMI%20Report%20to%20NMLAs%20210612%20doc%20(2).pdf, 
accessed 1 August 2012 (hereafter ‘CMI IWG’s Report on the proposals for the amendment of the YAR 2004’). 
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 The possible amendments were debated ad referendum, on the understanding that the participants had no 
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 See chap 5 § VI(d)(iii) infra. 
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 See chap 5 § VI(d)(ii) infra. 
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 Subsequent informal consultations between the CMI and IUMI showed that the proposed amendments as a 
package (including the restoration of Rule XI YAR 1994) would carry IUMI’s approval assuming no new 
concessions were requested, the Rule of Application went in and BIMCO’s Documentary Committee amended 
their standard documents as quickly as reasonably practicable to incorporate the proposed YAR 2012 if they 
were adopted at the CMI’s 2012 Beijing Conference. See CMI IWG’s Report on the proposals for the 
amendment of the YAR 2004 op cit note 572 at 2. 
577




 The idea was to create a group with representation from major stakeholders in the industry. However, for the 
group to be efficient and since the work was still at an initial stage and would be submitted for consideration by 
all interested parties and organisations at the Conference in Beijing, the IWG was limited in size. 
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drafting of the proposed amendments in order to create a set of Rules (‘YAR 2012’). The 
CMI was of the view that the agreement reached within the IWG on the proposed 
amendments would pave the way for their general acceptance
580
 and that the ‘2012 Rules’ 
that was to be adopted at the Beijing Conference would be widely applied.  
 
(d) Analysis of IWG proposed amendments to YAR 2004 
 
The proposed amendments were in relation to Rules VI and XI YAR 2004.
581
 The proposed 
amendments are analysed in what follows. 
(i) Rule VI – Salvage Remuneration 
 
In order to resolve the impasse on the YAR 2004, the IWG proposed the re-draft of Rule 
VI
582




Rule VI Salvage Remuneration  
‘(a) Except as provided in sub-rules VI(b) and (c) expenditure incurred by the parties to 
the adventure in the nature of salvage, whether under contract or otherwise, shall be 
allowed in general average provided that the salvage operations were carried out for the 
purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in the common maritime 
adventure. 
(b) Salvage payments including interest and legal costs shall not be allowed in general 
average if they exceed x per cent of the total sums allowable in general average if salvage 
were included. The foregoing shall not apply where salvage payments have been paid by 
one party on behalf of all salved interest. 
(c) If one party to the salvage shall have paid a proportion of salvage payments 
(including interest and legal costs) due from some, but not all, of the salved interests 
(calculated on the basis of salved values and not general average contributory values), 
the unpaid contribution to salvage due from the other parties plus interest pursuant to 
                                                          
580
 CMI IWG’s Report on the proposals for the amendment of the YAR 2004 op cit note 572 at 2. 
581
 Ibid.  
582
 The IWG considered that the proposed Rule should mirror Rule VI(a) YAR 2004, with minor amendments. 
583
 For a full text of the proposed redraft of Rule VI YAR 2004, see CMI IWG’s Report on the proposals for the 
amendment of the YAR 2004 op cit note 572 at 4. 
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Rule XXI shall be credited in the adjustment to the other party that has paid it and 
debited to the party on whose behalf the payments were made. 
(d) … 
(e) … 
(f) For the purpose of applying this Rule the term ‘salvage payments’ shall mean 
payments made in respect of salvage services and for which there is contractual and/or 
legal provision for apportionment and payment between the salved interests upon 




The proposed sub-rule (a) restated to some extent the provision of Rule VI YAR 1994. 
It makes it clear that expenditure will be re-apportioned in general average under the Rule for 
services rendered in the nature of salvage, whether under contract or otherwise. This was an 
attempt to solve the problem of construction of Rule VI YAR 2004 as to whether the Rule 
applies to contract towage or similar services in the nature of salvage.
585
 This problem of 
construction of the Rule led to the AAA forming a Sub-committee to consider the issue 
586
 
and also led to the AAA United States issuing a probationary Rule of Practice
587
 with respect 
to Rule VI YAR 2004.
588
  
It is submitted that the proposed Rule VI would have applied to charges by salvors for 
salvage services rendered as defined by s 65(2) MIA 1906 and under contracts such as LOF 
(which impose separate liability on each party) and to contract salvage or similar services 
which were contracted for and funded initially by the shipowner. However, the re-
apportionment of salvage expenditure in general average would have been restricted under 
the proposed Rule as sub-rule (a) was made subject to sub-rules (b) and (c). In other words, 
only salvage payments that met the criteria provided in sub-rules (b) and (c) would have been 
re-apportioned in general average. This is the implication of the phrase ‘except as provided in 
sub-rules VI(b) and (c)’ in sub-rule (a) of the proposed Rule.  
Sub-rule (b) was an attempt by the IWG to achieve a compromise between shipowning 
interests and insurance interests on the re-apportionment of salvage expenditure in general 
                                                          
584
 Sub-rules (d) and (e) of the proposed re-draft of Rule VI restated verbatim the wordings of sub-rules (b) and 
(c) respectively of the YAR 2004. 
585
 Cf chap 4 § II(a)(iii) supra.  
586
 See AAA Sub-committee Report on Rule VI YAR 2004, available at 
www.usaverageadjuster.org/AAA_Ga_Sub-committee_on_Rule_VI.pdf, accessed 30 April 2012. 
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 See note 393 supra.  
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 Cf chap 4 § II(a) supra. 
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average. The proposed amendment was to confine the re-apportionment of salvage 
expenditure in general average only to cases where the re-apportionment would have ‘a 
substantial effect.’
589
 The most significant aspect of sub-rule (b) was that it tried to limit the 
number of salvages that would be re-apportioned in general average. Thus, a salvage payment 
which exceeds a certain percentage of the total general average sums would not be allowed in 
general average. This was an attempt at allowing salvage expenditure in general average only 
where the result would be a substantial re-distribution of the costs between cargo and hull 
interests.  
The difficulty in this proposal would be to achieve a consensus amongst shipowning 
and insurance interests on the percentage to be adopted in the Rule. Furthermore, it might be 
difficult at an early stage for a shipowner to determine whether the limit would be exceeded 
(where he might still incur subsequent port of refuge expenses) to determine whether there 
would be a need to incur the expense of collecting general average security for cargo 
interests. The proposal, if it had been adopted,
590
 would have had the effect of excluding a 
substantial proportion of salvage cases in general average under the Rule. It is argued that 
such an effect might have been strongly opposed by shipowners as their main opposition to 
the changes introduced by the YAR 2004 was with respect to the substantial limit in Rule VI 
on the re-apportionment of salvage expenditure in general average.
591
  
However, the proposed sub-rule (b) would not have applied where a party makes the 
salvage payment on behalf of all salved parties. Thus, where a party pays for salvage on 
behalf of all the other parties to the adventure, the salvage expenditure would be allowed in 
general average even where it is the main element of the general average act. No restriction 
was, therefore, placed on the re-apportionment of salvage in general average (no matter the 
effect of such re-apportionment); where it is paid by one party on behalf of other parties to 
the adventure. It is argued that sub-rules (b) and (c) were commendable provisions in 
attempting to amend the provision of Rule VI YAR 2004,
592
 by providing that salvage 
whether paid by one party on behalf of other parties or settled by all the parties to the 
adventure, will be re-apportioned in general average, though subject to the provisions of the 
                                                          
589
 B Browne op cit note 396 at 2. 
590
 IUMI expressly noted that it would only support the proposed amendment to Rule VI if the percentage, to be 
decided at Beijing, had the effect of excluding a substantial proportion of salvage cases from general average. 
See CMI IWG’s Report on the proposals for the amendment of the YAR 2004 op cit note 572 at 2. 
591
 See note 570 supra.   
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 See chap 4 § II(a) supra. 
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sub-rules. Furthermore, sub-rule (f) was a laudable provision of the proposed re-draft of Rule 
VI by proposing a definition of ‘salvage payments’ in the YAR. This could have resolved the 
uncertainty that existed in the market as to the meaning of the wording ‘salvage payments’ 
used in Rule VI YAR 2004.
593
 
It is argued that the approval of the proposed amendment to Rule VI would have 
resulted in smaller savings to cargo insurers in adjustments unlike the higher percentage of 




(ii) Rule XI - Wages and maintenance of crew 
 
The IWG proposed the deletion of Rule XI(c)(i) and (ii) YAR 2004 and to replace it with a 




‘(i) When a ship shall have entered or been detained in any port or place in consequence 
of accident, sacrifice or other extraordinary circumstances which render that necessary 
for the common safety or to enable damage to the ship caused by sacrifice or accident to 
be repaired, if the repairs were necessary for the safe prosecution of the voyage, the 
wages and maintenance of the master, officers and crew reasonably incurred during the 
extra period of detention in such port or place until the ship shall or should have been 
made ready to proceed upon her voyage shall be allowed in general average, fuel and 





This proposed amendment (though not an amendment per se) was to restore the 
provision of Rule XI YAR 1994, thereby restoring the allowance of the cost of crew wages 
and maintenance while a vessel is detained at a port of refuge. Marine property insurers were 
of the view that the restoration of crew wages and maintenance while a ship is detained at a 
port of refuge to Rule XI will increase the sums shifted in general average by 1 to 2 per 











 It is argued that this was a commendable proposal as it could have resulted in a 
compromise between shipowners and cargo insurers on the proposed amendments to the 
YAR 2004; as this provision is important to shipowning interests because it enables them to 
recoup expenses incurred on the crew while the vessel is detained at the port of refuge. 
Pertinently, since this proposed amendment leaned more in favour of shipowners it might 
have had the effect of achieving a compromise between shipowners and cargo insurers on the 
proposed amendment to Rule VI.  
 
(iii) Rule of Application 
 
The IWG proposed the insertion of a new Rule to be titled ‘Rule of Application’ in the 
proposed 2012 Rules: 
 
‘These York-Antwerp Rules shall be considered to be an amendment or modification of 
the previous versions of the York-Antwerp Rules. Notwithstanding the foregoing, these 
York-Antwerp Rules 2012 shall not apply to contracts of carriage entered into before the 




It is argued that this proposed Rule of Application was necessary as the status of YAR 
2004 had been the subject of speculations and arguments amongst stakeholders, thereby 
creating confusion and uncertainty on the issue in the industry.
598
 However, the proposed 
Rule of Application would not have applied to contracts of carriage entered into before the 
formal adoption of the proposed 2012 Rules. The adoption of this proposal would have saved 
the printing of new standard documents and helped resolve any uncertainty in the market as 
to whether any subsequent YAR are covered by terms such as ‘any 
amendments/modifications thereof.’ Furthermore, the Rule would have assisted in the fast 
application of revised Rules.  
However, the proposal would have fettered the contractual right of parties to decide 
which version of the YAR to use. Furthermore, certain insurance policies
599
 refer to specific 
versions of the YAR and might have been prejudiced by this proposed Rule.   
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Generally, the replies showed that majority of the NMLAs were of the view that the YAR 
2004 should not be amended in accordance with the proposals until there was a confirmation 
of the willingness of the different representatives of organisations in the industry to accept 
such amendments or some others. Most importantly, the acceptance of the IWG’s proposals 
by shipowning interests was stressed. It is argued that this view was based on the need to 
avoid the rejection of any subsequent set of Rules in the market because of lack of consensus 
amongst interested parties. Of note is the fact that only one of the replies expressed a total 
support for the IWG’s proposals.
601
  
With respect to the amendments proposed by the IWG, mixed feelings were expressed 
by the NMLAs. The majority of the NMLAs felt that the proposal on salvage would pose a 
difficulty especially with respect to achieving a consensus on the percentage to be adopted 
and also that there would be difficulty in defining the moment when the threshold must be 
exceeded in order to exclude salvage expenditure from general average. This is because 
determining at an early stage whether the threshold will be exceeded will enable the 
shipowner to determine whether it will be necessary to incur the expense of collecting general 
average security for cargo interests.
602
 This concern was germane as it would be difficult to 
reach a consensus between shipowners and insurers on the percentage to be adopted. It is 
argued that this difficulty was exacerbated by IUMI’s position that it would accept the 
proposed amendment of Rule VI YAR 2004 only if a high percentage was chosen;
603
 which 
position would have been opposed by shipowners. It is instructive to note that it was on the 
issue of salvage that concerns of potential difficulties were raised by the NMLAs.
604
 The 
proposal on crew wages and maintenance was accepted by the majority of the NMLAs, 
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indicating a consensus amongst the NMLAs for the restoration in the YAR of the allowance 
of crew wages and maintenance while a vessel is detained at a port of refuge.
605
 
The British Maritime Law Association (BMLA), as an alternative to the IWG 
proposals, proposed the merger of the non-contentious 2004 amendments to Rules XIV(b) 
(temporary repairs), XX (commission), XXI (interest) and XXIII (time-bar) with the 
provisions of the YAR 1994. It is argued that based on shipowning interests’ opposition to 
the YAR 2004, the BMLA’s proposal could have ensured that these non-contentious 
provisions of the YAR 2004 would be used in contracts of carriage as shipowning interests 
might not necessarily have opposed such a merger.  
The replies showed that the requisite consensus amongst interested parties on the 
proposals had not been achieved prior to the CMI 2012 Beijing Conference. Importantly, 
there was not sufficient time for interested parties to thoroughly deliberate on the proposed 
amendments and reach a consensus amongst themselves on the proposals before the 
Conference. The CMI letter to NMLAs was sent on 25 June 2012
606
 with a directive that the 
Associations’ comments on the proposed amendments should be sent to the CMI no later than 
31 August 2012. This was barely two months before the Beijing Conference and was clearly 
not a sufficient period for proper consultations and deliberations by interested parties on the 
proposed amendments before the Conference. It seems likely that this contributed, at least in 
measure, to the rejection of the proposals at the CMI 2012 Beijing Conference. 
(f) CMI Beijing Conference 2012 - The demise of the YAR 2004? 
 
At the CMI Beijing Conference 2012,
607
 it was evident that there was no enthusiasm amongst 
majority of the NMLAs for the IWG proposals.
608
 It was also evident that the late 
involvement of the NMLAs and particularly shipowning interests (such as the ICS) at an 
early stage in the discussions for the amendment of the YAR 2004 made it difficult for proper 
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consultations and discussions on the proposed amendments and this resulted in the failure by 
interested parties to reach a consensus amongst themselves on the proposed amendments 
before the Beijing Conference. 
609
 
It is argued that the CMI was right in continuing the second session on the YAR at the 
Conference in the form of a workshop to identify and discuss issues that might be usefully 
received with a view to presenting a text of YAR for discussion and possible ratification at 
the next CMI Conference in 2016.
610
 This was recognition by the CMI that the adoption of 
the proposed amendments with the apparent opposition of majority of the NMLAs and 
shipowning interests to the proposed amendments, due to their late involvement in the 
amendment process, would have likely resulted in the rejection of the amended Rules in the 
market. The outcome of the Beijing Conference seems to be the ‘final nail in the coffin’ of 
the YAR 2004 as the Conference concluded that the YAR 2004 had not found acceptance in 
the shipowning community and recommended for a new IWG on General Average to be 
formed to carry out a general review of the YAR with the aim of drafting a new set of Rules 
with a view to their adoption at the CMI Conference in 2016.
611
  
Pertinently, the importance of a consensus amongst interested parties and the equitable 
balancing of their interests were emphasised as the Conference specifically recommended 
that the new Rules to be drafted had to meet the requirements of shipowners, cargo owners 
and their respective insurers.
612
 It is argued that if this recommendation is adhered to, the new 
set of Rules to be drafted will have a reasonable chance of being approved at the CMI 
Conference in 2016 as the various interested parties would have been duly consulted and 
compromises reached before drafting the new set of Rules. Such draft Rules, if approved at 
the CMI Conference in 2016, will likely not suffer the same fate as the 2004 Rules as they 
will be Rules that epitomise the equitable balance of the interest of the various interest groups 
and will consequently gain widespread acceptance and use in the maritime industry.  
Significantly, the outcome of the Conference reinforced the premise that the YAR 2004 
were doomed to fail without the support of all interested parties, particularly shipowning 
interests.  











(g) Towards adopting a new set of Rules in 2016  
 
In furtherance of the resolution at the CMI Beijing Conference, the CMI has initiated the 
process to generate proposals to be considered at the next CMI Conference in 2016 that may 
lead to the adoption of a new set of Rules. The new IWG on General Average has prepared 
and circulated to the NMLAs a questionnaire on a general review of the Rules on general 
average. The questionnaire
613
 is divided into four sections. Section one relates to general 
questions on general average and recent issues on general average with respect to, among 
other things, the Rotterdam Rules, piracy and arbitration. Section two relates to questions on 
the introductory Rules; section three deals with questions on the lettered Rules and section 
four relates to questions on the numbered Rules. The questionnaire is an attempt at a holistic 
review of the Rules on general average in a bid to ensure the adoption of a new set of Rules 
that will be acceptable to all interested parties. 
It is beyond the scope of this work to consider all the questions in the questionnaire as 
they are numerous. This thesis will examine questions on the changes in the YAR 2004 
which, in the opinion of the author, paid a pivotal role in the lack of widespread acceptance 
of the YAR 2004 by shipowning interests and their lack of widespread use in carriage 
contracts in the market. These are questions on the main issues in contention between cargo 
insurers and shipowning interests and it is argued that achieving a compromise between these 
interests on these issues will likely result in the widespread acceptance of the new set of 
Rules to be adopted. Thus, this examination will be with respect to salvage expenditure and 
crew wages and maintenance as shipowning interests’ objections to the YAR 2004 seem to be 
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(i) Rule VI – Salvage remuneration 
 
The IWG in the questionnaire restated the divergence in opinion of shipowning interests and 
cargo insurers on the re-apportionment of salvage expenditure in general average and stated 
that in looking to the future the current options would appear to be: (a) retaining the 1994 
position; (b) adopting the 2004 position; (c) adopting a compromise position as put forward 
by the CMI in Beijing which would involve deciding on the percentage figure;
615
 (d) 
continuing as in (a) but encouraging adjusters’ ‘ad-hoc’ approach wherever possible ie for the 
adjuster to approach the parties where it seems that re-apportioning salvage expenditure in 
general average will be disproportionate to the time and cost involved; (e) continuing as in (a) 
and (d) but including an express provision obliging the adjuster to consider the possibility of 
not including salvage, perhaps linked to the Rule Paramount. 
As pointed out earlier in the analysis of the 2004 IWG proposals
616
 and from the 
outcome of the Beijing Conference,
617
 it is argued that the IWG’s proposal for the 
amendment of Rule VI at Beijing should not be adopted because achieving a consensus 
amongst the various interested parties on the percentage to be adopted is an arduous task and 
may never be achieved. In addition, Rule VI 1994 was criticised by cargo insurers for 
resulting in insurers incurring more costs by the re-apportionment of salvage remuneration in 
general average, especially in cases where such re-apportionment is uneconomical
618
 and this 
resulted in the change in Rule VI YAR 2004. Thus retaining the YAR 1994 position would 
not be acceptable to insurers. 
However, it is argued that a compromise could be achieved by retaining the 1994 
position but including an express provision in the Rule encouraging adjusters to approach the 
parties where it seems that the effect of such a re-apportionment will be disproportionate to 
the time and cost. It is argued that this option could work in practice especially where the 
adjuster is regarded as reputable by the parties. Furthermore, parties could be willing to co-
operate to ensure that valuable time and cost are not wasted in re-apportioning uneconomic 
salvage expenditure.  
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 See chap 7 § III(d) infra.  
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It could be argued that such a provision leaves the decision to re-apportion salvage 
expenditure in general average at the discretion of the parties and does not provide for what 
would be the adjuster’s duty where a party insists on the re-apportionment of an uneconomic 
claim. It is argued that option (e) as stated above, would be more suitable as the adjuster 
would bear the onus (regardless of the decision of the parties) of considering the 
reasonableness of re-apportioning salvage expenditure in general average in making his 
decision whether to re-apportion salvage expenditure in general average in any given case. 
Thus option (d) merely encourages the adjuster to approach the parties while option (e) 
imposes an obligation on the adjuster to exercise his professional skill and training in the 
circumstances. The effect of option (e) as a Rule in the YAR will be that the adjuster will 
bear the onus of determining the reasonableness of re-apportioning salvage expenditure in 
general average irrespective of the outcome of his discussions with the parties.  
 
(ii) Rule XI - crew wages and maintenance  
 
The questionnaire stated that crew wages and maintenance are allowed in general average 
while a vessel is detained at a port of refuge for the common safety or to effect repairs 
necessary for the safe prosecution of the voyage under the YAR 1994
619
 but not in the YAR 
2004.
620
 Both sets of Rules allow wages during the deviation to a port of refuge. What then 
should be the position under the YAR 2016? 
As stated earlier,
621
 crew wages and maintenance while the vessel is detained at a port 
of refuge was allowed in Civil law countries and the United States prior to the existence of 
the YAR. They were recognised in the early years of the unification process in both the 
Glasgow Resolutions 1860 and the York Rules 1864.
622
 It could also be argued that the effect 
of the decisions in Svensen v Wallace
623
 and Attwood v Sellar
624
 in which the common benefit 
principle was recognised in English law was to allow crew wages and maintenance incurred 
while a vessel is detained at a port of refuge.  
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126 
 
Taking cognisance of the extra cost that would be incurred by shipowners under Rule 
XI YAR 2004 in providing special insurance cover for crew wages and maintenance when a 
vessel is detained at a port of refuge,
625
 it is argued that the allowance of the cost of crew 
wages and maintenance while a vessel is detained at a port of refuge in the proposed YAR 
2016 could play a pivotal role in the acceptance of the Rules by shipowners. The provision is 
important to them because over and above a shipowner’s loss of time at a port of refuge, the 
shipowner has an extra burden by having to pay and maintain its crew, who would be paid off 
at the end of the voyage. Thus, if this outlay is not made good to the shipowner, it is not 
compensated for its expenditure.
626
  
It is argued that such a provision in the draft of the proposed YAR 2016 could have the 
effect of making shipowners to be willing to reach a compromise with cargo insurers on other 
provisions of the Rules, particularly on the re-apportionment of salvage expenditure in 
general average.  
 
VII CONCLUSION  
 
The YAR 2004 failed to gain widespread use in the maritime industry
627
 as efforts by 
BIMCO and national shipowners’ associations ensured that the Rules were not incorporated 
in contracts of carriage in most jurisdictions. The failure of insurers and NMLAs to campaign 
proactively for the use of the 2004 Rules and to ensure that a compromise was reached with 
shipowning interests that could have ensured the widespread acceptance of the YAR 2004 in 
the maritime industry, also contributed to the lack of widespread use of the Rules in the 
industry and their non-enactment into legislation in countries, particularly in Scandinavia. 
Most importantly, national positions on the 2004 Rules seem to have been significantly 
influenced by the stance of national shipowners’ associations on the Rules. The stance of 
national shipowners’ associations on the 2004 Rules was evidently influenced by BIMCO’s 
opposition to the Rules. Thus, it is axiomatic that BIMCO remains the principal obstacle to 
the widespread use of the 2004 Rules in the market.  
It could be inferred from the outcome of the CMI Beijing Conference that the 2004 
Rules have been consigned to the recesses of maritime history as the maritime community 
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has shifted its focus to drafting a new set of Rules to be adopted in 2016. The lack of 
widespread use of the 2004 Rules in the market underlines the enormous influence 
shipowning interests exert (as carriers) in the general average system and this reinforces the 
premise that without the co-operation of shipowning interests no set of YAR will gain 
widespread use in the market.
628
 Hebditch remarks that; 
  
‘The 2004 Rules … have been very rarely used since their introduction and are unlikely 
to be given the opposition to them of all shipowning bodies and perhaps most 




This view seems justified taking cognisance of the lack of widespread use of the Rules 
in the market. It is argued that the lack of widespread acceptance and use of the YAR 2004 in 
the industry shows the disapproval by majority of interested parties of the Rules and the 
process that led to their approval. In retrospect, the author argues that the CMI should not 
have heeded the IUMI’s call for the revision of the YAR 1994 as the IUMI at the time was a 
‘unilateral bandwagon’
630
 in the call for revision of the YAR 1994
631
 as was Lloyd’s in its 
call for the abolition of the YAR in 1877.
632
  
The CMI has initiated the process for a holistic review of the Rules on general average 
and it is hoped that the maritime community will join ranks and work towards achieving a set 
of Rules that will gain widespread acceptance and use in the maritime industry. 
However, to understand the present failure of the 2004 Rules to gain widespread 
acceptance and use in the maritime industry, one would have to look at the past to identify the 
ingredients of previous successful revision processes of the Rules, as a comparative base in 
analysing the process that led to the present impasse on the YAR 2004 in the maritime 
industry, in order to identify the flaws (if any) in the process. This is to assist the maritime 
community to avoid such pitfalls in any subsequent amendments of the YAR. These 
discussions are provided in chapters six and seven respectively of this thesis.  
  
                                                          
628
 J Macdonald op cit note 78 at 440. 
629
 Remarks of Charles Hebditch (2010) 16 Journal of International Maritime Law 488, in his review of G 
Hudson & M Harvey op cit note 299.  
630
 G Hudson & M Harvey op cit note 299 at 282.  
631
 See chap 7 infra. 
632
 See chap 6 § II(b)(i) infra.  
128 
 





This chapter examines the previous revision processes of the YAR. This is aimed at 
identifying the ingredients of the previous successful revision processes of the YAR prior to 
2004. However, a discussion of these previous successful revision processes is inextricably 
linked with the content of the previous sets of Rules. This is because a thorough examination 
of the said processes cannot be made without determining the defects in the contents of the 
different versions of the Rules that necessitated the amendments and the consequent 
amendment of those Rules to rectify the defects. These defects in the content of the Rules and 
other factors that will be identified in this chapter (such as environmental concerns and 
changes in international trade) resulted in the process towards the revision of the previous 
sets of YAR. However, it is not intended to examine all the changes that were made in every 
revision as they are numerous in some of revisions that were made. Thus, this chapter will 
examine the major amendments that were made to the different versions of the YAR prior to 
2004.  
The analysis in this chapter will form the comparative base to show, in chapter seven, 
that the disregard by the IUMI and the CMI of the ingredients of the previous evolutionary 
processes in the revision of the YAR 1994 contributed to the failure of the YAR 2004 to gain 
widespread acceptance and use in the maritime industry. This is to highlight the need for 
those ingredients to be taken into consideration in the present process towards adopting a new 
set of Rules. 
  
II INGREDIENTS OF THE PREVIOUSLY ADOPTED PROCESSES IN THE 
REVISION OF THE YAR 
 
(a) ‘Timing’ of calls for revision 
  
In the process adopted in approving or amending the previous versions of the YAR the proper 
timing of the efforts to adopt a set of Rules or amend any existing Rules was crucial in 
achieving a successful outcome of the revision process. The international community 
129 
 
recognised the essence of raising the issue of the revision of any set of Rules at the 
appropriate time taking cognisance of the state of affairs in the maritime industry and in the 
commercial world. An examination of the issue of timing of calls for revision will show the 
progression in the time-frame allowed by the maritime community prior to 2004 (from the 
Glasgow Resolutions 1860 to the YAR 1994) for any set of Rules to be used in the market 
before efforts were made to approve or amend any set of Rules. 
 
(i) 1860 to 1877 – Efforts to achieve uniformity  
 
This period reflects the early efforts by the maritime community to achieve uniformity in the 
principles and practice of general average as a result of the divergence that existed in various 
jurisdictions on the law of general average.
633
 The efforts aimed at achieving uniformity 
commenced in 1860 with the intention by the maritime community for the adoption of an 
international uniform law that would ensure uniformity in the law of general average.
634
 In 
the bid to achieve uniformity, the process of adopting the Rules was hastened and various 
versions of the Rules were adopted within a period of four to ten years as there were constant 
calls by all interested parties at the time for concrete measures to be taken to achieve 
uniformity.
635
   
In 1860 the intention of the maritime community was to initiate the unification process 
and for onward continuation of the process in later years.
636
 This goal was reflected in the 
Resolutions that were adopted at the Glasgow Conference in 1860. To achieve the goal of 
uniformity, the Resolutions recognised both the principles of common safety and common 
benefit in the law of general average. Resolutions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 covered instances where 
acts are done when a ship is in peril and stated what would be allowed in general average in 
such instances. Resolutions 6 and 8 epitomised the intention of the maritime community to 
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The merger of these two principles and the bid to actualise the desired uniformity 
resulted in constant calls for continuous work to be done and the brevity in the time-frame 
within which Rules were approved within this period. This explains the adoption of the York 




The York Rules 1864 were a progression of the underlying principles exemplified in 
the 1860 Resolutions
639
 and covered cases were sacrifices and expenses are made both for the 
common safety and the common benefit. The process of unifying the two strands in the 
concept of general average had begun to yield results. The York Rules were the first concrete 
steps in that direction. In the York Rules 1864, Rule VII specifically provided that port of 
refuge expenses made for the continuation of the voyage would be admissible as general 
average. Rule VIII provided that the wages and cost of maintenance of master and crew from 
the time the ship entered the port of refuge (in the circumstances described in Rule VII) to the 
time it departs from the port would be admissible as general average. Rules I, II, IV, V and 
VI covered instances relating to the common safety principle and provided for what would be 
allowed as general average in those instances.  
The 1877 Rules were a product of the continuation of the efforts by the maritime 
community to achieve uniformity.
640
 However, contrary to the relatively short period of time 
between the Glasgow Resolutions 1860 and the York Rules 1864, the efforts at achieving 
uniformity took a relatively longer period (approximately 13 years) before the YAR 1877 
were adopted. It is argued that this longer period cannot necessarily be attributed to the desire 
by the maritime community to allow for a longer period before the continuation of efforts at 
achieving uniformity but it was as a result of opposition by Lloyd’s to the uniformity 
process.
641
 However, in the continuation of the uniformity process, four major changes were 
made in the YAR 1877 that reflected the practice in those areas in different jurisdictions and 
were aimed at achieving uniformity. It will suffice for the present purposes to analyse two of 
the major changes that were made in the YAR 1877 to show that the driving force behind the 
changes remained the objective of achieving uniformity. 
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In Rule I, the exception in favour of timber or deals jettisoned from deck was deleted, 
so that no jettison of deck cargo would be allowed in general average. Generally, loss 
occasioned by jettisoning goods carried on deck was not made good in general average, the 
reason being that the ship’s deck was, at the time, an improper place for cargo. In English 
law, the practice of average adjusters, which was recognised by the courts, was to exclude in 
general average the allowance of cargo jettisoned from deck, if carried on deck without the 
shipper’s consent.
642
 Later in the timber trades in Britain, ships were being constructed to 
carry deck cargo as a result of the repeal of earlier Acts of Parliament
643
 that prohibited that 
practice. In the United States there was considerable timber trade with up to one-third 
shipped on deck, however, the practice was to exclude from general average the jettison of 
any deck cargo.
644
 This was the same practice in the European countries.
645
 Rule I of the 1864 
Rules that provided for the allowance in general average of the jettison of timber from deck 
seems to have been influenced by the English delegates at the 1864 York Conference, though 
there is no record of this. However, the change to the Rule in the 1877 Rules seems to be as a 
result of the fact that there were more European delegates at the Antwerp Conference 1877 
unlike at the 1864 York Conference
646
 and it is argued that this influenced the final voting on 
the subject; thereby making the rule conform to the practice in the United States and the 
European countries. It could be argued that this amendment to Rule I in reflecting the 
objective of achieving uniformity also shows the extent national/regional interests influenced 
the amendment of the provisions of the YAR at the time.  
An amendment was also made to Rule III by adding a provision that no compensation 
was to be allowed in general average for water damage to packages which were already on 
fire. In England the practice of average adjusters prior to 1873 was not to allow such damage 
in general average.
647
 However, in Stewart v West India and Pacific SS Co,
648
 Quain J held 
that such loss properly formed the subject of general average contribution according to the 
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law of England. But since the parties had agreed to make the custom of British average 
adjusters a part of the contract, the plaintiff’s claim in general average failed. Quain J 
expressed the view that in the future the practice of average adjusters would take cognisance 
of the English common law.
649
 Following this decision, the AAA in 1873 passed a Rule of 
Practice allowing in general average damage done by water poured down a ship’s hold to 
extinguish fire.
650
 However, the Rule was amended the next year disallowing in general 
average damage to cargo by water voluntarily used to extinguish fire where the packages 
were on fire at the time water was thrown upon them.
651
 This was also the practice in the 
United States.
652
 It is argued that this amended Rule of Practice of British average adjusters 
influenced the wording of Rule III YAR 1877. Like the amendment to Rule I, it could be 
argued that the amendment to Rule III epitomises the influence of the national interests of 
influential maritime states in the amendment of the provisions of certain Rules of the YAR at 
the time.  
The amendments introduced by the YAR 1877 crystallised the uniformity process and 
laid the foundation for subsequent consideration of the law of general average within the 
context of rectifying the defects in the Rules, simplifying and updating the YAR to take 
cognisance of developments in the maritime industry and the commercial world.
653
 
(ii) 1890 to 1994 – Modernisation of the YAR 
 
The uniformity process that started in 1860 had gained momentum and had resulted in the 
formulation of the early sets of YAR to achieve the desired uniformity. After the adoption of 
the YAR 1877, the objective of amendment of the YAR was no longer primarily the 
unification of the divergent strands of general average, but to rectify defects in the Rules, 
simplify and modernise the Rules to take cognisance of developments at the time.
654
 To 
achieve this change in the primary objective, particularly the modernisation of the Rules, it is 
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argued that the urgency of achieving initial uniformity was no longer present. Rather the 
maritime community allowed the existing set of YAR to be used for a reasonable period for 
their impact in the market to be assessed and to identify any defects in the Rules before calls 
were made for revision. Thus, after the adoption of the YAR 1877, the Rules were allowed to 
undergo a practical test of 10 years, after which it was recognised by the maritime community 
that the YAR 1877 did not conform to changes
655
 in the commercial world; necessitating the 
amendment of the 1877 Rules that culminated in the approval of the 1890 Rules.
656
  
From 1890 to the adoption of the YAR 1994, periodic amendments to the Rules were 
only made after the Rules had operated in the market for a period of 20 to 25 years
657
 within 
which the various sets of Rules were incorporated into contracts of carriage and in marine 
insurance policies. This shows the progression in the time-frame allowed for existing Rules to 
have an impact in the industry before revisions were made. It is argued that this extended 
period was to provide sufficient time for interested parties and organisations (governmental 
and non-governmental) to identify any defects in the existing set of Rules in the maritime 
industry. This enabled interested parties to articulate their views on the desired amendments 
to be made in order to rectify any identified defects in the existing Rules and to simplify or 
update the Rules; before efforts were made by the maritime community to revise any set of 
Rules. Thus, the different sets of Rules prior to the 2004 Rules were given sufficient time to 
have an impact in the industry and were amended only after it was recognised by the 
maritime community that an amendment was requisite to rectify defects in the Rules and for 
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(b) Consensus amongst majority of interested parties 
(i) 1860 to 1877 
 
The history of the YAR and the amendments that have been made to the different sets of the 
YAR have been characterised by a consensus amongst majority
659
 of interested parties in the 
general average system on the need for amendment and the consequential amendments to be 
made in ensuring that the YAR continued to be an efficient risk and loss spreading 
mechanism.
660
 This was a reflection of the institution of general average which was ‘founded 
upon the consensus of parties to the adventure.’
661
 Feinberg CJ aptly notes that ‘the YAR 
represent an important consensus of the international shipping industry.’
662
 The genesis of the 
uniformity process in 1860 epitomises this consensus amongst interested parties as the call to 
the National Society for the Promotion of Social Sciences (hereafter ‘the Association’) to 
take up the arduous task of achieving uniformity in the law of general average was made by 
both insurers and shipowning interests; with Lloyd’s being at the vanguard.
663
 Thereafter, as 
a result of the circular letter and memorandum issued by the Association to all maritime 
states on the need to achieve uniformity, all interested parties in the general average system 
participated in the discussions at the Glasgow Conference 1860 and the resulting Glasgow 
Resolutions 1860 were a product of the compromises and consensus reached by the parties on 
the manner to proceed in achieving uniformity in the law of general average.
664
  
Pertinently, this process of encouraging participation and consensus amongst all 
interested parties from maritime states before the adoption of any uniform Rules on general 
average continued in the efforts to achieve uniformity. By 1864, experts in maritime law were 
involved in analysing a draft Bill to consolidate and amend the laws relating to general 
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average sacrifices and contributions.
665
 Furthermore, a committee was appointed to further 
analyse the Bill and the committee had as its members, representatives of different interest 
groups. The committee drew up a statement of the various principal issues in dispute in 
general average and elicited opinions and criticisms from all interest groups.
666
 This process 
of engagement of all interested parties led to their meaningful participation in the three days 
discussion on the issue of uniformity in the law of general average at the Third International 
General Average Congress at York in September 1864.
667
 The resulting 11 Rules that were 
titled the ‘York-Rules 1864’ were a product of the consensus that was reached amongst the 
interested parties at the said congress. It is argued that the process of engagement and 
consultation of all interest groups and the adoption of Rules by the consensus of majority of 
interested parties had been entrenched and this characterised the subsequent efforts to achieve 
uniformity.  
The engagement of all interested parties in the discussions on achieving uniformity 
continued at the Antwerp Conference 1877 which was attended by 68 delegates
668
 
representing various interest groups; particularly shipowning and insurance interests. At the 
meeting views were presented by the various delegates and after three days of discussion, a 
consensus was reached amongst majority of the interested parties which led to the approval of 
the YAR 1877. It is argued that events at the Conference underlined the established trend of 
the adoption of any set of Rules based on the consensus of the majority of interested parties 
as it was the first time that there was dissension on the uniformity process. Lloyd’s which had 
been at the vanguard of the uniformity efforts in 1860 was of the view that uniformity was no 
longer required but that the whole system of general average should be abolished, as in its 
view, all interests in a maritime adventure were, or at least ought to be insured and that 
general average was expensive.
669
 
Incidentally, Lloyd’s was a lone voice in the insurance market in the call for the 
abolition of general average as other insurers associations together with shipowning interests 
passed resolutions at a meeting in London in 1878 for the YAR 1877 to be carried into 
                                                          
665
 Ibid at 47.  
666
 Ibid.  
667
 Ibid at 48.  
668
 J Cooke & R Cornah op cit note 28 at 47.  
669
 H Dowdall ‘Suggestions for the Codification of the Law of General Average’ (1895) 11 Law Quarterly 
Review 32 at 37. However, Lloyd’s delegates joined in the discussions at the Conference but expressly 
disassociated themselves from the general approval of the proceedings.  
136 
 
operation through provisions to be inserted in bills of lading.
670
 Lloyd’s sentiments were also 
not shared by the maritime community as it was announced at the next Conference of the 
Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations in 1879, that the owners 
of more than two-fifths of the entire registered world tonnage and charterparties had agreed to 
include the 1877 Rules in their bills of lading and charterparties. The 1877 Rules had also 
being adopted by a large number of mutual insurance associations.
671
 Moreover, insurers 
generally, despite the continued opposition by Lloyd’s, agreed to the inclusion of the new 
Rules in their insurance policies without additional premium.
672
 Most importantly, delegates 
at the Antwerp Conference did not express support for Lloyd’s view.
673
 Thus, the view of the 
majority of the interested parties with respect to the importance of the general average system 
prevailed in the maritime industry.
674
   
 
(ii) 1890 to 1994 
 
As in the process that was adopted in achieving uniformity, efforts to amend the Rules were 
based on the acknowledgement by the majority of interested parties on the need for 
amendments and the amendments that were made were a product of the consensus reached 
amongst them in order to achieve a measure of equitable balance of their interests. In 1890, 
majority of the interested parties acknowledged the need for the amendment of the YAR 1877 
in order to update the Rules to take cognisance of developments at the time.
675
 Pertinently, 
average adjusters, under the auspices of the AAA, were proactive in the revision process by 
drafting a report suggesting the amendments to be made. This report was deliberated upon by 
interested parties at the Liverpool Conference of the Association for the Reform and 
Codification of the Law of Nations in 1890. At the end of the Conference, a consensus was 
reached amongst the majority of the interested parties, resulting in the adoption of 18 Rules 
known as the ‘YAR 1890.’
676
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This consensus amongst the majority of interested parties on the need for the 
amendment of any set of Rules before embarking on such an amendment was further 
reflected in the efforts by interested parties to amend the YAR 1890 to provide general 
principles on the law of general average, which were not contained in the YAR 1890.
677
 As in 
the previous amendments, majority of the interested parties and delegates from maritime 
states participated in the discussions at the thirty-third Conference of the International Law 
Association at Stockholm in 1924 and after four days of discussions a consensus was reached 
amongst majority of the delegates on the requisite amendments to be made. The amended 
Rules were titled the ‘YAR 1924.’ This consensus amongst majority of interested parties on 
the amendments to be made ensured the widespread acceptance and use of the revised Rules 
in the market and in countries except in the United States.
678
  
Shipowners in the United States were principally opposed, among other things, to the 
definition of general average in Rule A of the YAR 1924 on the ground that it restricted 
general average to sacrifices made or expenses incurred for the common safety and did not 
cover expenses incurred for the common benefit of the adventure which is allowed under 
United States law.
679
 Rule A YAR 1924 provides that ‘there is a general average act when 
and only when, any extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure is intentionally and reasonably 
made for the common safety for the purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in 
the common maritime adventure.’
680
 The wording of this provision was clearly based on 
English law
681
 and seemed to disallow in the YAR expenses incurred for the common benefit 
of the parties to an adventure which is allowed under United States law.
682
  
It is argued that this opposition by the United States shipowners shows the role national 
interests played in the development of the YAR.
683
 However, it is argued that the opposition 
of shipowners in the United States was not necessary as the numbered Rules
684
 of the 1924 
Rules provides for allowances for acts done for the common benefit of the maritime 
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adventure. However, for clarity and certainty, it is argued that Rule A YAR 1924 should have 
been drafted to reflect that acts done both for the common safety and common benefit of the 
common maritime adventure are allowed in general average under the Rules.
685
 
Furthermore, apart from it being the first time shipowners in any state opposed the 
Rules, it also marked the first time the Rules were partially applied in any jurisdiction by 
means of special clauses.
686
 However, cognisance should be taken of the fact that the 
disenchantment of the United States shipowners was not with the process adopted in the 
amendment of the YAR 1890 or the entire regime of the YAR. 
As in the previous amendments, subsequent amendments of the Rules in 1950, 1974, 
1990 and 1994, under the auspices of the CMI, were as a result of a consensus amongst 
majority of interested parties on the need for amendments in order to simplify and update the 
Rules to take cognisance of developments at the time.
687
 In the process of the amendment of 
the YAR under the auspices of the CMI, Working Groups on General Average were formed 
to examine the issues raised by different interested parties on the need for amendment. The 
Working Groups on General Average ascertained the views of interested parties through 
questionnaires that were circulated to NMLAs on the principal issues for consideration.
688
 
This process of consultation afforded all interested parties the opportunity of considering the 
issues that were raised and to proffer suggestions on the requisite amendments to be made. 
Though the CMI questionnaires were only sent to NMLAs, other interested parties were 
given the opportunity to make submissions to the CMI (as consultative members of the CMI) 
on the issues raised in the questionnaires and on other issues they considered to be germane. 
Thus, the amendments under the auspices of the CMI prior to 2004 were as a result of a 
consensus amongst majority of interested parties on the need for any existing Rules to be 
amended to take cognisance of developments at any given time.
689
 Amendments were never 
undertaken by the CMI as a result of the clamour for revision by any sectarian interest. 
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Pertinently, the adoption of the YAR 1994 was based on the acknowledgement by all interest 
groups that the revision of YAR 1974 (as amended in 1990) was necessary as there had been 
changes in shipping and commercial techniques and substantial developments in the 
environment in almost 20 years of the operation of the YAR 1974.
690
 The effort towards the 
amendment of the 1974 Rules was not as a result of disenchantment with the general average 
system by any interested party. This is shown in a rider to the 1991 preliminary report of the 
CMI Working Group on General Average: 
 
‘The current examination of the law of General Average and the York-Antwerp Rules is 
not inspired by any call for the abolition of General Average, or by any significant 
criticism of the present position. Nor is it either a response to the results or conclusions 
of any particular study or initiative. Rather it is inspired by the wish, by critical 





Hudson remarks that the review was ‘inspired by the desire by all interested parties for 
a critical and periodic examination of the Rules in order to test the validity of the Rules in the 
then commercial context where documentary techniques and operational techniques were 
developing rapidly.’
692
 This consensus amongst interested parties on the need for amendment 
of the YAR 1974 led to the consultation and involvement of majority of interested parties in 
the process that led to the adoption of the YAR 1994. Magone notes that ‘the YAR 1994 were 
approved after extensive consultation with all interested parties and associations, 
governmental and non-governmental interested in general average.’
693
 It is argued that this 
involvement of the majority of interested parties in the revision process culminated in the 
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unanimous adoption of the YAR 1994 at the CMI Sydney Conference
694
 and the widespread 
acceptance of the YAR 1994 by the majority of interested parties in the maritime industry.
695
  
(c) Developments in the industry 
 
The third important ingredient of the previous successful revision processes of the YAR is 
that amendments were undertaken as a result of the recognition by majority of interested 
parties that it was necessary to amend the existing set of Rules to take cognisance of 
significant developments in the industry. These developments were changes in international 
trade and shipping techniques, judicial decisions and environmental concerns. The 
amendments of the YAR from 1890 to 1994 were in a bid to modernise the Rules to take 
cognisance of developments at the time.
696
  
These factors drove the evolutionary development of the YAR prior to 2004. Thus to 
show how these factors drove the revision of the YAR, it is apposite to examine these 
developments and to show the amendments that were made to the previous sets of Rules as a 
result of these developments. However, in the examination, there will be more detailed 
analysis of the development that led to the need for the revision of the YAR 1974 (as 
amended in 1990), key proposals that were made by NMLAs for the revision and the cardinal 
changes introduced by the YAR 1994. This is to provide the necessary context for 
understanding the amendments that were made in the YAR 1994 to take cognisance of 
developments at the time: for a proper contextualisation and examination of IUMI’s call for 
the revision of the YAR 1994 in the next chapter of this thesis.  
(i) 1890 Rules – Changes in international trade 
 
The 1890 Rules were adopted as a result of the acknowledgement by the maritime 
community that the 1877 Rules, after a decade of their operation in the industry, did not 
entirely conform to the changing needs of international commerce and that some revision was 
required.
697
 These changing needs of international commerce were as a result of the gradual 
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replacement at the time of sailing vessels by steamships.
698
 Thus it was necessary to amend 
the Rules to provide for allowances in the YAR for certain circumstances that relate to the 
use of steamships in international trade. This development led to the introduction of new 
Rules VII and IX in the YAR 1890.  
Rule VII allowed in general average damage caused to machinery and boilers of a ship 
which is ashore and in a position of peril, in endeavouring to refloat when it is shown to have 
arisen from an actual intention to refloat the ship for the common safety at the risk of such 
damage. The Rule recognised that when a steamer is aground in a position of peril and the 
engines are kept going in order to back her off or over the ground, the vessel’s machinery 
may be strained in the process, bearings may become overheated or the propeller may sustain 
damage.
699
 Damage done to the vessel in this manner was analogous to the loss of sails blown 




Rule IX allowed in general average; cargo, ship’s materials and stores or any of them 
necessarily burnt for fuel for the common safety at a time of peril only when an ample supply 
of fuel had been provided. Rule IX recognised that as sail was giving way to steam, there 
were bound to be times at sea when the ship’s bunkers would be exhausted or about to be 
exhausted and it would be necessary for the cargo or ship’s materials to be burnt in the 
furnace for the safety of the common maritime adventure.  
It is argued that Rule IX ‘codified’ in the Rules the decision in Harrison v Bank of 
Australasia,
701
 where it was held that spare parts, planks and other ship’s materials used upon 
emergency for fuel for the ship’s engines to avert a peril and when there has been no original 
insufficiency in the supply of bunkers, are allowable in general average.  
(ii) 1924 Rules – Rectifying defects in the Rules and changes in international trade 
 
The adoption of the YAR 1924 was for two primary purposes, viz, to rectify defects in the 
YAR 1890 and to take cognisance of changes in international trade. 
                                                          
698
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(a) Defect in the Rules 
 
The YAR 1924 were a product of the need to address the identified weakness of the YAR 
1890. The 1890 Rules consisted merely of a group of Rules
702
 dealing with certain specific 
points and did not contain Rules laying down the general principles of general average
703
 and 
this made the Rules not to be based on a coherent and logical principle. This flaw made the 




To rectify this defect in the YAR 1890, eight lettered Rules
705
 were introduced in the 
YAR 1924 which laid down the general principles of general average.
706
 The lettered Rules 




(b) Changes in international trade 
 
Furthermore, like the YAR 1890, there was a need to produce a set of Rules that would take 
cognisance of changes in international trade because the replacement of sailing vessels with 
steamships resulted in rapid growth in international trade and it was acknowledged by the 
maritime community that the 1890 Rules would lose their value as circumstances changed.
708
 
It is argued that this concern of the maritime community was predicated on the fact that the 
YAR up to the 1890 Rules contained provisions that applied to sail ships and it was necessary 
to amend the Rules to take cognisance of the dominance of steamships in international trade. 
Thus, the dominance of steamship in navigation and its effect on international trade played a 
pivotal role in the amendment of the YAR 1890.
709
 
Thus, amendments were made to certain numbered Rules in the YAR 1924 to reflect 
the effects of changes in the type of vessel used in navigation to the provisions of the YAR. 
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 The period between 1890 and 1925 underlines the dominance of steamship as a support to global trade with 
its diffusion to ports across the globe. See J Rodrigue op cit note 698 at 55. 
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Rule X(b) was amended in the YAR 1924 to allow in general average the cost of fuel and 
stores at a port of refuge, call or loading; thereby recognising that steamships (and motor 
ships) had ousted sailing vessels. Furthermore, Rule XII was amended to allow in general 
average damage to or loss of cargo, fuel or stores caused in the act of handling, storing, 
reloading and stowing when such measures are admitted in general average.  
(iii) 1950 Rules – Effect of judicial decision and defect in the Rules 
 
Analogous to the adoption of the YAR 1924, the YAR 1950 were primarily adopted for two 
main purposes, viz, to remedy the effect in the maritime industry of a judicial decision with 
respect to the YAR 1980 and to rectify a defect in the Rules. 
 
(a) Effect of judicial decision 
 
The adoption of the YAR 1950 marked the first time a judicial decision played a principal 
role in the revision of the Rules. It was the intention of the framers of the 1924 Rules and of 
the delegates that adopted them at the Stockholm Conference 1924 that all cases provided for 
by the numbered Rules should be considered as general average and that the lettered Rules 




However, Roche J discarded this intention of the framers of the Rules in his decision in 
Vlassopoulos v British & Foreign Marine Insurance Co Ltd (The ‘Makis’).
711
 Roche J held 
that the numbered Rules were merely specific examples of types of general average 
situations, subordinate to the principles set forth in the lettered Rules. Consequently, there 
could be no general average case within the particular Rules unless it would also be covered 
by the provisions of the general Rules. This decision led to the introduction of what was 
called the ‘Makis Agreement’
712
 in which shipowners and insurers in England agreed to 
restore the precedence of the numbered rules over the lettered rules.
713
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It is argued that the adoption of the ‘Makis Agreement’ underlined the need to amend 
the 1924 Rules to remedy the effect of Roche J’s decision and to clarify the relationship 
between the numbered rules and the lettered rules. 
In solving the problem caused by The Makis decision, a new ‘Rule of Interpretation’
714
 
was inserted at the beginning of the YAR 1950 which gave priority to the numbered Rules 
over the lettered Rules, making it clear that if the facts support a general average under the 




(b) Defect in the Rules 
 
Another factor that led to the amendment of the 1924 Rules was the provision of Rule XXII 
of the Rules. Rule XXII YAR 1924 had provided for allowance of interest on general average 
expenditure and sacrifices at the legal rate per annum prevailing at the port of destination or 
at the rate of 5 per cent per annum where there is no recognised legal rate at the port of 
destination. There was a need to amend Rule XXII by providing a fixed rate as the legal rate 
at different ports varied considerably. Furthermore, there was no recognised legal rate in the 
majority of the importing countries and this led to profits or losses that were not warranted by 
the reason behind the Rule to be made.
716
 It is argued that an amendment to Rule XXII YAR 
1924 was necessary in order to achieve uniformity and certainty as every shipowner at the 
beginning of the adventure would be conversant with the fixed rate at which interest would 




With respect to Rule XXII, a fixed rate of 5 per cent was provided for the calculation of 
interest in general average. This amendment provided certainty in the calculation of interest 
in general average unlike the ‘legal rate’ that was used in the 1924 Rules. 
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(iv) 1974 Rules – Simplifying the Rules 
 
The adoption of the YAR 1974 was primarily directed towards simplifying the task of general 
average adjustment and modernising the Rules in order to expedite the adjustment process
718
 
as a result of changes at the time in commercial procedures and shipping techniques that were 
brought about by technological advancements.
719
 This need for the simplification and 
modernisation of the YAR was stressed in the preliminary report and questionnaire on the 
possible revision of the YAR 1950 which was circulated by the CMI to its NMLAs
720
 and in 
the replies by NMLAs to the questionnaire.
721
 The main object of the amendments introduced 
by the YAR 1974 was to simplify the Rules to ‘facilitate the drawing up of adjustments with 
the minimum of expense and delay.’
722
 
In the amendments introduced in the YAR 1974, the lettered Rules were unaltered apart 
from a small change that clarified the text of Rule D. The word ‘defences’ was inserted in 
Rule D to clarify that a party could have recourse to any remedies and defences available in 
any law; where the fault of a party gave rise to the general average act. However, important 
changes were made within the framework of the numbered Rules. Importantly, Rules X and 
XI were amended in order to exclude from general average the cost of cargo handling and 
expenses incurred at a port of call or loading, when the accident giving rise to such expenses 
had occurred prior to the common adventure. This amendment was because in solving the 
problem that arose from the decision in The Makis,
723
 the Rule of Interpretation had also 
allowed situations where nothing untoward had happened during the common venture other 
than the mere discovery of pre-existing damage. If the damage found required repairs 
necessary for the safe prosecution of the voyage, then allowances could be made under Rules 
X and XI YAR 1950.
724
 While cargo interests could and very often did decline to pay their 
share of contribution in such cases, it was anomalous that the expenses incurred in these 
circumstances should remain within the ambit of general average. 
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(v) 1974 Rules as amended in 1990 – Response to environmental concerns 
 
The amendment to the YAR 1974 in 1990 was as a result of the global concern for the 
protection of the environment due to shipping disasters at the time that resulted in the 
pollution of the marine environment and significant physical damage of marine life and 
resources in coastal waters.
725
 To address this concern, a new Salvage Convention 1989 was 
approved at an International Convention on Salvage organised by the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO).
726
 Article 13 of the Salvage Convention 1989 provides that one of the 
factors to be taken into account while determining a salvage award is the skill and efforts of 
the salvor in preventing or minimising damage to the environment. To ensure that adequate 
incentives are available to salvors, particularly where there is a prospect of salving a maritime 
property with a value that might be small, article 14 of the Convention introduced a new 
special compensation which is payable when the ship or cargo to be salved threatens damage 
to the environment and the value of the property salved was insufficient to provide an 
adequate result or where the property is lost despite the salvage operation. 
It was necessary to amend the YAR 1974 to clarify which of the expenses incurred by a 
salvor in preventing or minimising damage to the environment would be allowed in general 
average.
727
 Thus, an amendment was made to Rule VI of the 1974 Rules by adding new 
paragraphs, the first of which allowed in general average the element of enhancement of the 
award for the salvor’s efforts in avoiding or minimising damage to the environment,
728
 and 
the second of which excluded the special compensation paid under article 14 from being 
allowed in general average.
729
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(vi) 1994 Rules – Response to containerisation  
 
The revision of the 1974 Rules (as amended in 1990) was as a result of the acknowledgement 
by the maritime community of the need for revision as a result of changes in shipping and 
commercial techniques and substantial developments in the environment in almost 20 years 
of the operation of the YAR 1974.
730
 Recognising the clamour in the maritime community by 
shipowning interests, insurers, average adjusters, NMLAs and international organisations
731
 
for a revision of the YAR 1974 (as amended in 1990), the CMI ISC on General Average, 
appointed a Working Group
732
 to prepare a preliminary report and questionnaire
733
 for 




The replies of the NMLAs to the questionnaire indicated a serious interest in the 
continuation of efforts to update, simplify and improve the Rules to take account of 
circumstances at the time. Central to these efforts was the need to continue to increase 
uniformity while at the same time trying to identify ambiguity and uncertainty so as to reduce 
delay and expense.
735
 The majority of the replies showed that containerisation was the main 
commercial and technical development identified by the NMLAs for consideration in the 
amendment of the Rules.
736
 This is because the practice of containerisation of cargo (in which 
thousands of cargo interests might be involved) called for special consideration of the 
problems involved in identifying the owners and insurers of the containers as well as 
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problems of valuation in assessing the contributory values in general average of the various 
interests.
737
 Thus, containerisation brought about a practical need for early information on the 
identities of cargo owners and their insurers in the documentation for the various 
consignments as well as the question of general average securities for the release of cargo.
738
 
Having such early information expedites the adjustment process and helps save costs 
occasioned by delays in adjustments.  
(a) Proposals by NMLAs for revision of YAR 1974 (as amended in 1990) 
  
As part of the amendment process, some NMLAs in their reply to the CMI 1991 
questionnaire on the possible amendment of the YAR 1974 (as amended in 1990) made 
proposals for the amendment of certain provisions of the Rules in order to update and 
simplify the Rules. Some of these proposals that relate to the issues raised by IUMI for the 
revision of the YAR 1994
739
 are analysed in what follows. This is to provide the context for 
analysing whether all or some of the IUMI’s proposals had being considered by the maritime 
community in the process of adopting the YAR 1994, as contended by some interested parties 
during the revision process of  the YAR 1994.
740
 This analysis also provides the context for 
understanding the amendments that were made to the YAR 1974 to simplify and update the 
Rules. 
(i) Rule of Interpretation 
 
The Maritime Law Association of the United States (MLAUS) made a proposal that the Rule 
should be renamed ‘The Rule of Interpretation and Rule Paramount’ and that new third and 
fourth paragraphs should be added. The proposed third paragraph was as follows: 
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The reason for this proposal was the decision in Corfu Navigation Co and Bain 
Clarkson Ltd v Zaire S.E.P and Petroca S (The ‘Alpha’).
742
 The Alpha was grounded in the 
mouth of the Zaire River in heavy silt conditions and damage to the main engine occurred 
during refloating operations. The master had been warned by the crew that such an attempt to 
refloat the vessel would be unsuccessful and would damage the engine; but he ignored the 
warning. The shipowners claimed general average under Rule VII YAR 1974. The cargo 
interests denied liability in general average on the ground that the actions of the master were 
unreasonable. The court found that the master’s act was not merely unskilful but was also 
unreasonable. However, the court held that the cargo interests were liable to contribute in 
general average as the word ‘reasonably’ is not used in Rule VII YAR 1974. As such the 
reasonableness of an act is not a requirement for a claim under Rule VII YAR 1974. 
It is argued that this decision was correct taking cognisance of the fact that the Rule of 
Interpretation in the YAR 1974 gives the numbered Rules precedence over the lettered 
Rules.
743
 In construing the numbered Rules under the YAR 1974, the requirement of 
reasonableness in Rule A should not be applied. Where an act falls under the provisions of a 
numbered Rule in the 1974 Rules, there would be a valid claim; irrespective of the fact that 
the requirement of reasonableness in Rule A is not met. However, it is doubtful that this was 
the intention of the framers of the YAR in allowing unreasonable acts of parties in the general 
average system. It is argued that the proposal by the MLAUS was necessary in order to 
clarify that the requirement of reasonableness also applies to the numbered Rules. 
(ii) Rule E 
 
A proposal was made by the BMLA for an addition to Rule E to provide for a time limit for 
the notification of claims and the production of documents to average adjusters. It is argued 
that such an addition to Rule E was necessary as the majority of the replies by the NMLAs to 
the CMI 1991 questionnaire
744
 showed that one of the reasons adjustments were being 
delayed in the market was because documents in support of general average claims were not 
been promptly sent by parties to average adjusters.
745
 The proposed addition to the Rule was 
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to spur parties to promptly forward documents in support of their claims to adjusters; thereby 
hastening the adjustment process and reducing costs occasioned by delay in adjustments. 
(iii) Rule G 
 
The BMLA proposed a text to be added as second and third paragraphs in Rule G: 
 
‘When a ship is in any port or place in circumstances which would give rise to an 
allowance in general average under the provisions of Rules X and XI, and the cargo or 
part thereof is forwarded to destination by other means, the general average shall be 
adjusted so that the rights and liabilities of the parties in general average shall remain as 
nearly as possible the same as they would have been in the absence of such forwarding, 
as if the adventure had continued in the original ship for so long as justifiable under the 
contract of affreightment and the applicable law. In these circumstances the cargo and 
other property shall contribute on the basis of its value upon delivery at original 
destination, unless sold or otherwise disposed of short of that destination, and the ship 
shall contribute upon its actual net value at the time of completion of discharge of cargo. 
The proportion attaching to cargo of the allowances made in general average by reason 
of applying the second paragraph of this rule shall not exceed the cost which would have 




This proposal was to introduce a standard wording of what is known as ‘Non-
Separation Agreement’ (NSA) in the Rules. For over a century, it had been the custom to ask 
cargo interests, in return for the forwarding of their cargo and an earlier delivery, to agree to 
contribute to general average adjusted as though their cargo had remained at the port of 
refuge during the repairs to the ship and had been carried to destination in the original 
carrying ship; even though their cargo had been carried to destination by another ship from 
the port of refuge.
747
 This was achieved by incorporating a NSA into the average bond
748
 and 
average guarantee signed by the consignees and the cargo insurers, respectively.
749
 The NSA 
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ensures that cargo is forwarded from the port of refuge to the port of destination without 
delay.
750
 The second paragraph of the proposal was to include what is known as the ‘Bigham 
Clause’ in the wording of the NSA to be introduced in the Rules. The Bigham Clause is 
included in a NSA in order to give protection to cargo interests fearful of what they may be 
undertaking when signing a NSA. The Bingham Clause provides: 
 
‘It is understood that the amount charged to cargo under this agreement shall not exceed 
what it would have cost owners if cargo was delivered to them at … (port of refuge) and 




The above Clause ensures that cargo interests cannot be called upon to contribute 
towards general average expenditure during an extended period of repairs more than it would 
have cost them to forward the cargo themselves from the port of refuge to destination.
752
 It is 
argued that BMLA’s proposal was necessary in order to crystallise in the Rules a practice in 
the industry
753
 which worked for the benefit of all parties to a maritime adventure; 
particularly cargo interests, in getting cargo to destination without much delay. 
(iv) Rule VI  
 
In addition to the proposals by NMLAs, the ISC also discussed whether differential 
settlement of salvage costs should be brought into the general average apportionment as is the 
case under Rule VI YAR 1974 (as amended 1990).
754
 
It is conceded that material inequity is worked by the Rule when it obliges other 
otherwise advantageous individual salvage settlements to be cast into the general average pot 
and re-apportioned amongst the parties. A party who has used his commercial influence to 
secure a more favourable salvage settlement than others should ordinarily enjoy this 
advantage. 
                                                          
750
 Ibid.  
751
 Ibid.  
752
 See The Julia Blake (1882) 107 US 418 (US SCt); Ellerman Lines v Gibbs Nathaniel [1976] 2 FC 463 (Fed 
Can); The City of Colombo (1986) 26 DLR 161, (1986) AMC 2217 (4
th
 Cir); The ABT Rasha [2002] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 575 (CA). 
753
 G Hudson & M Harvey op cit note 299 at 82.  
754
 CMI Yearbook 1993 (Sydney I) 148. 
152 
 
However, it is argued that the re-apportionment of differential salvage settlements in 
general average is nevertheless a practical tool to give effect to the community of interest that 
underlines the notion of general average and for the burden of salvage expense to be 
equitably shouldered by the parties to an adventure. The importance of the re-apportionment 
of differential settlement of salvage costs has long been recognised in United States law.
755
 
The re-apportionment of differential salvage costs in general average was also indorsed in 
1983 in the United Kingdom by the Advisory Committee of the AAA. The committee stated 
that; 
 
 ‘Rule VI is mandatory as between the parties to a contract of affreightment providing for 
adjustment according to the YAR 1974 … subject to the overall requirement of 
reasonableness in the amounts claimed by parties to the adventure, differential 
expenditure, including costs, on account of the salvage should be allowed in general 




It could be argued that the committee hinged the re-apportionment of differential 
salvage settlements on the ‘reasonableness in the amount claimed.’ However, the phrase is 
ambiguous as it is not clear whether the committee was advocating for the exercise of the 
discretion of average adjusters on whether or not to re-apportion differential salvage 
expenditure in general average by taking cognisance of the ‘reasonableness in the amount 
claimed.’  
(v) Rule XIV 
 
The MLAUS proposed to delete the second paragraph of Rule XIV YAR 1974. The second 
paragraph of the Rule provides: 
 
‘where temporary repairs of accidental damage are effected in order to enable the 
adventure to be completed, the cost of such repairs shall be admitted as general average 
without regard to the saving, if any, to other interests, but only up to the saving in 
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expense which would have been incurred and allowed in general average if such repairs 




The MLAUS’ proposal was based on the decision in the English courts in The Bijela,
758
 
which showed the inherent problems of construction that could arise from the provision of the 
second paragraph of Rule XIV YAR 1974. On the facts, the shipowners’ vessel was chartered 
for the carriage of cargo from Providence, Rhode Island, to the West Coast of India, under a 
charterparty which provided that general average was to be settled in London according to the 
YAR 1974. Whilst still in Rhode Island Sound, the vessel grounded and sustained damage. 
She put into the port of Jamestown, where it was discovered that she could not safely reach 
New York, the nearest port where permanent repairs could be carried out in dry dock, without 
discharging the whole of her cargo. The shipowners elected to carry out temporary repairs in 
Jamestown at a cost of US$282,606. The cost of discharging, storing and reloading the cargo 
to allow permanent repairs in New York would have exceeded US$535,000. After the 
completion of the vessel’s voyage to India, the shipowners declared general average. The 
adjusters did not allow the cost of temporary repairs. The shipowners instructed a second firm 
of adjusters who included the cost of the temporary repairs in general average, as being less 
than the expense which would have been incurred and allowed if temporary repairs had not 
been effected, within Rule XIV of the 1974 Rules.  
The shipowners in the court of first instance argued that they were entitled to general 
average contribution from cargo owners as the temporary repairs at Jamestown were 
substituted expenses for the saved expenses of reloading, storing and warehousing the cargo 
that would have been incurred if permanent repairs had been carried out and that such 
expenses would have been allowable in general average under Rule X(b) and(c). The 
shipowners contented that in applying the second paragraph of Rule XIV it would have to be 
assumed that it was not possible to carry out temporary repairs at Jamestown. The defendants 
contended that had the vessel discharged its cargo and proceeded to New York for permanent 
repairs none of the expenses incurred would have been allowable in general average because 
the alternative of carrying out temporary repairs which were all that was required to enable 
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the adventure to be completed or for the safe prosecution of the voyage could be carried out 
at Jamestown, as in fact occurred. 
At first instance Hobhouse J held that for the shipowners’ case to succeed they would 
have to show that there was some other expenditure which if incurred would have been 
allowable as general average expenditure under the YAR. The shipowners in order to rely on 
Rule X had to show that the repairs in dry dock in New York were necessary for the safe 
prosecution of the voyage. The court in dismissing the case held that the expenses that would 
have been incurred in carrying out permanent repairs at New York would not have been 
allowable in general average because all that was necessary in the circumstances for the safe 
prosecution of the voyage were the temporary repairs that were carried out at Jamestown. 
Thus there was no basis for the assumption proposed by the shipowners. This decision was 
upheld by the majority in the Appeal Court.
759
 
Hoffman LJ in dissenting stated that in construing the second paragraph of Rule XIV to 
achieve business efficacy; it would have to be assumed that temporary repairs, not only were 
not, but could not have been carried out in Jamestown. In such a case the expenses incurred 
in carrying out permanent repairs at New York would be allowable in general average as 
necessary for the safe prosecution of the voyage. The shipowners’ appeal was allowed by the 
House of Lords. Lord Berwick in giving the decision of the court stated that in giving effect 
to Rules X and XIV, it was not necessary to assume that the vessel could not have been 
repaired in Jamestown. It was necessary only to assume that she was not so repaired as Rule 
XIV requires. Thus the discharging, storing and reloading of cargo at Providence would have 
been carried out in New York instead of Jamestown and therefore recoverable in general 
average, since such repairs, would, on the assumption, have been necessary, within the 
meaning of Rule X(b) for the safe prosecution of the voyage.  
The decision of the House of Lords took a purposive approach that was based on the 
need to give business efficacy to Rule XIV in ensuring that the cost of temporary repairs are 
recoverable in general average under the second paragraph of Rule XIV. However, with 
respect to the House of Lords, it is argued that there was no basis for applying such an 
assumption to Rule XIV of the YAR 1974. The provisions of the Rule should have been 
given its literal interpretation as the wording is unambiguous. The wording of the second 
paragraph of Rule XIV explicitly provides that such temporary repairs of accidental damage 
will be allowable in general average ‘only up to the saving in expense that would have been 
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incurred and allowed in general average if such repairs had not been effected there’ 
(emphasis added).  
Thus, for the expenses in carrying out permanent repairs at New York to have been 
allowable in general average in the Bijela case, there was a need for them to have been 
incurred because temporary repairs could not have been carried out at the port of refuge and 
permanent repairs at New York then became necessary for the safe prosecution of the voyage 
under Rule X(b). However, where temporary repairs of accidental damage are effected at a 
port of refuge and those repairs are what were necessary to prosecute the voyage, no basis 
exists to allow such expenses as substituted expenses under Rule F. It is respectfully argued 
that there was no need for assumptions by the House of Lords in construing the second 
paragraph of Rule XIV. Though the modern trend in the construction of commercial contracts 
is the application of the purposive approach,
760
 the courts should not in the guise of giving 
business efficacy ‘amend’ any Rule of the YAR through assumptions, where the wording of a 
Rule is clear and unambiguous. It is argued that such business efficacy could have been best 




(b) Cardinal amendments introduced by YAR 1994 
 
As a result of the developments in the maritime industry at the time and the proposals of the 
NMLAs, certain changes were introduced in the YAR 1994 that was adopted in the CMI 
Conference 1994 in Sydney in order to simplify and modernise the Rules. The paramount 
changes introduced in the Rules are analysed in what follows.  
(i) Rule Paramount  
 
This Rule was introduced by the YAR 1994 as a result of the decision in the English case of 
The Alpha.
762
 The Rule ensures that for a sacrifice or expenditure to qualify as a general 
average act under any provision of the Rules, it must have been reasonably made or 
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 The Rule seeks to influence the ship’s master to make reasonable sacrifices and 
incur reasonable expenses at ensuring the successful completion of the common maritime 
adventure. It is argued that the Rule will prevent allowances in certain cases where the 
working of the previous Rules may have allowed a more generous interpretation than was 
originally intended as illustrated in the Alpha case. However, the test should be what a 
reasonable master would do in the circumstances, the more immediate the peril at the time of 
the act, the greater latitude in judging after the event whether the master’s act was 
reasonable.
764
   
(ii) Rule E – Onus of proof  
 
Rule E was first introduced in YAR 1924. The Rule was amended in the YAR 1994 to 
provide that the claimant in proof of its claim has 12 months from the date of the termination 
of the adventure to give notice to the average adjuster of the loss or damage in respect of 
which it claims contribution. Where it fails to give such notice and upon request by the 
average adjuster fails to proffer evidence in proof of its claim within 12 months of such a 
request by the average adjuster, the average adjuster is at liberty to estimate the extent of 
allowance or the contributory value on the basis of the available information to him/her. Such 
estimate can only be challenged for being manifestly incorrect.
765
 
It is argued that such a challenge of the estimate being manifestly incorrect should be 
on the basis of the available information to the adjuster which he/she used in the adjustment 
and not based on information which was not made known to the adjuster and which would 
have made the adjuster arrive at a different estimate if it had been made available to him/her. 
The claimant has the onus to provide all the necessary information to enable the adjuster 
arrive at an equitable and manifestly correct estimate which would be acceptable to all parties 
to the maritime adventure or bear the consequence of its failure to do so.  
This amendment is significant as it was an attempt to address one of the main criticisms 
of the general average system, which is that average adjustments take time.
766
 The 
amendment curtails the length of time taken to produce general average adjustments caused 
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either by parties claiming in general average failing to give prompt notice of their intention to 
claim or having given prompt notice of their intention, failing to produce adequate evidence 
in support of their claim promptly despite being requested to do so by the adjuster. This 
provision reduces the task of average adjusters as it requires the claimant to produce 
documentary evidence of the matters relied upon to justify its claim, and it reduces the 




 (iii) Rule G – Valuation of Losses and Contributory Values, Non-Separation Agreement  
 
Rule G was first introduced in the YAR 1920. The amendment of the Rule in 1994 was the 
addition of two new paragraphs, as a reaction to developments in the maritime community, 
which imported the NSA in the YAR 1994. This addition to Rule G in the YAR 1994 
crystallised the practice of using standard Non-Separation forms in the market, thereby 
reducing paper work and avoiding the use of irregular wording.
768
 
(iv) Rule XI(d)  
 
This provision was introduced in the 1994 Rules to support the global efforts in preventing 
and minimising environmental pollution. This Rule was based on an understanding between 
marine property insurers and liability insurers at the CMI Sydney Conference referred to as 
the ‘pollution compromise’ which was to exclude from general average liabilities and clean-
up costs in connection with pollution which had already occurred under Rule C YAR 1994, 
but to admit certain of the costs of avoidance measures under Rule XI(d) YAR 1994. This 
forms a limited exception to the principle expressed in the second paragraph of Rule C YAR 
1994. It is submitted that the formulation of Rule XI(d) as part of the pollution compromise 
has the effect of providing a uniform framework for practice of many average adjusters.
769
 
This amendment in Rule XI(d) has the support of hull insurers and the International Group of 
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The evolution of the YAR from 1860 to 1994 epitomises the collective efforts by the 
maritime community towards achieving uniformity in the principles and practice of general 
average, rectifying identified defects in the YAR, simplifying and updating the Rules. Allen 
aptly notes that the periodic amendments of the YAR were ‘to keep pace with changes in 
shipping and to remedy deficiencies revealed by experience.’
771
  
The periodic revisions of the Rules were dictated by a consensus amongst the majority 
of interested parties of the need to keep abreast of developments in international commerce 
and in the maritime industry. This consensus amongst the majority of interested parties on the 
need for amendments provided the platform for the proper involvement of the various interest 
groups in updating and simplifying the YAR. The revision of the Rules in 2004, as will be 
shown in the next chapter, was the first time the Rules were revised without a consensus 
amongst the majority of interested parties on the need for the amendment of the Rules.
772
  
Significantly, before embarking on the amendment of any previous set of the YAR, 
sufficient time was allowed by the maritime community for the Rules to apply in the 
maritime industry for a proper assessment of the impact of the Rules before calls for revisions 
were made.
773
 The Rules were never revised as a result of a lone crusade by any interest 
group or as a result of any one interest acquiring more relative power in determining the 
scope of the Rules. This consensus amongst the majority of interested parties on the need for 
the amendment of any set of Rules and the requisite amendments to be made ensured the 




Regrettably, the outlined ingredients of the previous successful revision processes of 
the YAR were disregarded in the process that culminated in the approval of the YAR 2004, 
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as is shown in the next chapter, and it is argued that this contributed to the failure of the YAR 




CHAPTER 7 THE DISREGARD OF THE INGREDIENTS OF PREVIOUS 
SUCCESSFUL REVISION PROCESSES IN THE REVISION OF THE YORK-
ANTWERP RULES 1994 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter aims to show that the IUMI in its call for the revision of the YAR 1994 and the 
CMI in revising the YAR 1994 disregarded the earlier identified ingredients of the previous 
successful revision processes of the YAR and this contributed to the lack of widespread 
acceptance and use of the YAR 2004 in the maritime industry. Using the discussion in 
chapter six as a comparative base, this chapter examines the IUMI’s proposals for the 
revision of the YAR 1994 and the entire process that culminated in the adoption of the YAR 
2004 in order to identify the flaws in the proposals and in the process of revising the YAR 
1994. An examination of IUMI’s proposals is relevant as they relate to the content of the 
Rules which is inextricably linked with the revision process of the YAR 1994. This chapter 
informs the recommendations that will be made in this thesis with respect to the substantive 
revisions to the YAR and the process to be followed leading to consideration of any 
proposals to revise the YAR in 2016; with a view to avoiding the identified pitfalls in the 
revision of the YAR 1994. 
II IUMI’S CALL FOR THE REVISION OF THE YAR 1994  
(a) Timing 
 
Very soon, a matter of months in fact, after the adoption of the YAR 1994 at the CMI’s 
Sydney Conference, marine cargo insurers, led by the IUMI, initiated a call for revision of the 
YAR 1994.
775
 This call for revision was made so soon after the adoption of the YAR 1994 
because the IUMI was of the view that its position on the amendment of the YAR 1974 (as 
amended in 1990) had not been considered at the Sydney Conference.
776
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It is relevant to examine the basis for IUMI’s call for the revision of the YAR 1994 so 
soon after the Sydney Conference and its proposals for revision, to determine if there was any 
significant development in the maritime industry at the time that necessitated its call for 
revision immediately after the adoption of the YAR 1994 and the flaws, if any, in its 
proposals for revision. 
 
(b) The statistical basis for IUMI’s call for revision – A holistic assessment of the state of 
the general average system at the time? 
(i) Introduction 
 
The statistical basis for IUMI’s call for the revision of the YAR 1994 was the findings of 
Matthew Marshall contained in his paper
777
 presented to IUMI in 1994 (the findings were 
updated in 1996 and 1999) in which he carried out research into about 1700 general average 
adjustments.  
(ii) Identified flaws 
 
Marshall’s research principally showed that:  
 
(i) General average is expensive.  
The annual cost of general average claims to insurers at the time was about US$300 
million. 10 per cent was made up of adjusters’ fees and a further 10 per cent was interest and 
commission. 
The statistics showed that salvage occupied the most significant part of claims in 
general average and represented over half of total claims in collision and grounding cases, 
while in fire losses it was relatively restricted.
778
 This echoed the assertion by cargo insurers 
that general average claims were made up mostly of salvage claims and that they had seen 
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(ii) General average takes too long.  
The statistics showed that the adjustment of claims was a time consuming and lengthy 
process. In seven years only 95 per cent of adjustments could be expected to be completed. 
Two-thirds of the adjustments were produced in the first two years but unfortunately that 
accounted for only one-third of the money moved.  
Many general average adjustments were produced in under a year (about 30 per cent) 
and about two-thirds were produced within two years of the date of the casualty. However, in 
terms of the values involved in those claims the production of adjustments was much slower 
– about 5 per cent in a year while it took four and half years for the two-thirds mark to be 
reached.
780
 These statistics were similar to UNCTAD statistics (in its study of the general 
average system in 1993) which showed that 20 per cent of the adjustments sampled were 
completed within a year, 60 per cent in two years and 83 per cent in three years.
781
 However, 
Marshall was of the view that one change to the YAR in 1994 might have a marginal effect – 
the introduction of a time limit for the production of documents in Rule E,
782
 after which 
adjusters will be able to estimate the relevant values.  
It is argued that Marshall’s assertion on the likely effect of Rule E YAR 1994 should be 
regarded as a general assertion without evidentiary basis as his study failed to assess the 
impact of Rule E in the market with respect to the length of time it took to produce average 
adjustments; to ascertain whether Rule E would have a ‘marginal effect’ or a ‘significant 
effect’ on general average adjustments. Marshall’s statistics also showed a different position 
from the assertion of IUMI members who had stated that adjustments were being produced in 




(iii) General average is inequitable.  
The statistics showed that 80 per cent of cases were acknowledged as being caused or 
likely to have been caused by the shipowner’s fault. Nevertheless, 60 to 65 per cent of the 
total cost of general average claims was borne by cargo interests. Engine failures
784
 
                                                          
780
 M Marshall op cit note 415 at 7. 
781
 See UNCTAD report op cit note 779 at 33. 
782
 Cf chap 6 § II(c)(vi)(b)(ii) supra. 
783
 See chap 7 § II(c) infra.   
784
 Includes any problems with the ship’s machinery, generators or electrical equipment. 
163 
 
accounted for 30 per cent of the number of general averages and 8 per cent of claims value.
785
 
Thus, engine failures accounted for the single largest source of general average though 
shipowners’ share of the total claims in monetary terms was much lower. About a third of 
engine failure losses seemed to be as a result of the unseaworthiness of the vessels. 
These findings were also similar to UNCTAD’s findings.
786
 UNCTAD statistics, it 
could be argued, gave credence to the findings of Marshall on the causes of general average 
incidents and their percentages in terms of number and claims value.  
Marshall’s findings also showed that the age of ships also had an impact on the general 
average system. The older the ship the more likely it was to be involved in a general average. 
There was a very sharp increase in the number of general averages occurring to ships at 
around the age of six years, especially involving container and general cargo ships.
787
 This 
finding was also analogous to findings in the UNCTAD study.
788
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This surely has an effect on the way general average loss is distributed. Different trades 
are affected by ageing tonnage with declining values as the ship grows older leading to ever 
higher shares borne by cargo. It becomes more attractive for a shipowner of an ageing ship to 
declare general average since the ship’s value will represent a lower proportion of the total 
contributory values. Cargo owners therefore pay significantly higher contributions as the ship 
gets older, especially in relation to container vessels where there might be several cargo 
interests. This leads to heavier financial burden on cargo in the general average system.  
The statistics also showed that the size of the general average loss influenced the 
distribution of losses between cargo and hull. Proportions due from both interests were 
reasonably similar in the smaller claims, but much higher for cargo in large claims.
789
  
Marshall’s statistics showed that most general average incidents were as a result of 
negligence in the maintenance, operation and navigation of vessels. Despite this fact, cargo 
owners and ultimately their insurers continued to bear the bulk of general average 
contributions especially with respect to container vessels. General average incidents were 
more prevalent in older vessels that were poorly maintained and owners of such vessels 
would be more inclined to declare general average as their proportion of the general average 
contribution would be less than that of cargo. The statistics showed that a very low 
percentage of all costs involved sacrifice or expense to cargo and very few incidents involved 
partial or total loss to cargo. Thus, there was a measure of transference of burden of losses 
and general average expenditure (and ultimately general average contribution) from hull to 
cargo.  
However, it is argued that the statistics cannot be regarded as a complete reflection of 
the state of the general average system at the time as it failed to consider the effects of the 
International Safety and Management (ISM) Code
790
 and Port State Control on the general 
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 Furthermore, Rule D YAR 1994 ensures that were the general average act 
was necessitated by the carrier’s fault in providing an unseaworthy vessel, cargo owners will 
not contribute to make good the carrier’s personal loss. To further address any inequities that 
may arise and the issue of the cost of general average, the Rule Paramount was introduced in 
YAR 1994 to ensure that only sacrifices and expenses that were reasonably made and 
incurred would be reapportioned in general average.
792
 The statistics also failed to examine 
the impact of modern technology and the change introduced in Rule E YAR 1994 in 
hastening the adjustment of claims and cutting down the cost of adjusters fees.
793
 Thus, the 
statistics were not a holistic finding of the state of the general average system at the time and 
it is argued that the statistics cannot be regarded as sufficient basis for IUMI’s call for 
revision immediately after the Sydney Conference. Furthermore, the statistics did not show 
any new significant development in the maritime industry so soon after the adoption of the 
YAR 1994. It could be argued that Marshall’s study did not raise any new issue that the 
maritime community was not aware of at the time of adopting the YAR 1994. This is because 
the findings in Marshall’s statistics were similar to the UNCTAD findings about the general 
average system which the maritime community had studied in 1993 prior to adopting the 
YAR 1994. 
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(c) IUMI 1996 questionnaire on general average  
(i) Introduction 
 
Based on the above non-holistic statistics, IUMI, prior to its Oslo Conference in 1996, sent 
out questionnaires to its members and it received a good response from member associations 
from all over the world, with 33 replies
794
 received as at the date of the Conference. The 
questionnaire was divided into two parts: Part A contained general questions on the YAR 
1994 and Part B were questions on market attitudes to the general average system. It is 
relevant to examine the replies to determine if they showed any defects in the YAR 1994 or 
any significant development in the industry after the adoption of the YAR 1994 to justify 
IUMI’s call for revision. 




 to the questionnaire gave a useful insight into the general average system and 
the activities of marine insurers with regard to general average at the time. The replies 
showed that IUMI member associations after the CMI Sydney Conference had not 
undertaken any study on the YAR 1994 to determine their effect on the general average 
system and on insurers;
796
 signifying that marine insurers were not proactive enough in their 
local markets on issues relating to general average. 
With respect to the YAR 1994, the replies clearly showed that the Rules had not 
attracted significant criticisms in most local markets. The Rules had been accepted in most 
markets and more markets were in the process of accepting and using the Rules.
797
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Furthermore, the changes introduced in the YAR 1994 had not caused great concern to hull 
and cargo insurers in most local markets.
798
 This clearly showed widespread acceptance of 
the Rules globally and that no defect in the Rules had yet been identified.  
The replies showed that General Average Absorption Clauses were being used in most 
jurisdictions and had reduced the number of general average claims; though some cargo 
insurers claimed they were still seeing uneconomic claims in general average.
799
 
Significantly, the better known and quality shipowners, mostly in the container trade, made it 
a rule not to declare general average even to the extent of meeting cargo’s proportion of 
general average contribution;
800
 clearly showing that the quality shipowners did not consider 
general average as a vessel maintenance system. These developments had the effect of 
reducing the cost of general average to marine insurers; particularly cargo insurers. Most 
importantly, two-third of IUMI member associations stated there was a tendency for 
adjustments to be prepared more quickly in recent years.
801
 It is argued that this assertion 




Thus, the replies showed that there had not been any major criticisms of the YAR 1994 
and no developments at the time showed any defects in the Rules that necessitated a revision 
of the YAR 1994.
803
 Noteworthy is the fact that IUMI’s questionnaire was sent out two years 
after the Sydney Conference when the YAR 1994 were still in their infancy in the market (but 
gaining much acceptance) and also when the impact of the changes introduced by the YAR 
1994 had not been felt in the general average system. It was evidently still premature to 
assess the full impact of the changes introduced by the 1994 Rules,
804
 let alone to advocate 
for the revision of the Rules. 
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(d) IUMI’s disregard for the ingredients of previous successful revisions 
(i) IUMI Oslo Conference 1996 
 
Despite the replies to IUMI’s questionnaire showing that there was no significant 
development necessitating the revision of the YAR 1994 and the evident lack of support for 
revision at the time, IUMI remained undaunted in its call for revision. Its call for the revision 
of the YAR 1994 was then discussed at its Oslo Conference in 1996. The Conference 
considered papers presented to it on the subject. Gooding (one of the IUMI’s members that 
formulated its proposals for revision) in his paper stated that the YAR 1994 should be 
amended to ‘do away with safe prosecution of the voyage and all the layers of extraneous 
expense that go with it.’
805
 
Thus, Gooding was advocating for the restriction of general average to the common 
safety principle by the abolition of the common benefit principle. 
Alluding to the wrong timing of IUMI’s call for revision, Taylor (then chairman of the 
CMI ISC on the revision of the YAR 1974) in his remarks at the Conference stressed the fact 




On IMUI’s complaints about the general average system as reflected in Marshall’s 
study, Taylor was of the view that ‘the complaint that the shipowner, who operates badly 
maintained and incompetently crewed vessels can benefit under general average and the YAR 
is, to my mind, not a criticism of the general average system, but a criticism of the fact that 
such shipowners are tolerated and even insured.’
807
   
The point made by Taylor is very pertinent. Most standard hull policies impose a duty 
on the assured to ensure at the inception and throughout the duration of the insurance that the 
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vessel is classed with a Classification Society
808
 agreed by the hull insurer and that the 
vessel’s class within the Society is maintained.
809
 The shipowner also has a further duty of 
ensuring that any requirements made by the Classification Society in relation to the 
seaworthiness of the vessel or to her maintenance are complied with by the dates required by 
that Society.
810
 Where the shipowner fails to comply with the above requirements the insurer 
will be discharged from any liability arising from the policy.
811
 In practice, most insurers take 
this duty imposed on shipowners seriously and only accept class certificates from a 




However, the depressed insurance market of the recent past made the insurance market 
less selective and cover was made available to owners of manifestly sub-standard vessels 
without making relevant enquiries.
813
 Insurers by this act were contributing to the problem in 
the general average system as sub-standard vessels are more prone to be involved in general 
average situations. Without insurance cover for such sub-standard vessels, the owners would 
be compelled to carry out the necessary repairs in order to obtain insurance cover.  
Furthermore, IUMI’s concern about the activities of unscrupulous shipowners at a port 
of refuge had been addressed by the maritime community through the introduction of the 
Rule Paramount in the YAR 1994.
814
  
However, in disregard of Taylor’s caution against a premature call for the revision of 
the YAR 1994, IUMI’s Executive Committee at the end of the Oslo Conference set up a 
Working Group to discuss the whole system of general average, the benefits and 
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shortcomings of the YAR (specifically the 1994 Rules).
815
 After the deliberations of the 
delegates at the meetings of the Working Group, the Working Group produced a report titled 
‘General Average - How should it be changed?’ the articulated purpose of which was to 
restrict general average to the common safety principle by disallowing in general average 
expenses incurred for the safe prosecution of a voyage from a port of refuge.
816
 This report 
was presented at the Open Council Meeting of IUMI in Lisbon, in September 1998
817
 and at 
the IUMI Conference in Berlin in 1999.
818
 This resulted in a formal request by IUMI to the 
CMI the following year for further reform of the YAR to be given urgent consideration.  
 
(ii) IUMI Open Council Meeting, Lisbon, 1998 
 
In furtherance of IUMI’s disregard of the premature timing of its call for revision, the report 
of its Working Group on the proposed changes to the YAR 1994 was presented at its Open 
Council Meeting in Lisbon in September 1998. The proposed changes in the report were to 
restrict the concept of general average in the YAR to the common safety principle.
819
 The 
report was of the view that the restriction of general average to the common safety principle 
would take out a very substantial number of the flaws of the general average system.
820
 IUMI 
noted that the changes would be at the expense of the shipowner, but the better quality, the 
less impact.
821
 It however, conceded that the proposed changes would present 
 
 ‘some problems to the cargo owner with respect to forwarding cargo to destination in 




                                                          
815
 Report of IUMI General Average Working Group, 2, IUMI Open Council Meeting, Lisbon, 1998, available 
at www.jssusa.com/assets/Uploads/Ga-paper/WGLisbon98.pdf, accessed 21 November 2011. 
816
 Cf chap 2 § II(a) supra. 
817
 The full Report is available at www.jssusa.com/assets/Uploads/Ga-papers/WGLisbon98.pdf, accessed 21 
November 2011. 
818
 J McCormack ‘The Impetus for Change in the 1994 York-Antwerp Rules – Real or Fanciful’, 16, available at 
www.jssusa.com/assets/Uploads/GA-papers/HMMAAA.pdf, accessed 20 November 2011. 
819
 Report of IUMI General Average Working Group, 5, IUMI Open Council Meeting, Lisbon, 1998, available 
at www.jssusa.com/assets/Uploads/Ga-papers/WGLisbon98.pdf, accessed 21 November 2011. 
820
 Ibid at 6. 
821





The above concession by IUMI correctly stated what would have been the effect of its 
proposals. Where there is a restriction of general average to the common safety principle, the 
effect will be that acts done for the common benefit of the parties to the adventure will not be 
allowed in general average and this will have adverse effects on shipowners as such acts are 
usually done at a port of refuge and in most cases the shipowner makes the disbursements for 
such port of refuge expenses with a view that such costs will be re-apportioned in general 
average.
823
 However, cargo owners will also be affected. Under Rule G YAR 1994, the 
shipowner where he terminates a voyage at a port of refuge can forward cargo in another 
vessel to the port of destination by availing himself of the NSA principle in Rule G; thereby 
avoiding unnecessary delays
824
 and such transhipment cost is allowed in general average. The 
abolition of the common benefit principle will lead to the abolition of the NSA principle in 
Rule G and this will result in cargo owners bearing the cost of forwarding cargo to the port of 
destination. Such cost will be more than the cost cargo interests and ultimately their insurers 
would have incurred under Rule G because cargo owners will bear the cost alone.  
Economically, cargo insurers will incur less cost under a general average system that is 
confined to the common safety principle as most port of refuge expenses are incurred by 
shipowners.  
It is argued that having been cautioned in Oslo of the wrong timing of its call for 
revision and by its concession in Lisbon of the likely negative impact of its proposal, 
especially on cargo, IUMI should have been discouraged at this stage from persisting with its 
call for revision. 
III IUMI’S PROPOSALS TO THE CMI FOR THE REVISION OF THE YAR 1994 
(a) Introduction 
 
After its Oslo and Lisbon meetings, IUMI made several proposals for the revision of the 
YAR 1994 with the aim of restricting general average to the common safety principle. The 
proposals are analysed to determine if they were justified. This thesis will restrict its analysis 
to the proposals that resulted in the changes introduced by the YAR 2004 because the 
proposals made by IUMI were numerous.
825
 An examination of the proposals is what follows. 
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(b) Redefinition of general average 
 
IUMI proposed that a definition of general average be drawn from a slightly amended section 




‘(1) A general average loss is a loss reasonably, proximately and directly caused by or 
consequential on a general average act. It includes general average expenditure as well as 
general average sacrifice. 
(2) There is a general average act when and only when any extraordinary sacrifice or 
expenditure is intentionally and reasonably made or incurred for the common safety in 




The most significant change would be the deletion of the words ‘imperilled in the 
common adventure’, coupled with the insertion of ‘for the common safety’ in paragraph two. 
The effect of this would be to restrict allowances in general average to the common safety 
principle. Thus, all allowances in general average under the common benefit principle would 
be excluded in general average.  
The proponents for retaining the common benefit principle opposed this proposal and 
argued that the general philosophy of co-operation which underlies general average 
encourages the parties to incur the expenditure necessary to ensure that the ship and cargo 
reach their ultimate destination.
828
 
It is argued that this proposal was flawed. Although the MIA 1906 in its definition of 
general average in section 66(2) limited it to the common safety principle, English courts had 
recognised the common benefit principle shortly after the commencement of efforts in 1860 
to achieve uniformity in the principles and practice of general average. 
In Attwood v Sellar,
829
 the Court of Appeal in recognising the common benefit principle 
for the first time in English law held that the costs of port entry, discharging, warehousing 
cargo, reloading it and leaving the port were to be allowed in general average. Thesiger LJ 
posited that those expenses ‘are all events part of one act or operation contemplated, resolved 
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Subsequently in Svendsen v Wallace,
831
 the House of Lords confirmed the common 
benefit principle in English law by deciding that the costs of port entry and discharge of cargo 
were general average. 
These decisions of the English courts took cognisance of the provisions of Resolutions 
6 and 8 of the Glasgow Resolutions 1860 and Rules VII and VIII YAR 1864 which allowed 
in general average expenses in discharging and warehousing cargo at a port of refuge and 
crew wages and maintenance at a port of refuge respectively.
832
 The above cases show that 
English law on general average codified in the MIA 1906, which IUMI’s proposal referred to, 
had embraced the common benefit principle some years after the uniformity process began in 
1860. Thus, IUMI’s argument that its proposed redefinition of general average in Rule A 
would bring it into line with the concept of general average in English law as reflected in the 
MIA 1906 is without foundation in reality.  
Of note is that after the English courts’ decisions mentioned above, neither insurers nor 
shipowners sent any more test cases on the subject of common benefit to trial. Also the AAA 
extracted some of the principles stated in their Rules of Practice from these judgments.
833
 
Thus, IUMI’s proposal for a restriction of general average to the common safety principle 
codified in s 66 MIA 1906 involved a ‘jettisoned’ English law of general average.  
The common benefit principle ensures that the adventure is completed, which is the 
essence of a sea adventure, by providing allowances for general average expenses incurred 
for the safe prosecution of the voyage from a port of refuge. This importance of the common 
benefit principle was recognised at the inception of the efforts to achieve uniformity in the 
law of general average.
834
 The safety of the vessel without a successful completion of the 
venture does not aid international trade and the economic growth of states.  
Alluding to the practical importance of the common benefit principle in a maritime 
adventure, Wilmer J notes that ‘it is no use saying that this valuable property … is safe, if it is 
safe in circumstances where nobody can use it. For practical purposes it might as well be at 
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the bottom of the sea.’
835
 Selmer, the most renowned abolitionist of general average, 
concludes that; 
 
 ‘the sharing of expenses incurred for the continuation of the transport after vessel and 
cargo have been brought to safety in a port of refuge … acts as a ‘buffer’ between the 
parties in situations where their interests may diverge materially. The equitable 





By stating the positive effect of the common benefit principle above, the practical 
benefit of the principle is even apparent to those who have had strong criticisms of the 
concept of general average.  
(c) In time of peril 
 
IUMI proposed that a peril should only continue until ship and cargo are in a condition of 




This proposal was a continuation of the proposal to restrict general average to the 
common safety principle. However, as stated earlier, it had long been established in English 
law that a vessel need not be in the grip of peril in order to justify a general average act.
838
 In 
Vlassopoulos v British & Foreign Marine Insurance Co (The ‘Makis’),
839
 the court held that 
‘it is not necessary that the ship should be actually in the grip, or even nearly in the grip, of 
the disaster that may arise from a danger. It would be a very bad thing if shipmasters had to 




Furthermore, the IUMI did not state what it meant by the vessel and cargo being in a 
‘condition of reasonable safety.’ Is such ‘condition of reasonable safety’ attained upon the 
arrival of a vessel at a port of refuge? It should be borne in mind that in some cases the arrival 
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of a vessel at a port of refuge does not put it in a condition of safety. Where a ship arrives at a 
port of refuge and is on fire or leaking, the danger is as much present as it was when the 
vessel was in danger at sea, until the fire is put out or the leakage staunched. In certain 
circumstances expenses have to be incurred at a port of refuge to enable a vessel attain a 
condition of safety at a port of refuge.
841
 If this proposal is followed, then once a vessel 
arrives at a port of refuge, allowances in general average will cease. Whatever expenditure is 
incurred after the vessel has arrived at a port of refuge (even if done for the safety of the 
vessel at the port of refuge) will be excluded in general average. It is argued that this proposal 
was even contrary to the common safety principle which IUMI wanted to govern the general 
average system, as safety in some cases will not be attained immediately a vessel arrives at a 
port of refuge.   
 
(d) Rule F - Substituted expenses 
 
IUMI proposed that the allowance of substituted expenses in Rule F should be abandoned. 
Rule F YAR 1994 states: 
 
‘Any extra expense incurred in place of another expense which would have been allowed 
as general average shall be deemed to be general average and so allowed without regard 





IUMI noted that the most usual substituted expenses scenario occurs when a vessel has 
suffered damage and put into a port of refuge where it will be necessary to carry out repairs 
before the voyage can be completed.  
In support of this proposal IUMI relied on essentially two arguments. First, IUMI 
argued that if it is intended to substantially amend the YAR to remove general average 
expenses and sacrifices incurred or made once ship and cargo are no longer in the grip of a 
peril, then it would follow that this usual scenario could not arise because the cost of 
discharging, storing and reloading would not in any event be recoverable in general 
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 This rightly would have been the effect of the restriction of general average to the 
common safety principle.  
Secondly, it argued that to abandon substituted expenses would merely be to restore the 
English common law position.
844
 
Substituted expenses are expenses incurred in respect of a course of action undertaken 
as an alternative to, or in substitution for the expense of an action that would be allowable in 
general average.
845
 These include forwarding of cargo to destination by other vessels from the 




Contrary to IUMI’s assertion, there was uncertainty in English law with respect to 
substituted expenses. This uncertainty is evident in the decisions of English courts on 
substituted expenses. In Wilson v Bank of Victoria,
847
 the court held that the purchase of coals 
to work the auxiliary engine of a sailing ship, incurred in place of the greater expense of 
repairing masts and spars damaged in a storm, should not be made the subject of general 
average contribution since it was the shipowner’s duty under the contract of carriage to adopt 
the most economic course available to him. However, in Lee v Southern Insurance,
848
 the 
principle of substituted expenses was applied to a claim under a policy of insurance on freight 
for the cost of forwarding cargo to destination by rail from a port where the voyage had been 
abandoned. This uncertainty in English law led the AAA to adopt two Rules of Practice in 
1876 on substituted expenses – Rule F14 (previously B16) and Rule F15 (previously B17) – 
relating to towage of a vessel from a port of refuge and forwarding of cargo from a port of 
refuge respectively. Thus, English practice recognised the importance of substituted 
expenses. Of importance is that these Rules of Practice formed the basis of the Rule on 
substituted expenses in the YAR introduced for the first time in Rule X(d) YAR 1890 and 
presently Rule F YAR 2004. Thus, the adoption of IUMI’s proposal would have been a 
radical departure from the original Rules. 
A further consideration to be weighed in this regard is that by introducing a Rule on 
substituted expenses in 1890 the maritime community recognised the importance of 
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substituted expenses in the commercial community. Allowing substituted expenses as 
provided in Rules F, G and XI helps avoid costly repairs at a port of refuge to the benefit of 
all. It also reduces delay in the delivery of cargo by ensuring that the cargo is forwarded 
promptly to destination by transhipment under Rule G and also helps in making the ship more 
readily available for repairs. In general, substituted expenses help minimise the quantum of 
general average expenses at a port of refuge. The advantages to both shipowner and cargo of 
substituted expense of forwarding cargo to destination under Rule G YAR 1994 was affirmed 




‘Cargo owners can promptly recover their cargo in circumstances where substantial delay 
might otherwise ensue while the shipowners, anxious to earn their freight, store the 
cargo, carry out repairs and then resume the voyage. From the shipowners’ point of view, 
they are able to treat the general average situation as continuing when otherwise it would 
terminate and recover contribution pro rata for value for post-separation expenses which 




Thus, IUMI’s proposal was not based on current English law on substituted expenses 
and the abolition of substituted expenses in the Rules will eliminate the advantages to both 
the shipowner and cargo owner alluded to by Steel J.  
(e) Rule VI – Salvage remuneration 
 
IUMI proposed the amendment of the wording of Rule VI YAR 1994 as follows:  
 
‘(a) salvage payments (including legal fees associated with such payments) shall lie 
where they fall and not be brought into general average save only that any amounts paid 
by one party to the general average in respect of the proportion (calculated on salved 
values and not general average contributory values) of another party or parties shall be 
apportioned between the parties to the general average in accordance with these Rules. 
(b) In paragraph (a) of this section references to salvage payments and the like 
expressions shall be construed as excluding payments under article 14 of the Salvage 
Convention and similar provisions (including SCOPIC).’
851
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IUMI stated that Rule VI was only introduced in the YAR 1974 and has been accused 
of creating more work for general average adjusters and more expenses for marine property 
insurers than almost any other single change to the YAR in the last 50 years.
852
  
This assertion is correct because adjusters, among other things, would have to collect 
two sets of securities for salvage remuneration and general average and would have to 
ascertain the contributory values of the salved interests in order to ascertain the contributions 
to be made by each interest in general average. This can be a herculean task with respect to a 
container vessel involving thousands of cargo interests.
853
 Marine insurers incur more costs in 
covering their assured’s contribution both for the salvage remuneration and the re-
apportionment of the salvage remuneration in general average.
854
  
IUMI’s arguments for the exclusion of salvage expenses from general average were, 
among other things, that the inclusion of salvage expenses involves unnecessary duplication 
of the apportionment of the salvage remuneration between contributing interests, and in most 
cases the proportions are not changed significantly but the cost of readjustment may be 
relatively high. It requires collection of two sets of security to cover basically the same 
moneys, it prolongs the whole operation, sometimes for years; and it involves additional 
work for cargo insurers.
855
 
With respect to IUMI’s argument that including salvage expenses in general average 
prolongs the adjustment process, it should be noted that in practice, the exclusion of salvage 
expenses will not necessarily hasten the adjustment process. By Rule XVII YAR 1994 
general average is adjusted based on the value of the property at the termination of the 
adventure and the value can only be quantified when charges, other than general average 
charges, that are incurred in respect of that property subsequent to the general average is 
ascertained. In other words, the salvage has to be settled before the average adjuster can be 
able to calculate the contributory value of the property. Thus, average adjusters will continue 
to collect two sets of security even if salvage is not re-apportioned in general average. 
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 On the argument that the cost of readjustment may be relatively high, it is submitted 
that most reputable adjusters calculate their fees on a time basis.
856
 Thus, a contributing party 
can rightly decline to pay adjusting fees which an adjuster cannot adequately demonstrate to 
be justified by the work involved.
857
  
Also the equitable distribution of the overall expenditure could be distorted where a 
party pays a lower percentage of salvage than another, because to arrive at its contributory 
value a smaller deduction from sound value would have to be made. Where the general 
average is bigger in monetary terms than the salvage, a party that reaches a more favourable 
salvage settlement with the salvor than other parties to the adventure could pay more in the 




It could be argued that the removal of salvage expenses from general average could 
give rise to inequities, particularly where there is differential settlement of salvage as one 
commercial interest can strike a bargain with salvors at the expense of other commercial 
interests. However, it is argued that the shipowner is likely to be in a stronger position to 
make an advantageous settlement with the salvor (with whom he may have had dealings with 
in the past) leaving the salvor to recover the bulk of his remuneration from cargo.
859
 
Thus, the arguments for and against the inclusion of salvage expenses in general 
average certainly had their merits and as such there was a need for a compromise in relation 
to the reapportionment of salvage expenditure in general average under the YAR. 
(f) Rule XX - Commission 
 
IUMI proposed that all general average commission should be abolished.
860
 It also proposed 
that administrative costs such as telephones, telexes and other communication charges should 
be excluded from general average completely. In support of this proposal, it argued that 
originally commission served as a useful incentive to parties to fund general average 
disbursements, but the introduction of interest by the YAR 1924 had created unwarranted 
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duplication, and that shipowners’ communication, banking and office expenses are now 
allowed separately which equally has created unwarranted duplication.
861
 
IUMI was right in making this proposal. Commission was introduced in Rule XXI of 
the YAR 1924 as an incentive to parties to fund general average disbursements. This was in 
recognition of the practice in most European States and in the United States.
862
 English law, 
as confirmed in Schuster v Fletcher,
863
 did not allow commission for general average 
disbursements. Rule XXI YAR 1924, therefore, brought uniformity on the issue. However, 
Rule XXII was also introduced in the YAR 1924 allowing interest payable on accounts 
expended which was also to serve as an incentive to parties to fund general average 
disbursements.
864
 Thus, Rules XXI and XXII both aimed at encouraging parties to fund 
general average disbursements. 
It is argued that the allowance of interest is sufficient incentive for parties to fund 
general average disbursements as it provides them with adequate recompense for advancing 
funds for general average disbursements. Commission could, therefore, be abolished without 
any adverse effect on the parties as it was a duplication of the purpose served by the 
allowance of interest in general average.  
(g) Time bar 
 
In order to speed up the general average process, IUMI proposed a general contractual time 
limit for general average claims. It proposed a clause that might read: 
 
‘All parties to the general average and their guarantors (if any) shall in any event be 
discharged from all liability whatsoever in respect of claims for general average 
contributions unless judicial or arbitral proceedings have been instituted within a period 
of one year after the date upon which the general average adjustment has been published 
or six years after the general average act (whichever is the earlier). These periods may 
however be extended if the parties so agree after the cause of action has arisen.’
865
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IUMI argued that this rule shall supersede any domestic law which provides for a 
different time limit to that specified herein for the commencement of suit in respect of claims 
for general average contributions between parties to the general average and their guarantors. 
This proposal was an attempt to speed up the adjustment proposal. Rule E 1994 
Rules
866
 was the first attempt by the maritime community to speed up the adjustment process 
by providing a 12 month time-limit in which documentation in support of general average 
claims should be sent to an average adjuster. This was to ensure that the average adjuster 
receives such documentation promptly in order for the adjustment to be completed on time; 
thereby cutting down the administrative costs involved in the process.  
However, IUMI’s proposal would not have been applicable in certain jurisdictions that 
have mandatory time bar provisions on general average and which cannot be departed from 
by parties through contract.
867
 Thus, any rule that seeks to supersede such mandatory 
domestic laws on time bar will be declared null by the courts in such jurisdictions. 
(h) Rule XXI - Interest 
 
IUMI proposed the amendment of the rate of interest in Rule XXI to provide for a more 
flexible rate.
868
 A 7 per cent rate of interest is specified in Rule XXI YAR 1994, but it had 
widely been recognised that it could give rise to injustice if the rate is only revised every 20 
to 25 years when the YAR are revised.
869
 IUMI noted that the abolition of the 7 per cent fixed 
rate would give rise to uncertainty but it was felt that fixing the new rate by reference to the 
currency of the adjustment would be fairer in view of the very wide differences in the interest 
rates from country to country.  
It is argued that this proposal was necessary as commercial rates would always 
fluctuate substantially during long intervals between the revisions of the Rules. Having a 
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fixed interest rate in the Rules could cause hardship on cargo owners and shipowners alike as 
such a fixed rate will not take cognisance of changes in commercial bank rates and inflation. 
Such a fixed interest rate might sometimes be inadequate in fully compensating a party who 
has made the sacrifice or incurred the expenditure (where the fixed rate is lower than the 
prevailing bank rate)
870
 and could also represent a windfall to a party that has incurred such 
expenditure or sacrifice (where the fixed rate is much higher than current bank rate). This 
shows the need for the amendment to Rule XXI in YAR 2004
871
 to be retained in the new 
Rules to be adopted in 2016. 
IV THE CMI’S ROLE IN THE REVISION OF THE YAR 1994 – A DISREGARD 
OF THE INGREDIENTS OF PREVIOUS SUCCESSFUL REVISION PROCESSES? 
(a) Introduction 
 
In considering the CMI’s role in the revision of the YAR 1994, it is pertinent to analyse the 
replies of the NMLAs to the CMI 1999 questionnaire on the possible revision of the YAR 
1994, the submissions made to the CMI by other interested parties on IUMI’s proposals and 
the views of delegates at the various CMI pre-Vancouver meetings in an attempt to ascertain 
whether the identified ingredients of the previous successful revision processes were reflected 
in the CMI’s revision of the YAR 1994. This comparison of the revision process of the YAR 
1994 with the previous revision processes will provide the proper context for drawing a 
conclusion on whether, in amending the YAR 1994; the CMI disregarded the ingredients of 
previous successful revision processes. 
 
(b) CMI 1999 questionnaire on the possible revision of the YAR 1994 
 
The CMI, in considering IUMI’s call for revision, established a Working Group on General 
Average which prepared a questionnaire that was sent to all NMLAs.
872
 The questionnaire 
                                                          
870
 It is relevant to note that the low rate of the fixed interest rate of 5 per cent in the 1950 Rules as compared to 
prevailing bank rates at that time necessitated the call for an amendment of Rule XXI 1950 Rules. This led to 
the increase of interest rate to 7 per cent in the YAR 1974. See the Preliminary Report of the President of the 
ISC on the revision of YAR 1950 in CMI Documentation 1970 (IV) 98.  
871
 Cf chap 4 § II(d) supra. 
872
 For a full text of the questionnaire, see the Report of the CMI Working Group on General Average in CMI 
Yearbook 2000 (Singapore I) 290. 
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was aimed at ascertaining the views of NMLAs on the IUMI’s call and its proposals for the 
revision of the YAR 1994. Replies
873
 to the questionnaire were received from 21 NMLAs.
874
 
The analysis of the replies
875
 is relevant in order to determine the level of support or 
opposition by the NMLAs to IUMI’s proposals and the proposed revision of the YAR 1994 at 
the time to determine if there was a consensus amongst the NMLAs for the revision of the 
YAR 1994 at the time. 
(i) Question 1 
 
The first question asked whether time had come to reduce the scope of the YAR to the 
principle of common safety. The question was prefaced by the statement that the YAR 
originally provided for the distribution of expenses and sacrifices over the contributing 
interests only as far as they were incurred for the common safety of ship and cargo. Later on 
the scope was extended to include expenses incurred for the common benefit – like port of 
refuge and substituted expenses.  
The MLAUS
876
 and the BMLA
877
 were in agreement that the question as formulated 
was incorrect. They stated that the first Rules (York Rules 1864) were not solely limited to 
the principle of common safety but included several instances of the common benefit 
                                                          
873
 The replies are unpublished by the CMI; however, electronic copies of some of the replies were kindly made 
available to the author by the CMI Secretariat. The replies are contained in a file. 
874
 Report of CMI Working Group on General Average in CMI Yearbook 2000 (Singapore I) 291. See also CMI 
Yearbook 2003 (Vancouver I) 277. 
875
 The author was unable to obtain all the replies of the 21 NMLAs that replied to the questionnaire from the 
CMI and the Associations involved despite repeated requests. Thus effort is made in this work to analyse replies 
that represent views from at least one Association in each of the different continents. This is an attempt to have a 
sense, though limited, of the views of NMLAs on the IUMI’s proposals. However the reply of the Maritime Law 
Association (MLA) of Australia and New Zealand is not analysed as the Association informed the CMI 
Secretariat that it would not be commenting on the questionnaire. The Senegalese MLA was the only African 
MLA that replied to the questionnaire and answered ‘yes’ to all the questions without proffering reasons for its 
answers. The Gulf MLA and the Slovenia MLA also gave ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers to the questionnaire without 
explanations. The replies of BMLA, MLAUS, Associacao Brasileira de Dirreito Maritimo (‘ABDM’ – Brazilian 
Maritime Law Association) and China Maritime Law Association (CMLA) are what is analysed. 
876
 The MLAUS’ reply to CMI 1999 questionnaire on general average (hereafter ‘MLAUS’ reply’) dated 30 
March 2000. 
877
 BMLA’s reply to CMI 1999 questionnaire on general average (hereafter ‘BMLA’s reply’) 1. 
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principle. As stated earlier,
878
 Rule VII 1864 Rules allowed the cost of discharging, reloading 
and stowing cargo at a port of refuge and also the cost of leaving the port. Similarly, Rule 
VIII 1864 Rules allowed wages and maintenance of the master and mariners from the time of 
entering a port of refuge until the ship shall have been made ready to proceed on her voyage. 
The Associations’ views correctly stated the position under the York Rules 1864.
879
 
Furthermore, it has been noted in this thesis that the Glasgow Resolutions also recognised the 
common benefit principle in Resolutions 6 and 8.
880
 Thus, the first question in the 
questionnaire was incorrect.  
Based on the above view, the MLAUS expressly did not support any proposal to restrict 
general average to the common safety principle.
881
 The MLAUS further emphasised that after 
all the intensive work done by member associations of the CMI, leading up to and at the 
Sydney Conference when the YAR 1994 were adopted; there was simply no good reason to 
embark on another review of the Rules at the time. It felt that all the issues in the CMI 
questionnaire were fully debated at the Sydney Conference and that there had been no 




The above view reiterated the view of David Taylor in his remarks at the IUMI Oslo 
Conference 1996
883
 and the view of shipowning interests represented by the ICS,
884
 on the 
wrong timing of IUMI’s call for revision. Furthermore, the view underscored the fact that 
significant developments in international trade and in the maritime industry had played a 
pivotal role in the amendment of previous versions of the YAR and that there was no 
development at the time necessitating a review of the YAR 1994.
885
   
The BMLA, although it pointed out that the York Rules 1864 contained Rules on the 
common benefit principle, could not provide an answer to this question as opinions within the 
                                                          
878






 This view was supported in the replies of the NMLAs of France, Venezuela, the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Germany.  
882
 MLAUS’ reply, 1. Cf chap 6 § II(c) supra. This view was also shared by the Italian Maritime Law 
Association (IMLA). 
883
 See chap 7 § II(d)(i) supra.  
884
 See chap 7 § V(c) infra. 
885
 Cf chap 6 § II(c) supra. 
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Association were polarised between those who were in favour of the abolition of the common 
safety principle (cargo and hull insurers) and those who were in favour of the retention of the 
common benefit principle (shipowners and average adjusters).
886
 Of note is that the view of 
shipowners and average adjusters in the BMLA concurred with the view of the MLAUS that 
it was premature for a revision of the 1994 Rules barely six years after the adoption of the 
1994 Rules; which Rules had not been demonstrated to work unsatisfactorily.
887
 It is 
submitted that the polarisation within the BMLA underline the divergent interests that make 
up a NMLA and how their varying interests shape the response of a NMLA to CMI 
questionnaires.  
The CMLA was unable to make any comment on questions one and two and did not 
adduce reasons for its inability to do so.
888
 It could be inferred that, like in the BMLA, there 
was divergence of opinion on the questions within the CMLA.
889
 
The ABDM concurred with the view of the MLAUS and contended that there was no 
reason to change in the YAR 1994, the common benefit principle to the common safety 
principle. It stated that in the event of the non-acceptance of the common benefit principle, if 
a ship changes her course to a port of refuge in order to safeguard the common interests, only 
one interest (usually shipowning interest) will have the burden to pay extraordinary expenses 
at the port of refuge, in order to proceed with the common adventure to reach the 
destination.
890
 If the Rules are altered only for the sake of common safety principle, it would 
result in a position in which the cargo interests will take advantage from the extraordinary 
expenses that should be incurred by all concerned, only to be paid by the shipowner, in order 
for the ship to carry the cargo in safety to their destination.
891
  
                                                          
886
 There was also a similar divergence in opinion between these interests within the German MLA. See German 
MLA’s reply dated 11 April 2000.  
887
 BMLA’s reply 1. See chap 7 § II(c) supra. 
888
 CMLA’s reply to CMI questionnaire on general average dated 30 March 2000 (hereafter ‘CMLA’s reply’) 1. 
889
 It should be noted that art 193 of the Chinese Maritime Code 1993 recognises only the common safety 
principle in its definition of general average. The definition is akin to Rule A YAR 1994. However, arts 194 and 
195 recognise the common benefit principle by allowing in general average certain port of refuge expenses and 
substituted expenses respectively. 
890
 ABDM’s reply to CMI 1999 questionnaire on general average (hereafter ‘ABDM’s reply’) 1.  
891
 Ibid.  
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The view of ABDM underscores the fact that the common benefit principle has long 
been recognised in Brazilian law.
892
 Article 764(9) of the Code allows in general average the 
wages and board of the crew during delay at a port of refuge. Furthermore, art 764(11) allows 
in general average the rent of warehouses for the deposit of goods at a port of refuge during 
the repair of the ship.  
Thus, the views of these Associations show that there was support for the retention of 
the common benefit principle in opposition to IUMI’s proposal for the restriction of general 
average to the common safety principle.
893
  
(ii) Question 2.1  
 
The question asked whether there was support that sacrifices and expenses should be 
included in general average only if made or incurred while ship and cargo are ‘in the grip of a 
peril.’ 





 concurred that an attempt to limit general average to only those sacrifices and 
extraordinary expenditures whilst in the grip of peril had been dealt with in Roche J’s 
decision in the English case of Vlasspoulos v British and Foreign Insurance Co (The 
‘Makis’).
896
 Furthermore, the MLAUS stated that the practical result of IUMI’s proposal 
would probably be a prolonged argument and litigation as to when the period considered 
‘grip of peril’ commenced and ceased.
897
 The BMLA, in concurring with the view of the 
MLAUS, stated that the phrase ‘in the grip of peril’ might be understood as meaning that the 
peril must actually have begun to operate before any allowances can be made. It was of the 
view that even if allowances ceased when common safety was attained, expenses incurred as 
a direct consequence of a general average sacrifice for the common safety (eg cost of repairs 
to the ship of damage caused by sacrifice) would continue to be allowed whenever incurred.  
                                                          
892
Article 764 Brazil Commercial Code 1850.  
893
 Though copies of the entire replies could not be obtained, it is pertinent to note that the over-all replies by 
NMLAs showed that majority of the NMLAs (10 as opposed to seven NMLAs) were in favour of the retention 
of the common benefit principle. See CMI Yearbook 2000 (Singapore I) 291.   
894
 MLAUS’ reply, 1. 
895
 BMLA’s reply, 2. 
896
 [1929] 1 KB 187 at 191 (KB). Cf chap 2 § II(b), IV(b), VI(c) and chap 7 § III(c) supra. 
897
 MLAUS’ reply, 2.  
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In support of the above view of the MLAUS and BMLA, the ABDM stated that 
expenses and sacrifices in general average should not be accepted only when the vessel is in 
the grip of peril. It stated that they should be maintained in general average until such time as 




These views underscored the difficulties inherent in the IUMI’s proposal
899
 in 
ascertaining at what stage a vessel will be said not to be ‘in peril’ as the mere arrival of a 
vessel at a port of refuge does not stop it from being in peril in certain circumstances. Of note 
is that there was no divergence of opinion within the BMLA on this issue. It could be argued 
that the proponents of the abolition of the common benefit principle within the BMLA had 
conceded the fact that this proposal was impracticable.  
(iii) Question 2.2 
 
The question asked whether there was support that temporary repairs of the vessel in a port of 
refuge should be excluded from GA. 
The NMLAs in their replies gave divergent opinions on this issue. The MLAUS was of 
the view that the language of the proposition in the questionnaire overlooked those cases 
where the temporary repairs are necessary for the common safety. It argued that certainly, it 
was not the intention to eliminate from general average the cost of temporary repairs in those 
circumstances. In American practice it has always been the position that, when reasonably 
incurred to save other general average expenses, temporary repairs of accidental damage 
should be allowed as a substituted expense.
900
  
The MLAUS also noted the concerns about some of the abuses that might occur as a 
result of the decision in The Bijela
901
 case and stated that the Association’s delegation at the 
Sydney Conference 1994 was similarly concerned and proposed a tripartite solution to deal 
with what it perceived to be an over-expansion of general average in these situations.
902
 
First, the MLAUS proposed that the second paragraph of Rule XIV be excised from the 
Rules, thus placing the question of temporary repairs in the ambit of Rule F dealing with 
                                                          
898
 ABDM’s reply, 2. 
899
 See chap 7 § III(c) supra.  
900
 L Buglass op cit note 27 at 275. 
901
 Marida Ltd v Ors v Oswal Steel and others (The ‘Bijela’) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 636 (QB). 
902
 MLAUS’ reply, 2. 
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substituted expenses in general. Secondly, it proposed that the second paragraph of Rule X(a) 
be changed so as to allow in general average the cost of proceeding from a port of refuge, 
where repairs could not be effected, to a port where they could only in those cases where the 
first port could not provide repairs of any sort which were sufficient for the safe prosecution 
of the voyage. It was immaterial if the first port could only effect temporary repairs; as long 
as they could do the job sufficient for the voyage, one could not look to theoretical 
alternatives, such as those considered in The Bijela.
903
  
It should be noted that Rule X(a) 1994 Rules only applies to cost incurred were a vessel 
is ‘necessarily removed from a port of refuge because repairs cannot be carried out.’ It is 
argued that the repairs contemplated are those necessary to complete the voyage, which may 
or may not be permanent repairs. If it is possible in a commercial sense to carry out 
temporary or permanent repairs, the paragraph will not apply. In The Bijela,
904
 Hobhouse J 
held that the paragraph did not apply if either temporary repairs or permanent repairs were 
possible at the first port of refuge. It is argued that this is the only logical conclusion of the 
wording of the paragraph.  
Thirdly, the MLAUS stated that the Rule Paramount requiring reasonableness would 
always be a restraining force in those situations and some of the abuse feared by IUMI would 
be controlled.
905
 This assertion correctly emphasised the effect of the Rule Paramount
906
 in 
ensuring the non-recovery of a shipowner’s expenses in general average for temporary repairs 
at a port of refuge for the safe prosecution of the voyage, where the temporary repairs were 
unreasonable in the circumstances, thereby curbing abuses of Rule XIV.  
However, the MLAUS conceded that to limit temporary repairs only to those situations 
were an actual danger is present is to run in the face of universal law and practice of all 
maritime nations.  
The BMLA was of the view that there was no need to disallow temporary repairs 
allowed in their own right such as repairs of damage caused by sacrifice, or when effected for 
the common safety, the allowance of which is not in conflict with IUMI’s proposals. 
                                                          
903
 [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 636 (QB). 
904
 Ibid at 644. The decision was upheld in the Court of Appeal [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 411, but reversed in the 
House of Lords [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1. However, in neither of those courts did the point under the second 
paragraph of Rule X(a) arise directly for decision. Thus it is argued that Hobhouse J’s decision on the second 
paragraph of Rule X(a) remains valid.  
905
 MLAUS’ reply, 2. 
906
 Cf chap 6 § II(c)(vi)(b)(i) supra. 
189 
 
However, opinions of members were polarised as regard the allowance in general average of 
temporary repairs effected at a port of refuge for the safe prosecution of the voyage, which 
are allowable only on a substituted expense basis.
907
 Its members that were in favour of 
restricting general average to the common safety principle were in favour of disallowing this 
while those in favour of retaining the scheme in the YAR 1994 considered that temporary 
repairs, as other substituted expenses, should continue to be allowed.  
The views of the MLAUS and BMLA show that both MLAs were in support of 
retention of the allowance in general average of temporary repairs made at a port of refuge 
for the common safety of the adventure. However, the views show that there was support 
within the MLAUS for the amendment of paragraph two of Rule XIV 1994 Rules in view of 
the decision in The Bijela.
908
 The divergence of opinion in the BMLA signified that this was 
a thorny issue that needed to be addressed.  
Unlike the MLAUS, the ABDM did not see any need to amend Rule XIV and stated 
that since such temporary repairs are effected in order to proceed to the destination of the 
common maritime adventure, they should be included in general average up to the amount of 
the economy saved.
909
 This view was in support of the retention of the second paragraph of 
Rule XIV YAR 1994. This allows the cost of temporary repairs at a port of refuge necessary 
in order to proceed to destination to be allowed on a substituted expense basis.
910
 Thus, where 
a vessel carries out temporary repairs instead of permanent repairs at a port of refuge which 
would have taken longer than temporary repairs and the vessel thereby avoids costs such as 
port charges, crew wages, cost of discharging, storing and reloading of cargo during the 
detention for permanent repairs; the cost of the temporary repairs should be allowed in 
general average up to these general average expenses saved.
911
  
(iv) Question 2.3 
 
The question asked whether there was support for the exclusion of crew wages and 
maintenance in the port of refuge in the Rules. 
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 MLAUS’ reply, 2. 
908
  [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 636. The MLAUS’ view was supported by the view of the IMLA. 
909
 ABDM’s reply, 2. 
910
 Rule F YAR 1994.  
911
 The view is in support of the decision of the House of Lords in The Bijela [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (HL).  
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The MLAUS stated that the United States common law has always confirmed that port 
of refuge expenses, including wages and maintenance of the crew, that are for the common 
benefit are an inherent part of general average. It argued that there was no rationale to change 
this view through the Rules.
912
 The ABDM in support of the MLAUS’ view stated that crew 
wages and maintenance expenses should be maintained in general average where they are 
exclusively necessary for the common maritime adventure. 
The MLAUS’ view underlines the fact that United States law since Campbell v 
Alknomac
913
 has recognised the allowance of crew wages and maintenance in general average 
and the decision of the court in that case has been followed in subsequent judgments.
914
 The 
view of the ABDM was based on the fact that crew wages and maintenance at a port of 
refuge has long been recognised in Brazilian law.
915
 
However, there was divergence of opinion within the BMLA on this issue. The 
BMLA’s members who were in support of the restriction of the scope of general average to 
common safety favoured the abolition of allowances for crew wages and maintenance after 
reaching the port of refuge and achieving a point of safety (except during delay caused by 
making good damage caused by sacrifice).
916
 Those in favour of the system in the YAR 1994 
saw no reason to alter the allowance of crew wages and maintenance.
917
 The BMLA therefore 
did not present an official position on this issue. 
 
(v) Question 2.4 
  
The question asked whether there was support that the cost of discharging; storage and 
reloading of cargo in the port of refuge should no longer be allowed in general average. 
                                                          
912
 MLAUS’ reply, 2. 
913
 Bee 124, 4 Fed Cas 1155, No 2350 (DCSC 1798).  
914
 See The Star of Hope 9 Wall 203 (1869) (US SCt); Hobson v Lord 92 US 397 (1875) (US SCt). However, 
the allowance ceases when the voyage is abandoned or the vessel is ready to resume her voyage: The Joseph 
Farwell 31 Fed Rep 844 (DC Ala 1887).  
915
 See art 764(9) Brazil Commercial Code 1850. Though the CMLA did not reply to this question, crew wages 
and maintenance during the extra period of detention of a vessel at a port of refuge for repairs for the safe 
prosecution of the voyage is allowed in Chinese law by art 194 Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of 
China 1993. 
916
 This view was also supported by the Gulf MLA and the Slovenia MLA.   
917
 BMLA’s reply, 2. This view was supported by the IMLA. See IMLA’s reply to CMI 1999 questionnaire, 2.  
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The Associations agreed that such expenses should be allowed in general average 
except the BMLA which could not provide a definite answer as there was a divergence in 
opinion on the subject between its shipowning and insurance members. The MLAUS noted 
that the questionnaire overlooked those instances where the discharge of cargo is necessary 
for the common safety. It stated that the expense should continue to be allowed, since that 
expense and the subsequent cost of storage and reloading were allowed not only in the 1864 
Rules, but in the law and practice of almost all maritime nations and also in those cases where 
it is necessary in order to carry out repairs necessary for the safe prosecution of the voyage.
918
 
It is submitted that this view was in recognition of Rule VII 1864 Rules and Rule X(b) and 
(c) YAR 1994. ABDM, in support of the MLAUS’ view, stated that costs of unloading, 
storage and reloading the cargo should be allowable in general average, while they are 
effected for the common benefit of all interests involved in a common maritime adventure.
919
 
It is argued that this view is ambiguous as it seems to suggest that such cost should not be 
allowed when incurred for the common safety. However, it is doubtful that this was the 
intention of the ABDM.  
Unlike the MLAUS and ABDM, BMLA’s members who were in support of restricting 
the scope of general average, favoured disallowing the costs of discharging (except when 
necessary for the common safety) storing and reloading of cargo. Those in favour of the 1994 
Rules saw no reason to alter the provision.
920
   
(vi) Question 2.5 
 
The question asked whether there was support that substituted expenses should be made good 
in general average. 
There was unanimity in the replies for the retention of substituted expenses in Rule F. 
The MLAUS stated that allowing substituted expenses aims at keeping the quantum of 
general average as low as possible and to achieve an earlier delivery of the cargo; either by 
incurring a shorter repair period through temporary repairs or by transhipment under a NSA. 
It also aims to make the ship more readily available for repairs.
921
 The MLAUS was of the 
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 MLAUS’ reply, 2. 
919
 ABDM’s reply, 2. 
920
 BMLA’s reply, 2.  
921
 MLAUS’ reply, 3. 
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view that it would seem that each of these aims would be to the benefit of all parties to the 
common maritime adventure and should continue to be allowed in general average. 
The MLAUS’ view was supported by the BMLA. The BMLA, with the exception of 
the representatives of marine property insurers, did not favour any change in NSAs since 
according to the BMLA it is impossible to prohibit NSAs and the NSA in Rule G, which the 
parties can adapt as they choose, fulfils a useful practical function as a model and assists the 
parties to reach agreement on the terms on which cargo is forwarded.
922
 Also the Bigham 
Clause
923




The replies emphasised the effect of the NSA wording in Rule G in ensuring that there 
is no delay in the delivery of cargo to destination.
925
 The Bigham Clause ensures that cargo 
interests do not contribute towards general average incurred during the extended period of 
repairs more than it would have cost them to forward the cargo by themselves from the port 
of refuge to the port of destination.
926
 Thus, there was a clear intention by the NMLAs for the 
retention of allowances for substituted expenses. 
(vii) Question 2.7 
 





 stated that Rules X and XI should not be abolished. It 
should be noted that Rules X and XI first appeared in the York Rules 1864 as Rules VII and 
VIII respectively. Since then they Rules have been amended to simplify and improve the text 
for a better application and to bring them up to date to the needs of commerce and the 
maritime industry.  
The BMLA’s members who were in favour of restricting general average were in 
support of terminating Rules X and XI allowances in general average as soon as the common 
safety had been achieved but permitting them up to a point. However, the supporters of the 




 See chap 6 § II(c)(vi)(a)(iii) supra. 
924
 ABDM’s reply, 3. 
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 MLAUS’ reply, 3 
928
 ABDM’s reply, 3. 
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YAR 1994 were opposed to such change.
929




(viii) Question 3 
 
The question asked whether any non-compliance with international conventions like the ISM 
Code or the Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-keeping (STCW) Convention 
should be considered a fault under Rule D irrespective of the merits of the individual case and 
the applicability of such Convention. 
There was unanimity in the Association’s views that non-compliance with international 
conventions should not be considered as fault under Rule D.  
The BMLA was of the view that the effect of Rule D is to leave all questions of fault 
outside the scope of the YAR.
931
 It noted that under English law, a party resisting 
contribution on the grounds of fault must show that the event which gave rise to the general 
average was caused by the actionable fault, under the applicable law, of the person claiming 
contribution.
932
 In the BMLA’s view, it is unnecessary and undesirable for the YAR to 
concern themselves with fault.
933
  
It is pertinent to note that there was no divergence of opinion within the BMLA on this 
issue and it seems that both factions were in agreement against non-compliance with 
international conventions being considered a fault.  
In support of the BMLA’s view, the MLAUS stated that it has long been the position of 
average adjusters, usually endorsed by members of the maritime bar, that it is not the 
province of the Rules to deal with issues of liability. Indeed under Rule D, the Rules textually 
detach themselves from questions of remedy and defence. It argued that no good case had yet 
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 The CMLA also had no answer to this question. 
931
 BMLA’s reply, 4. 
932
 Goulandris Bros Ltd v B Goldman and Sons Ltd [1958] 1 QB 74 at 109. Cf chap 3 § II(b) supra. 
933
 Further objections by BMLA to IUMI’s proposal that non-compliance with the ISM Code or STCW should 
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where the non-compliance does not cause or contribute to the event there is no reason why it should affect rights 
of contribution in any way. 
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been made for changing that position.
934
 ABDM in concurring with the BMLA and MLAUS’ 
views stated that a shipowner must take care of his ship and respect international conventions 
including the ISM Code and STCW. Such compliance will improve the shipowner’s 
performance and reduce the average records. However, it stated that non-compliance with the 
ISM Code and STCW should not be considered a fault irrespective of the merits of the 
individual case and the applicability of such conventions.
935
 The CMLA supported the view 
that non-compliance with international conventions should not be considered as fault 
irrespective of the merits of the individual case and the applicability of such convention.
936
 
These views were based on the decision of the English court in Goulandris Bros Ltd v 
B Goldman & Sons Ltd
937
 where the court held that if the necessity for a general average act 
arose as a result of the fault of one of the parties to the adventure, the act retains its general 
average character and contribution is due between the parties to the adventure. However, 
contributions will not be made to make good the loss of the party at fault. Thus, it is 
submitted that non-compliance with the ISM Code and STCW, even if considered as fault, 
will not be a bar to general average adjustments. 
(ix) Question 4 
 
The questionnaire asked whether there was support that salvage remuneration should not be 
distributed in general average if settled separately by ship and cargo with salvor. 
There was divergence of opinion in the replies by NMLAs. The MLAUS stated that the 
question had been the subject of much deliberation. It stated that the cost of salvage should 
continue to be reapportioned over the arrived values of ship and cargo at the destination.
938
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 ABDM stated that there are various good reasons for re-adjusting salvage expenditure in general average, 
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It is submitted that the MLAUS’ view was based on the fact that the inclusion of 
salvage in general average has a particularly American genesis. Under American law, when 
salvage services meet the requirements of general average, the salvage award is re-
apportioned as a general average on the basis of values at the termination of the voyage.
939
 In 
explaining the basis for the American law on re-apportionment of salvage expenses in general 
average, the United States Supreme Court in The Jason stated that ‘… salvage expense, 
however or whenever liquidated, was something done for the common benefit and therefore 
should under American law be brought into general average adjustment.’
940
 
ABDM was in support of the MLAUS’ view and stated that salvage remuneration 
should be distributed in general average even if settled by ship and cargo. ABDM stated that 
the remuneration of all interests involved must be apportioned by the average adjuster who 
will have the actual value of each interest at destination and is the only person that can 
calculate the exact and fair value of the contributory values.
941
  
However, the views of the MLAUS and ABDM were not shared by the BMLA. The 
BMLA stated that there were some cases in which the distribution of salvage expenses in 
general average will yield a fairer result than leaving each party to bear his own liability to 
the salvor. However, it was of the view that the additional complications to which it gives rise 




The BMLA’s reply does not show that there was a divergence of opinion within the 
BMLA on the issue. It could reasonably be inferred that there was a consensus amongst the 
different interest groups within the BMLA on the need for the revision of Rule VI in 
accordance with IUMI’s proposal. The CMLA’s view was analogous to the reply of the 
BMLA. However, the CMLA was of the view that salvage expenditure should not be 
distributed in general average only where there is differential settlement of the salvage 
remuneration by ship and cargo with the salvor.
943
 This view was not completely in support 
of IUMI’s proposal on the amendment of Rule VI YAR 1994.
944
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It is argued that the divergence in opinion amongst the NMLAs on the issue of re-
apportionment of salvage expenditure in general average showed that there was a need for a 
consideration of the issue at the Vancouver Conference in order to provide a Rule on salvage 
expenditure that would be a compromise of the interests of interested parties. This further 
iterates the need for this issue to be reconsidered in the present efforts to adopt a new set of 
Rules. 
(x) Question 5 
 
The question asked whether expenses in preventing or minimising damage to the 
environment should not be allowed in general average. 
The Associations
945
 were unanimous in their views that such expenses should continue 
to be allowed in general average. They noted that a wide variety of pollution liabilities and 
expenses were recoverable under the YAR 1974 where reasonably incurred as an incident of 
a general average act or as a direct consequence of such act. The purpose of the provisions 
introduced in Rule XI(d) YAR 1994 was not to introduce or increase all allowances in 
general average in respect of liabilities and expenses, but to limit them, hence the restriction 
of the allowances to costs and expenses of preventing or minimising damage to the 
environment; thereby excluding any allowances in respect of liability in damages for 
pollution already occurred.  
The Associations stated that Rule XI(d) YAR 1994 was determined upon after 
elaborate discussion between interested parties and there was no need to change them.  
It should be noted that IUMI did not propose a change in Rule XI(d) and the P&I Clubs 
who bear the cost of the allowance in general average of such measures to avert or minimise 
pollution
946
 did not make such a proposal and had no criticism of the Rule. The replies 
showed that there was no criticism of the Rule and of note is that there was no divergence of 
opinion within the BMLA on the issue. It is argued that the question on the Rule should not 
have been included in the CMI’s questionnaire as there was no development at the time that 
necessitated a review of the Rule. Furthermore, such costs were and are still been met by the 
P&I Clubs without any complaints.
947
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(xi) Question 6  
 
The question asked whether a time bar should be introduced in the Rules so as to prevail over 
national law. 







 were of the view that time bar and commencement of legal 
proceedings relate to legal issues. As such, they should be outside the scope of the YAR in 
the same way that matters of liability are concerned. They stated that such matters should be 
best left to the national law called for in the contract of carriage. The ABDM was of the view 
that there would be great difficulty in obtaining amongst the nations consensus on a text that 
would be included in the YAR which would prevail over national law.
951
 The CMLA stated 
that under Chinese law the limitation period is considered a matter of substantive law and 
cannot be altered by the parties through contractual agreement. The limitation period for 
claims with regard to general average contribution has been prescribed in the Chinese 
Maritime Code
952
 and Chinese courts will not give effect to any agreement on time bar if it 
differs from the Code.
953
  
However, the BMLA differed from these views and stated that it had no objection in 
principle to a time bar in the Rules, provided that the time limit is not unreasonably short. It 
proposed a period of two years after the publication of adjustment or six years after the 
completion or abandonment of the voyage.
954
 However, it conceded that a provision of this 
nature will not be effective in all jurisdictions, since some legal systems impose time bars 
which cannot be departed from by private contract.  
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It should be noted that the views of the MLAUS, ABDM, CMLA was supported by 
majority of the replies from NMLAs which indicated that the issue of time bar should be left 
to national law because it cannot validly be dealt with through contractual agreement.
955
 
Thus, the replies did not show a consensus for the provision of a time bar in the YAR. 
V OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES’ RESPONSE TO IUMI’S PROPOSALS 
(a) Introduction  
 
Other interested parties in the general average system, especially CMI’s consultative 
members, made submissions to the CMI on IUMI’s proposals. Their submissions are 
examined to determine their views on the IUMI’s proposals and their level of support for the 
revision of the YAR 1994 at the time. As interested parties in the general average system, 
their views (in addition to that of the NMLAs) are relevant in ascertaining whether there was 
a consensus amongst the majority of interested parties for the revision of the YAR 1994 at the 








AMD set up a Working Group to examine the proposed revision of the YAR 1994 and this 
consequently led to a consideration of IUMI’s proposals by the Association.
957
  
(ii) AMD’s views 
 
(a) Common safety v common benefit 
 
AMD stated that in practical terms, the purpose of general average is indeed to achieve 
common safety in time of peril, but in doing so, also to enable the common adventure to be 
                                                          
955
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This view rightly underscored the truism that merchants and sea carriers in today’s 
global economy are more than ever pressed to co-operate in order to meet the growing 
requirements for more efficient service implying tighter schedules which increasingly lead to 
prompt deliveries. Therefore, the removal of the common benefit principle may affect this co-
operation between parties and make them to shy away from their common efforts which 
would be against their best common interest. 
AMD further stated that the more port of refuge expenditure is removed from general 
average the less expenditure will qualify by way of substituted expenses under Rule F to 
forward the cargo to destination under NSAs. It stated that without the incentive of the 
common benefit principle, frustration of the voyage is likely to occur more frequently when 
repairs result in a long detention period; leaving cargo owners and their insurers to bear 
substantial additional costs alone. 
The frustration of an adventure, as an English law concept, is an event that allows the 
carrier to rescind the contract of carriage. According to Lord Radcliffe in Davis Contractors 
Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council,
959
 frustration occurs ‘whenever the law recognises 
that without the fault of the parties a contractual obligation has become incapable of being 
performed because the circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a 
thing radically different from what was undertaken under the contract.’
960
 Frustration as a 
principle is very narrowly applied by the courts.
961
 In American law, for an event to lead to 
the frustration of a contract it must not be as a result of a party’s fault nor should the contract 
have allocated the risk of the occurrence of the event.
962
 Inordinate delay in the performance 
of a carriage contract may lead to the frustration of the contract of carriage, although this will 
depend on whether the delay is so prolonged as to be regarded to have defeated the 
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commercial object of the adventure.
963
 In Jackson v Union Marine Insurance,
964
 the 
shipowner contracted to pick up a cargo at Newport with all possible dispatch, ‘dangers and 
accidents of navigation excepted.’ When the ship ran aground in Caernarvon Bay en route for 
Newport and suffered damage which would take six months to repair, all further liability 
under the contract was discharged despite the exceptions clause. The court held that the 
carriage contract had been frustrated and that the parties had not expected the exceptions 
clause to cover such a fundamental alteration in the nature of the contract. 
In Bankline Ltd v Capel & Co,
965
 where the issue was whether delay caused by 
requisition of the ship had frustrated a time charter, Lord Sumner noted that ‘delay even of 
considerable length and of wholly uncertain duration is an incident of maritime adventure, 
which is clearly within the contemplation of the parties … ultimately the frustration of an 
adventure depends on the facts of each case.’
966
 Thus a pure simple delay will not be 
considered sufficient, unless other circumstances join in complicating the matter, making the 
charter as a matter of business a totally different thing from what the parties agreed to.
967
 
However, it is submitted that in considering the length of delay at a port of refuge that 
will give rise to the frustration of the carriage contract, it will be relevant to consider the 
length of time which the voyage would normally be expected to last, the nature of the cargo 
and whether the cargo is intended for a particular market or use which makes it of 
fundamental importance that it should arrive on time.  
It is argued that the non-allowance of port of refuge expenses in general average based 
on IUMI’s proposal might have resulted in increase in cases of frustration of the voyage as 
shipowners might not be willing to make disbursements for the prompt repair of accidental 
damage to the vessel at the port of refuge, resulting in inordinate delay of a vessel at a port of 
refuge that could lead to the frustration of the adventure. However, such inordinate delays 
must be delays that would be seen to have changed the character of the contract of carriage; 
rendering it impossible to perform the contract as originally contemplated by the parties. 
However, each case should be decided on its facts and the test should be an objective one.
968
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(b) Complaint about general average 
 
AMD stated that general average and the YAR are unique and valuable instruments to assist 
parties in achieving a fair resolution of most issues which arise at the time of a casualty 
requiring measures for the common good. It argued that the complaints about general average 
being abusively used by unscrupulous owners operating substandard vessels certainly warrant 
attention, but general average would not be a useful scapegoat to hull insurers who agree to 
insure substandard vessels and to cargo insurers who agree to cover cargo carried on them.
969
  
This view reiterates Taylor’s view stated earlier in this thesis.
970
 However, this view 
further alludes to the fact that cargo owners were also contributing to general average 
situations by entering into contracts of carriage with owners of substandard vessels in 
exchange for cheaper freight and cargo insurers were agreeing to insure cargo placed on such 
vessels.
971
 This fact was not considered by Marshall in his statistics.
972
 It is submitted that 
cargo insurers by accepting to insure cargo carried on such vessels were helping increase the 
number of general average situations as such substandard vessels are more prone to be 
involved in general average situations than seaworthy vessels.  
It is further argued that this act of cargo insurers was as a result of the weak insurance 
market of the time.
973
 Ordinarily the condition of a ship in which cargo is carried is controlled 
by cargo insurers in two ways. First, is the requirement that the vessels used by the assured 
are classed with a particular Classification Society and the vessel should not exceed a certain 
age.
974
 Secondly, the ICC absolve the cargo insurer from liability arising from 
unseaworthiness or unfitness of the vessel where the unseaworthiness is known to the 
assured.
975
  However, in practice, cargo insurers are of the view that in some cases the 
assured may not be aware of the unfitness of a vessel, though it is classed with a 
Classification Society.
976
 Thus, to a large extent in practice, cargo insurers pay out a claim in 
cases of unseaworthiness (where the assured is not privy to the unseaworthiness) and then 
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bring an action for recovery against the carrier.
977
 It is argued that though the assured in most 
instances may not be privy to the unseaworthiness of a vessel, such practice by cargo insurers 
is prone to abuse by assureds and in such instances it could be difficult for the insurer to 
prove that the assured was privy to the unseaworthiness of the vessel.  
 
(c) Partial application of amended Rules 
 
AMD stated that in view of shipowners’ strong resistance of any major changes, sea carriage 
contracts may either maintain the YAR 1994 or introduce special wordings such as ‘general 
average to be adjusted in accordance with YAR 2004 but including Rules X and XI of the 
YAR 1994.’
978
 It is submitted that such a scenario is within the contractual rights of 
shipowners as carriers. Of note is that shipowners in the United States had partially applied 
the YAR 1924 by special clauses because of their opposition to some of the provisions of the 
1924 Rules.
979
   
 
(d) Rule XIV – Temporary repairs 
 
AMD, like the MLAUS, conceded the fact that Rule XIV needed to be amended. According 
to AMD, Rule XIV dealing with temporary repairs offers room for improvement to eliminate 
undue advantage to shipowning interests but any revision of this Rule should ensure that it 
does not delay the final adjustment nor render it unduly complicated.
980
 However, it failed to 
make any proposals on how the Rule should be amended. 
 
(e) Rule IV – Salvage remuneration 
 
With respect to IUMI’s proposal on salvage, AMD was of the view that salvage is the 
archetype of a general average expense and that in certain countries the shipowner is liable 
for the payment of the entire salvage charges.
981
 It stated that frequently and independently 
from any legal obligation, the shipowner provides security on behalf of all parties and that 
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some cargo interests have a stronger bargaining position than others leading to an unfair 
result if the salvage charges are not reapportioned in general average.
982
 It argued that the 
exclusion of salvage expenses from general average would neither hasten nor simplify the 
adjustment as salvage charges together with interest and legal costs would need to be 
considered in the calculation of contributory values.
983
 
AMD’s view on salvage is similar to that of the MLAUS and ABDM in which the 
Associations proposed that salvage expenditure should be re-apportioned in general 
average.
984
 However, AMD’s view is not supported by the view of the BMLA who supported 
IUMI’s proposals that salvage expenditure should not be re-apportioned in general 
average.
985
 AMD’s view is also supported by the view of the CMLA; however, the CMLA’s 
view partially differs from that of AMD as the CMLA only proposed that differential salvage 




(f) Time bar  
 
AMD argued that national laws already provide for a time limit. It stated that the provision of 
a time bar rule in the YAR would not be a vital addition since with the use of modern 
technology, particularly by means of instant communication, general average adjustments are 
seldom unduly delayed.
987
 This view reiterates the views of the NMLAs on this issue and 
clearly shows that IUMI’s proposal on time bar was not seen by the maritime community as a 
necessary addition to the YAR. AMD’s view also alludes to the fact that modern technology 
has aided adjusters in preparing adjustments on time.
988
 As argued earlier in this thesis,
989
 
Marshall failed to consider this fact in his statistics. 
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(g) Rule XXI - Interest 
 
AMD stated that the Rule on interest had to be addressed to be more in line with prevailing 
rates. It stated that a simple rule should be devised to avoid complicating adjustments and 
should a variable rate be favoured, this should be left to the CMI to be suitably dealt with. 
AMD by this view conceded the fact raised by IUMI that the 7 per cent fixed rate in Rule 
XXI YAR 1994 could lead to unfair results in some cases as the Rule does not provide for 
flexibility with respect to changing bank rates and inflation. 
 
(h) Rule XX - Commission 
 
AMD was of the view that the 2 per cent rule on commission in the YAR 1994 is simple to 
apply and stated that the proposed changes were liable to lead to complication and result in 
increased adjustment costs instead of simplifying matters.
990
 However, it failed to state how 






ICS was the only trade Association known to have commented on the proposed changes to 
the YAR 1994.
991
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(ii) ICS’ views  
(a) Common benefit versus common safety 
 
ICS stated that the YAR are a result of general concerted effort to ensure a uniform approach 
to general average and the Rules unified the two strands of general average.
993
 It argued that 
narrowing down the scope of general average to only the common safety principle would 
exclude many of the allowances allowed in the YAR 1994, particularly port of refuge 
expenses. This view reiterates the views of ABDM and the majority of NMLAs on the issue. 
With respect to IUMI’s proposal that allowances should only be allowed in general 
average where sacrifices or expenses are made when the ship is in peril, ICS stated that much 
argument would arise on the extent of the peril which would present problems. It stated that 
English law long ago decided that though the peril must be real, the vessel need not be in the 
actual grip or even nearly in the grip of danger. ICS further stressed that the difficulty was in 
assessing ‘peril’ and ‘reasonable safety’ based on IUMI’s proposal.  
The NMLAs in their replies to the questionnaire had expressed a similar view on the 
issue of ‘peril’ based on the decision of the English court in Vlasspoulos v British and 
Foreign Insurance Co (The ‘Makis’).
994
 Thus, there was a consensus amongst shipowning 
interests and the NMLAs that IUMI’s proposals would give rise to difficulties in construing 
when a peril would be said to have commenced and when reasonable safety could be said to 
have been attained. 
ICS further argued that the elimination of port of refuge expenses might exclude cargo 
owners from having their cargo forwarded to destination through substituted expenses. It 
stated that shipowners whose vessels put into a port of refuge for repairs after a peril are 
unlikely to be under any obligation to forward cargo to destination and depending on its 
position and stow could be reluctant or unable to discharge the vessel in whole or in part. 
Cargo would thus remain on board pending repairs and cargo owners would likely have no 
remedy under the contract of carriage.
995
 It stated that if expenses such as handling fall away 
in general average, many of them will fall on the shipowner/hull insurer. Such cost could be 
added to repair costs and the ratio between repair costs and the sound value of vessel would 
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likely increase the number of abandoned voyages. Cargo owners would deal with the 
forwarding of cargo and probably be responsible for the resulting costs.
996
  
It should be noted that this argument was also canvassed by Hudson at the CMI Toledo 
Colloquium 2000 as the likely consequence of the non-allowance of port of refuge expenses 
in general average.
997
 IUMI had also conceded that such an abandonment of the voyage 
would result in cargo owners incurring additional cost to forward cargo to destination
998
 as 
the NSA wording in Rule G YAR would not be available where the common benefit 
principle is abolished. The NMLAs also reiterated this consequence and canvassed for the 
retention of the NSA wording in the YAR.
999
 Thus, it is submitted that there was a consensus 








 ICS decried the wrong timing of IUMI’s 
call for revision and stated that the Rules had not been given sufficient time to operate in the 




(c) Complaints about general average 
 
ICS was of the view that general average is not a panacea for protecting poor quality 
operators. This view is correct because by Rule D YAR 1994 cargo interest have a defence to 
a claim for general average contribution where the incident was caused by breach of the 
carriage contract, particularly the unseaworthiness of a vessel.
1003
 Furthermore, the ISM 
Code, with its requirement for shipowners to fully be aware of all operational and safety 
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issues connected with their vessels and take early remedial action when problems arise 
represents a further means of encouraging higher standards in the industry.
1004
 
ICS argued that the likely consequences of accepting IUMI’s proposal for restriction of 
general average to the common safety principle might be that there would be fewer general 
average settlements. However, costs would still be met and it seemed likely that some of the 
new costs would fall to hull insurers in terms of a transfer of risk from one sector of the 
insurance industry to another. This view correctly reflects the fact that IUMI’s proposals 
would primarily result in the transfer of risk and cost from cargo insurers to hull insurers.
1005
 
Where the common benefit principle is abolished, most of the port of refuge expenses will 
not be allowed in general average. These expenses would be borne alone by the shipowner 
and ultimately by the hull insurer as particular average claims.
1006
  
Finally, the ICS stated that the principle of general average is sound; however, the 
advantages can be outweighed in relation to smaller, uneconomic claims or adjustments 
involving large numbers of individual cargo interests where collection of security represents a 
significant proportion of the cost. In the view of the ICS, General Average Absorption 
Clauses are the satisfactory market-based solution that has been adopted. The Clauses were 
favoured by container operators but in the ICS’ estimate, the Clauses were being used by 65 
per cent of operators at the time.
1007
 
It should be noted that the IUMI members in their replies to IUMI’s 1996 
questionnaire
1008
 had conceded that there had been some reduction in the declaration of 
general average by shipowners as a result of the General Average Absorption Clauses in their 
hull policies.
1009
 Thus, there was a consensus amongst shipowners and cargo insurers on the 
effectiveness of the Clause in reducing general average declarations and costs. 
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VI CMI PRE-VANCOUVER 2004 MEETINGS 
(a) Introduction 
 
As a consequence of IUMI’s persistence with its call for revision, the CMI at various 
meetings considered IUMI’s proposals for revision and provided a platform for IUMI and 
other interested parties to present their views on the IUMI’s proposals. The views expressed 
by delegates at these CMI meetings prior to its Vancouver Conference are analysed in what 
follows to determine the level of support amongst delegates for the IUMI’s proposals and the 
revision of the YAR 1994 at the time. 
 
(b) CMI Toledo Colloquium 2000     
                                                
At the CMI Colloquium in Toledo in September 2000, IUMI’s position on the need to revise 
the YAR 1994 was considered. IUMI’s proposals were presented by Eamonn Magee. His 
paper contended that IUMI’s proposals were aimed at addressing the inequities in the general 
average system shown in Marshall’s statistics.
1010
 Geoffrey Hudson, former chairman of the 
AAA, United Kingdom, in his reply to IUMI’s proposals
1011
 argued that IUMI’s proposals 
would remove the positive incentive which the YAR provide to encourage a shipowner to 
take proper measures to fulfil his obligations under the contract of carriage.
1012
 He further 
stated that the proposed curtailment of general average allowances put forth by IUMI at a 
port of refuge would directly increase the number of valid abandonment cases. IUMI’s 
proposals according to him would do away with all issues of avoiding delays at a port of 
refuge by forwarding of cargo on a NSA to the port of destination, since IUMI’s proposal 
would have no allowances for general average in a port of refuge and moreover would 
abolish the principle of substituted expenses altogether.
1013
 
It is argued that Hudson’s argument correctly underscored the effect restriction of 
general average to the common safety principle might have on the general average system. 
However, it should be noted that the law on abandonment of voyage is not universally clear 
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as there is a dearth of legal precedents on the subject. In De Cuadra v Swann,
1014
 the court 
held that the master of a vessel will be justified in abandoning the voyage where the ship is so 
seriously damaged as to be incapable of repair so as to prosecute the voyage except at an 
expense exceeding her value together with the freight when repaired. In such a case, the 
shipowner may abandon the vessel at the port of refuge, especially, as the extent of the 
repairs to be considered in this connection are those that are necessary to complete the 
voyage.
1015
 Where there is a valid abandonment of a voyage, liability in general average 
ceases from the moment the voyage was abandoned.
1016
  
In Assicurazioni Generali v SS Bessie Morris Co Ltd,
1017
 Lord Esher pointed out that if 
the cost of repairs, which are necessary to enable a vessel complete her voyage, is more than 
the benefit which the owner will derive from them, it is impossible in a business sense to 
have the vessel repaired and the owner in such circumstances could validly abandon the 
vessel.  
Lord Esher seems to suggest that a ‘business sense’ test should be applied in 
determining the right to abandon a voyage. If a ‘business sense’ test is to be applied, it could 
be argued that shipowners could validly abandon a voyage where the cost of repairs will 
exceed the value of the vessel when repaired as held in the De Cuadra case. Thus, from the 
decisions in the above cases it could be argued that in ascertaining the shipowner’s right to 
abandon the voyage the test should be whether effecting temporary repairs would be contrary 
to sound business reasoning by the shipowner, taking cognisance of the repair cost vis à vis 
the vessel’s sound value after the repairs are effected.  
Thus, since by IUMI’s proposals allowances for all expenses incurred at a port of 
refuge (especially temporary repair costs) which are currently uninsured would have been 
excluded; there would likely have been an increase in the number of valid abandonment cases 
as the cost of effecting temporary repairs might exceed the ship’s value when repaired in 
some instances. Cargo owners would have to collect their cargo and forward cargo to their 
destination at their own expense. However, if the cargo is insured, the cost involved, may in 
principle be recovered from the insurers.
1018
 Of note is that this effect of IUMI’s proposals 
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was conceded by IUMI at its Lisbon meeting in 1998.
1019
 Thus, abolition of the common 
benefit principle would have adverse effects on both the ship and cargo with more adverse 
effects on the shipowner as most port of refuge expenses are made by the shipowner. 
 
(c) CMI Singapore Conference 2001
1020
 
The subject of the revision of the YAR 1994 was again open for discussion at the CMI 
Conference in Singapore in 2001. The Conference provided a platform for interested parties 
to air their views on the IUMI’s proposals without any efforts being made to bring any of the 
subjects under discussion to a conclusion. In the discussions at the Conference, many of the 
delegates were of the view that the time was not ripe for a consideration of the review of the 
YAR 1994 as the Rules had just been introduced in the market.
1021
 It is submitted that this 




 that it was 
premature to revise the YAR 1994 at the time.  
Despite this strong objection by a majority of the delegates at the Conference, it was 
decided at the Conference that the CMI should continue its work on the possible revision of 
the YAR 1994 without restricting its terms to the IUMI’s proposal.
1024
 However, the ICS, the 
International P&I Group and the MLAUS voted against the proposal at Singapore for a 
consideration of what changes would be made, if any, to the YAR 1994.
1025
 
It could be argued that the outcome of the Singapore Conference shows that IUMI was 
beginning to get an audience receptive to the proposals that it had been making since the CMI 
Sydney Conference. However, it is argued that the view amongst majority of interested 
parties, particularly shipowners and liability insurers, underpin the fact that the IUMI’s 
proposals were ill-timed as the YAR 1994 had just been introduced in the market and their 
impact was yet to be assessed.
1026
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(d) CMI Bordeaux Colloquium 2003 
 
Subsequently, the CMI held a Colloquium in Bordeaux from 10 to 13 June 2003, which was 
attended by 226 delegates from 30 NMLAs and three observers.
1027
 The CMI ISC on General 
Average at the Colloquium discussed the General Average Working Group’s report on the 
proposals by IUMI for changes to the YAR 1994 and other issues on general average. At the 
end of the meeting, Bent Nielsen (the Chairman of the ISC) prepared a summary of the 
conclusions at the meeting which was unanimously approved by the ISC.
1028
 
The views at the meeting showed that there were divergent opinions on issues such as: 
(i) the abolition or incremental changes to the common benefit principle in the Rules; (ii) 
redistribution of salvage expenses; (iii) time bar; (iv) interest; and (v) commission. The 
divergence in opinion on these issues made it difficult to reach any final decisions on the 
issues. However, it would be evinced that at this stage the majority of the delegates were of 
the view that there should be a restriction of allowances permitted in the YAR under the 
common benefit principle. This could be inferred from the recommendation at the meeting 
that draft wordings should be made to amend the YAR to exclude from general average 
allowance for crew wages, maintenance, fuel and stores and to limit allowance for temporary 
repairs so as to avoid any undue advantages for shipowners; particularly in cases where a 
temporary repair makes it possible for the ship to make final repairs at a place where repairs 
can be made cheaper than at or close to the port of refuge.
1029
 
With respect to salvage, there seemed to be some support of the proposal to exclude 
allowance for salvage expenses from general average. However, the support was not enough 
to make a final decision on the issue at the meeting.
1030
 With respect to interest, the majority 
of the delegates were in support of a change whereby the interest rate is made variable in a 
more simple way, possibly by providing for the CMI to fix the interest rate at suitable 
intervals.
1031
 It is argued that this was a reflection of the need to provide for a flexible system 
that would take cognisance of prevailing bank rates; unlike the 7 per cent fixed rate in Rule 
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XXI YAR 1994. This shows the support of the delegates for the IUMI’s proposal on the 
amendment of the Rule.  
However, no decision was made on the abolition of commission and there is no record 
of whether there was support by the majority of the delegates for the abolition of commission 
as proposed by IUMI. With respect to the issue of time-bar, there was much resistance, in 
particular by South American countries and other civil law countries against the proposed 
draft clause. This resistance was because certain countries have mandatory time bar 
provisions that cannot be departed from by the agreement of parties.
1032
 However, there was a 
likelihood that a compromise could be reached about an amended wording.  
It is argued that at this stage in the deliberations on IUMI’s proposals, though there was 
no support for the abolition of the common benefit principle, the delegates were beginning to 
be more amenable to the restriction of certain allowances in general average that were 
allowable under the common benefit principle. Nonetheless, divergent opinions still existed 
on the need for amendments, the amendments to be made and how best to effect such 
amendments; showing a lack of consensus amongst interested parties for the revision of YAR 
1994.   
VII COMPARISON OF THE PROCESS ADOPTED IN THE SUCCESSFUL 
REVISION OF PREVIOUS VERSIONS OF THE YAR AND THE PROCESS 
ADOPTED IN THE REVISION OF THE YAR 1994 
 
In the process adopted in the successful revision of the previous versions of the YAR, either 
in amending the Rules to ensure uniformity in the principles and practice of general average 
or to take cognisance of developments in international trade and in the maritime industry, the 
existing Rules were given sufficient time to operate in the market before efforts were made 
by the maritime community to amend them.
1033
 However, IUMI’s call that initiated the 
process of the revision of the YAR 1994 started barely months after the adoption of the YAR 
1994 at the CMI Sydney Conference in 1994.
1034
 Significantly, Marshall’s study of the 
general average system, which was the basis for IUMI’s call for reform, was carried out in 
1994 (the same year the 1994 Rules were adopted).
1035
 Furthermore, IUMI circulated its 
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questionnaire on the general average system and the YAR 1994 to its member associations 
two years after the YAR 1994 were adopted.
1036
 Thus, the YAR 1994, unlike previous 
versions of the YAR, were not given sufficient time to have an impact in the maritime 
industry (for a proper assessment of their effect) by the advocates for revision contrary to the 
previous trend in the maritime industry. 
In the revision of the previous versions of the YAR, there was usually a consensus 
amongst majority of interested parties; first, on the need for the amendment of the existing set 
of Rules at the time and secondly, on the requisite amendments to be made.
1037
 This 
consensus amongst majority of interested parties ensured the widespread acceptance and use 
of amended Rules as the Rules epitomised the compromises reached amongst majority of 
interested parties.
1038
 However, in revising the YAR 1994, there was clearly no consensus 
amongst majority of interested parties for the revision of the Rules at the time as the majority 
of interested parties felt that the Rules had not operated for a sufficient time in the market to 
necessitate a revision of the Rules.
1039
 Second, there was no consensus amongst majority of 
interested parties on the revisions to be made as parties were divided on the issue of 




 Furthermore, previous amendments were necessitated by significant changes in 
international trade and in the maritime community; as well as judicial decisions, 
environmental concerns and identified defects in the YAR.
1041
 Thus, previous amendments of 
the YAR were aimed at simplifying and updating the Rules and rectifying the defects 
identified in the Rules in their operation in the market. However, there was no significant 
change in international trade or in the maritime community that necessitated a revision of the 
YAR at the time and IUMI did not allude to any.
1042
 Marshall’s study also failed to identify 
any defects in the YAR 1994 that required a revision of the YAR 1994 at the time.
1043
 
Significantly, the replies by IUMI’s member associations to IUMI’s 1996 questionnaire on 
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the YAR 1994 did not identify any defects in the YAR 1994. Rather, the replies showed that 
the YAR 1994 had been accepted in most markets and were in the process of being accepted 
in more markets.
1044
 Thus, there was no significant development at the time that necessitated 
a call by the IUMI for the revision of the YAR 1994.  
VIII CONCLUSION 
 
The IUMI proposals for the revision of the YAR 1994 were based on its perceived inherent 
flaws in the general average system. It perceived the abolition of the common benefit 
principle as a means of achieving a measure of equitable balance of the interests of cargo 
insurers and shipowners. However, the restriction of general average to the common safety 
principle would have had the legal effect of disallowing in general average expenses incurred 
for the safe prosecution of the voyage. This would have negated the intention of the maritime 
community of achieving a merger of the common benefit and common safety principles in 
the YAR. Furthermore, English law (referred to by IUMI as the legal basis for its proposals) 
had long recognised the common benefit principle.
1045
 
Economically, a restriction of general average to the common safety principle would 
have had an adverse effect on the world’s economy. Merchant shipping is the life blood of 
the world’s economy
1046
 as such undue delays in the delivery of cargo to destination as a 
result of the frustration or abandonment of voyages would have the multiplier effect of 
adversely affecting international commerce and the world’s economy.  
The discussions at the CMI meetings showed that there was a measure of support for 
the consideration of some of IUMI’s proposals, although there were strong views that the 
proposals would have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the general average system as 
a casualty management system. Though IUMI’s proposals raised some relevant issues for 
consideration, they were ill-timed as the YAR 1994 had not operated in the industry for a 
sufficient time to assess their impact in the market before IUMI started its call for reform.
1047
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Furthermore, most of the issues raised by IUMI had been raised by interested parties prior to 
the CMI Sydney Conference 1994
1048
 and were dealt with at the Sydney Conference.
1049
  
The views of various interested parties show that the CMI did not have the consensus of 
majority of interested parties in the maritime community for a revision of the YAR 1994 at 
the time. The CMI in the past had undertaken the amendment of any version of the YAR only 
where there was a consensus amongst the majority of interested parties on the need to amend 
the Rules to take cognisance of significant developments in the industry.
1050
 There was 
clearly no significant development at the time that was referred to by IUMI as the basis for its 
proposals and it is argued that none existed at the time. IUMI was a lone voice on the need 
for change at the time and such lone voices in the past had been ignored by the maritime 
community.
1051
 It is argued that the pockets of support within the CMI for the consideration 
of IUMI’s proposals were not enough impetus for the CMI to have neglected the ingredients 
of the previous successful revision processes of the YAR.
1052
  
This lack of consensus amongst majority of interested parties on the need for revision 
and the premature call for the revision of the YAR 1994 contributed to the failure of the YAR 
2004 to gain widespread acceptance and use in the industry. This reinforces the need for the 
maritime community to take cognisance of the identified ingredients of the previous 
successful revision processes of the Rules in the present efforts at adopting a new set of Rules 
in 2016.  
Significantly, the current process of the general review of the Rules on general average 
is as a result of the consensus amongst all interested parties of the need for the adoption of a 
new set of Rules.
1053
 It is argued that with the existence of this essential ingredient 
exemplified in previous successful revisions of the YAR, what is now required is a 
compromise amongst interested parties on the substantive revisions to be made to the YAR 
2004 that will enhance the widespread use of the new Rules to be adopted in 2016.  
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The CMI, as the custodian of the YAR, has initiated the process for the general review of the 
Rules on general average in a bid for the adoption of a new set of Rules in 2016. The failure 
of the YAR 2004 to gain widespread use in the maritime industry as a result of the opposition 
by shipowning interests and the subsequent abortive efforts by the CMI to resolve the 
resulting impasse between cargo insurers and shipowning interests have meant that the 
maritime industry’s focus has turned to the drafting of a new set of Rules to be approved at 
the next CMI Conference in 2016. It has been argued in this thesis that the failure of the 2004 
Rules to gain widespread acceptance and use in the maritime industry was as a result of the 
disregard by the IUMI and the CMI of the ingredients of the previous successful processes of 
the Rules that ensured the widespread acceptance of revised Rules in the maritime 
industry.
1054
 Furthermore, the failure of the changes introduced by the YAR 2004 to achieve a 
measure of equitable balance of the interests of all interested parties also contributed to the 
lack of widespread acceptance of the Rules, particularly by shipowning interests.
1055
  
If the current efforts aimed at a general review of the Rules on general average are to 
have any prospects of succeeding, there is a need for the maritime community to take 
cognisance of the identified ingredients of the processes adopted in the successful 
amendments of previous sets of YAR prior to 2004.
1056
 This will at least ensure that 
amendments that will be made to the YAR, going forward, will achieve a measure of 
equitable balance of the interests of all interested parties. 
The recent impasse between shipowning interests and cargo insurers on the YAR 2004 
is inimical to the cohesiveness and efficiency of the YAR as a risk and loss distribution 
system and this is detrimental to achieving the objective of uniformity in the principles and 
practice of general average which was the original reason for the generation of the Rules.
1057
 
This reason for the generation of the Rules has been the guiding theme of subsequent 
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revisions of the YAR prior to 2004; as well as the need to simplify and update the YAR to 
keep abreast of developments in the commercial world and in the maritime industry.
1058
 It is, 
therefore, of the utmost importance that a similar impasse does not develop in the process of 
generating the next version of the YAR. The over-arching objective of all involved in the 
general average system during this process of the review of the Rules on general average 
should be the avoidance of the repeat of such impasse to ensure that the new Rules to be 
adopted will not be consigned, like the YAR 2004, to the recesses of maritime history. 
Based on the foregoing, recommendations are made in what follows with regard 
specifically to certain substantive revisions of the Rules and more generally, the process for 
considering these and any other revisions that might be proposed leading up to the CMI 
Conference in 2016. The proposals with regard to substantive revisions consider the effect of 
such amendments and are informed by a recognition of the need to balance the interests of the 
parties involved. The recommendations relating to process recognise the need for reaching a 
level of acceptance of any revision that will ensure not only their formal adoption but also 
implementation. In this process, there is a need for concerted efforts by all interested parties 
in the general average system; particularly cargo insurers and shipowining interests, as the 
main interest groups, to be prepared to compromise. 
II RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO SUBSTANTIVE REVISIONS OF CERTAIN 
RULES 
 
For the YAR to remain attractive as a risk and loss distribution system it should not be 
perceived by any interest as a system that is designed to merely transfer the bulk of the risk 
and cost of general average from one interest to another.
1059
 To achieve a balance of the 
interests of these interest groups that will lead to the acceptance of any adopted Rules, there 
is a need for a the spreading of the risk and cost of general average with at least a measure of 




The current review of the Rules on general average is pivotal in ensuring that 
amendments made to the content of the YAR will not only be accepted by all interested 
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parties in the general average system but also implemented. Bearing this in mind, the 
recommendations made with regard to the substantive Rules are restricted to Rule VI on 
salvage remuneration and Rule XI on crew wages and maintenance whose amendment in 
2004 appear to have been the main reason for shipowning interests’ refusal to implement the 
Rules. This seems so because those changes will lead to the transference of significant cost 
from cargo to shipowning interests than the other changes.
1061
 Thus, these recommendations 
are made with the view that the other changes made in the YAR 2004 should be carried 
forward, in their present form, to the new Rules to be adopted as they ensure a measure of 
equitable balance of the interests of the parties with regard to the circumstances covered by 




In making these recommendations with regard to the substantive revisions, an attempt 
has been made to address the objections to those Rules in their current form by formulating a 
compromise text that might be viewed by cargo and shipowning interests as a more equitable 
redistribution of risk and cost. An attempt has also been made to make them linguistically 
consistent with the existing Rules, so that if adopted, they will fit coherently into the whole. 
(a) Rule VI - Salvage remuneration 
 
The main reason shipowning interests are opposed to the changes introduced by the YAR 
2004 is that the re-apportionment of salvage expenditure in general average has been limited 
in Rule VI to instances in which a party pays salvage remuneration on behalf of another party 
or other parties.
1063
 This is because the change will lead to the transference of a significant 
percentage of the cost of general average from cargo insurers to shipowning interests.
1064
 
Cargo insurers, however, are of the view that the re-apportionment of salvage expenditure in 
general average delays the adjustment process, is not equitable in some instances and leads to 
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increase in the cost of general average adjustments;
1065
 particularly to cargo insurers. Thus, 
there is the need for an amendment to Rule VI that will ensure a compromise between 
shipowning interests and cargo insurers on the Rule. The compromise recommended is that 
the provisions of Rule VI YAR 1994 should essentially be retained with certain additions. 
The first of these amendments is aimed at ensuring that uneconomic salvage expenses are not 
re-apportioned in general average. The second amendment has been proposed as a trade-off 
that could ensure a compromise by cargo insurers on the proposed amendment of Rule VI. 
(i) Amendment addressing problem of uneconomic adjustments 
 
It is proposed that a new paragraph (c) should be included in Rule VI that will read as 
follows: 
 
‘(c) The average adjuster shall determine the reasonableness of the allowance of salvage 
expenditure in general average without prejudice to the right of the parties to be 
approached by the average adjuster, before making such determination, where the 
adjuster is of the opinion that allowing salvage expenditure in general average will not be 
reasonable in any given case. Such determination may be challenged on the ground that it 
is manifestly incorrect.’ 
 
This is to guard against the re-apportionment of uneconomic salvage expenditure in 
general average. Based on the earlier analysis of the options, on the amendment to be made to 
Rule VI, proposed by the CMI IWG in the CMI 2013 questionnaire on the general review of 
the Rules on general average,
1066
 it is recommended that the new paragraph should be worded 
in such a way as to require average adjusters to first approach the parties involved in the 
adventure where adjusters are of the view that the likely effect of re-apportioning salvage 
expenditure in general average in any given case will be disproportionate to the time and cost 
involved. This is with a view for the parties to be intimated of the need for such uneconomic 
salvage expenditure not to be re-apportioned and for them to reach an agreement amongst 
themselves that there be no re-apportionment. Second, the adjuster should be empowered to 
decide the reasonableness of re-apportioning salvage expenditure in general average 
irrespective of the outcome of the adjuster’s discussion with the parties. This is necessary as 
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there might be instances where a party could insist on the re-apportionment of uneconomic 
salvage expenditure after been advised against such re-apportionment by the adjuster. Thus, 
the re-apportionment of salvage expenditure in general average should be left to the 
discretion of average adjusters as skilled and reputable neutral parties in the general average 
system.
1067
 Such exercise by the adjuster of his/her skill and expertise could ensure that 
uneconomic salvage expenses are not re-apportioned in general average and ensure a measure 
of balance of the interests of parties with regard to the provisions of Rule VI. The 
competence and neutrality of average adjusters was judicially recognised by Kaufman J: 
 
‘The members of this profession enjoy a very high reputation for fairness to ship and 





As pointed out by Allen, average adjusters ‘successfully conclude hundreds of cases 
annually without the necessity of litigation’
1069
 and it is argued that the dearth of cases on 
general average in the past two decades attests to this fact. 
However, such discretion by the adjuster should be exercised in light of the Rule 
Paramount
1070
 and can be challenged by a party who is of the view that the determination by 
the adjuster was manifestly incorrect taking cognisance of the facts made known to the 
adjuster at the time of the adjustment. Thus, the recommended re-apportionment of salvage 
expenditure in general average based on the adjuster’s discretion has two safe guards. First is 
that the adjuster’s discretion will be exercised in light of the Rule Paramount and the second 
is that such exercise of his/her discretion is subject to be challenged for being manifestly 
incorrect (this is analogous to the safe guard provision in Rule E
1071
 YAR 1994 and YAR 
2004 with respect to the production of documents in proof of a general average claim).  
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(ii) Amendments with regard to legal fees and other costs incidental to salvage operation 
 
Furthermore, it is proposed that legal fees and other costs incidental to a salvage operation 
should be excluded; leaving only the allowance of interest on disbursements for salvage 
operations. This is because such legal and other incidental costs (together with interest) 
enhance the expense of the re-apportionment of salvage expenditure in general average on 
cargo owners and ultimately on cargo insurers.
1072
  Though no reference to such costs is made 
in Rule VI YAR 2004, they are customarily allowed by adjusters under Rule C as a direct 
consequence of engaging salvors.
1073
 It is argued that the removal of such legal and other 
costs from Rule VI by letting them lie where they fall (and ultimately reducing the cost on 
cargo of the re-apportionment of salvage expenditure in general average) could enhance 
cargo interests’ co-operation with other salved interests, particularly shipowning interests, 
resulting in early negotiated settlements.  
It is argued that the proposal with regard to the re-apportionment of uneconomic 
salvage expenditure will have the effect of addressing the concerns of interested parties on 
the provisions of Rule VI by ensuring that though salvage expenditure will be allowed to be 
re-apportioned in general average (as canvassed by shipowning interests) there will be no re-
apportionment of uneconomic salvage expenditure. In addition, the proposed trade off could 
achieve a compromise by cargo insurers on the proposed amendment to Rule VI that could 
ensure the avoidance of any impasse on the provisions of Rule VI. 
(b) Rule XI - Wages and maintenance of crew 
 
It is recommended that the text of Rule XI(b) 1994 YAR should be retained in the new YAR 
to be adopted in 2016, without amendment. This will allow in general average the wages and 
maintenance of crew during the extra period a vessel is detained at a port of refuge 
undergoing repairs to accidental damage in addition to the allowance in Rule XI(a) YAR 
2004 of the cost of crew wages and maintenance in deviating to a port of refuge and 
regaining the normal route from a port of refuge.  
Crew wages and maintenance during the extra period of detention of a vessel at a port 
of refuge was allowed as general average under the law of many countries prior to the 
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 The importance of the allowance of crew wages and maintenance at a port of refuge 
was underscored in the early years of the efforts aimed at achieving uniformity in both the 
Glasgow Resolutions 1860
1075
 and York Rules 1864.
1076
 Such costs are allowed in general 
average as they are incurred as a consequence of efforts to ensure the successful completion 
of the voyage from a port of refuge. The cost of crew wages and maintenance could involve a 
considerable outlay on the part of the shipowner, particularly where a vessel is detained at a 
port of refuge for a considerable period of time. The shipowner bears an additional burden of 
paying and maintaining his crew though he is deprived of their services and consequent loss 
of earnings. Thus the cost of crew wages and maintenance when a vessel is detained at a port 
of refuge represents a real cost to the shipowner, especially in a weak freight market where 
shipowners may experience difficulty in covering their running costs.
1077
 Furthermore, such 
costs are incurred for the mutual benefit of the interests involved in a sea adventure as they 
are incurred while the vessel is detained at a port of refuge carrying out needed repairs (or 
performing other acts) necessary for the successful completion of the voyage. 
The YAR 2004 amendment to Rule XI disallowing such costs in general average is 
likely to have the effect that the shipowner will be compelled to incur additional expense in 
the form of premium for a special cover for crew wages and maintenance where a vessel is 
detained at a port of refuge as he will not be able to recover this cost as a particular average 
claim under the existing hull policies in the market.
1078
 It is argued that allowing the cost of 
crew wages and maintenance while a vessel is detained at a port of refuge will not impose 
undue burden on cargo insurers as it is estimated that the removal of such cost in general 
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 See chap 4 § II(b) supra. 
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average will not necessarily give rise to significant savings to cargo insurers
1079
 because such 
costs are normally insignificant in light of the total sums allowable in general average.
1080
  
Furthermore, as shown earlier,
1081
 such costs are incurred for the benefit of both cargo 
and the shipowner as they are incurred both for the common safety and common benefit of 
the adventure.  
Rule XI(b) YAR 1994, though subject to the Rule Paramount, provides that such cost 
must be ‘reasonably’ incurred. Though this criterion in Rule XI(b) YAR 1994 is superfluous 
in light of the Rule Paramount, it underscores the intention of the draftsman of the Rule that 
only such cost that is reasonably incurred in the prevailing circumstances that will be allowed 
under the Rule. This prevents the abuse of the Rule by unscrupulous shipowning interests.  
In making this recommendation, it is recognised that other interests do not enjoy the 
equivalent of the preferential treatment reserved for shipowners under Rule XI(b) YAR 1994; 
though these interests could also suffer economic losses, which are not allowed in general 
average, in consequence of the prolongation of the voyage.
1082
 However, it is argued that the 
restoration of the cost of crew wages and maintenance while a vessel is detained at a port of 
refuge could have the effect of persuading shipowning interests to reach a compromise with 
cargo insurers on other provisions of the YAR to be adopted in 2016; particularly Rule VI.  
There seems so little scope for compromise on the part of shipowners on this that it 
seems safe to predict that any amended version of the YAR not retaining the provisions of 
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 Brown estimates that the savings to cargo as a result of the removal of crew wages and maintenance in the 
YAR 2004 will be with regard to adjuster’s fees and administrative fees. See B Browne op cit note 396 at 12. 
Furthermore, Brown estimates that the restoration of crew wages and maintenance while a vessel is at a port of 
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 See the Reply of the Norwegian MLA to the CMI IWG on General Average Report on the proposals for the 
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 For eg, cargo might suffer financial loss because of its inability to dispose valuable goods or loss of profit as 
a result of the prolongation of the voyage.  
1083
 The importance of the restoration of crew wages and maintenance while a vessel is detained at a port of 
refuge in avoiding an impasse on the new Rules to be adopted is underscored by the fact that 95 per cent of the 
replies of NMLAs to the CMI 2013 questionnaire on the review of the Rules on general average stated that the 
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III RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO THE PROCESS OF ADOPTING THE RULES 
(a) Introduction 
 
The author in making recommendations on the process of adopting the new rules draws from 
the ingredients of past successful revision processes as compared with the revision process of 
the YAR 1994.
1084
 These recommendations are made pursuant to the identified flaws in the 
revision process of the YAR 1994 to ensure that such pitfalls are avoided in the process of 
adopting the new set of Rules. The recommendations that follow are essentially centred on 
the ingredients of proper timing of calls for revision and the level of consensus necessary for 
the call for revision and in adopting any proposed amendments. 
 (b) Proper timing of efforts to revise the Rules 
 
History has shown that the previous successful amendments of the Rules were as a result of 
the sufficient time that was allowed by the maritime community for any given set of Rules to 
have an impact in the industry before efforts were made to rectify any identified defects in the 
Rules or to amend the Rules to take cognisance of significant developments in international 
trade and in the maritime industry.
1085
 Thus, the proper timing of efforts at revising any set of 
Rules is of the essence in ensuring widespread acceptance of the amended Rules.  
Seen against this background, the IUMI’s call for the revision of the YAR 1994 barely 
months after the Sydney Conference was a significant flaw in the process of revising the 
YAR 1994 and this contributed to the opposition by shipowning interests to the revision of 
the YAR 1994 and the incorporation of the YAR 2004 in carriage contracts.
1086
  
It is recommended that in future revisions of the YAR, after the adoption of the new set 
of Rules in 2016, sufficient time should be allowed for any set of Rules to have an impact in 
the industry before efforts are made to amend the Rules. In making this recommendation, it is 
not proposed that any set of Rules must be allowed to operate in the market for up to 25 years 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
provision should be restored in the YAR. See the Report of the CMI IWG on General Average, 88-89, dated 12 
August 2013. This view was expressed in the replies by the NMLAs of Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
China, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, 
Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.  
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(as was the case in the previous amendments of the Rules from 1890 to 1994). This is 
because the pace of developments in the maritime industry at the moment is different from 
the pace of developments in the late 19
th




 The maritime 
industry has evolved from the era of sailing vessels and steamships to the era of sophisticated 
vessels and electronic data that ensure the prompt transportation of large volume of cargo to 
destination within specified time schedules and changes in the industry continue at a fast pace 
as a result of technological advancements.
1088
 Thus, there should be no hard and fast rule on 
the subject.
1089
 Owing to the present fast pace of developments in the industry, it is 
recommended that existing Rules should be allowed a minimum of 10 years to operate in the 
industry through their incorporation in carriage contracts and marine insurance policies 
before efforts are made to amend the Rules. A minimum of 10 years, it is argued, should be 
sufficient to identify any weakness in the existing Rules that should be rectified or any 
additions to be made to the existing Rules to enhance their effectiveness as a risk and loss 
distribution system. 
(c) Consensus amongst interested parties 
 
The lack of consensus amongst the majority of interested parties on the need for the revision 
of the YAR 1994 and the requisite changes to be introduced by the Rules contributed 
significantly to the failure of the 2004 Rules to gain widespread acceptance and use in the 
market.
1090
 The YAR from inception and subsequent amendments to the YAR prior to 2004 
have been a product of the consensus reached amongst majority of interested parties on the 
need for revision and the amendments to be made, thereby making any approved set of Rules 
a product of ‘the distillation of the thoughts of dedicated parties and the consensus they 
represent; reached through the process of reason, negotiation and compromise in achieving a 
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blend of principles towards achieving uniformity.’
1091
 The lack of widespread acceptance of 
the YAR 2004 in the industry has reinforced the premise that consensus amongst the majority 
of interested parties on the revision or adoption of any set of Rules is pivotal to the 
acceptance and use of any set of Rules in the industry.  
To achieve a consensus amongst interested parties on the revision of any set of Rules, it 
is recommended that a close working relationship should be established amongst shipowning, 
insurance and adjusting associations in pre-conference considerations of proposals to review 
the Rules on general average.
1092
 Such active collaboration would enable parties to listen and 
appreciate the arguments presented by all interested parties in the maritime industry.
1093
 Such 
a collaborative measure could lead to compromises that could ensure a consensus amongst 
the interested parties on the requisite amendments to be made to any set of YAR. Particularly 
such pre-conference collaboration should be encouraged between BIMCO and the IUMI as 
they are the main interest groups that need to reach a compromise with respect to the 
provisions of the YAR. Taking cognisance of their influence in the shipowning and insurance 
communities respectively, it is argued that such collaborative efforts between these bodies 
could ensure the adoption of Rules that will gain widespread acceptance and use in the 
maritime industry.  
 
(c) Equitable balance of interests of parties 
 
The inequitable balance of most of the changes introduced by the YAR 2004 in favour of 
cargo interests significantly contributed to the opposition by shipowning interests to the Rules 
and the subsequent lack of widespread acceptance and use of the YAR 2004 in the market.
1094
 
This is in contrast to previous versions of the YAR prior to 2004 which had ensured a 
measure of equitable balance of the interests of majority of interested parties and this resulted 
in their widespread use in the market. Commenting on the previous versions of the YAR, 
Taylor notes that ‘close regard should be had to the unique uniformity of acceptance of the 
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Rules and to the extent to which those Rules balance the interest of all parties.’
1095
 Of 
significance was the introduction of the Rule Paramount in the YAR 1994 to ensure a 
measure of equity in the general average system by ensuring that only general average acts 
that are reasonable in any given circumstance would be allowable in general average.
1096
 
Pertinently, the need to ensure a measure of equitable balance of the interest of all parties was 
underscored in the resolution adopted at the CMI Beijing Conference in 2012 for the adoption 
of a new set of Rules.
1097
  
The question remains how the varying interests of all interested parties can be balanced 
and whether an ‘equitable balance’ can ever be achieved. It is argued that achieving an 
equitable balance of the interests of interested parties is an arduous task that may not be 
feasible. What could be achieved, it is argued, is an appreciable degree of equitable balance 
of the interests of parties. It is argued that achieving this might require a change of practice 
by the CMI. In achieving a measure of equitable balance of the interest of all parties, it is 
recommended that the CMI as the custodian of the Rules should first carry out a study of the 
present general average system to identify measures that could be adopted in the YAR that 
could result in a measure of equitable balance of the interests of insurers and shipowning 
interests. This is because the CMI in recent years has not carried out any study on measures 
that could be adopted to achieve a measure of equitable balance of the interest of the various 
interested parties in the YAR.
1098
 It is argued that such a study is imperative as the perception 
of the general average system, as exemplified in the YAR, as a mechanism that tilts in favour 
of shipowning interests
1099
 seems to be the pith of the agitations by cargo insurers against the 
system. Furthermore, achieving a measure of equitable balance of the interests of interested 
parties is not feasible without first understanding the present general average system.  
It is argued that such a study would be invaluable and would be accorded recognition 
by the various interest groups as it would not be seen as an attempt by any interest to advance 
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 The findings in the CMI study should then form the basis of a 
questionnaire to be drafted by an IWG on General Average and circulated to the NMLAs on 
the amendment of the YAR.
1101
 Such a questionnaire should be circulated on time
1102
 to 
NMLAs to provide interested parties with sufficient time for proper analysis of the CMI 
study, consultations and deliberations amongst themselves towards reaching compromises on 
the requisite changes that would ensure a balance of their interests prior to any CMI 
Conference for the amendment or adoption of any set of Rules. Reaching compromises prior 
to CMI Conferences amongst interest groups could ensure that the Rules to be adopted at the 
CMI Conference would be a mere formal endorsement of the understanding that has already 
been reached by the parties at ensuring a balance of their respective interests.  
In making this recommendation, the author is aware of the CMI practice of forming an 
IWG that sends questionnaires to NMLAs and collates replies from the NMLAs; which then 
form the basis for further discussion and study on the issues raised in the replies.
1103
 
However, it is argued that such practice may not necessarily produce an effective result in 
balancing the interest of all interested parties in the present general average system as the 
questionnaires are sent to NMLAs without first conducting a study of the general average 
system to understand the current state of the system through information and data that would 
be collated from a wide spectrum of interested parties. A holistic study of the general average 
system, it is argued, should precede the drafting and circulation of questionnaires to NMLAs. 
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IV LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
 
The YAR epitomise the efforts that have been made by the maritime community, over a 
century, to achieve uniformity in the principles and practice of general average and to 
constantly modernise the Rules to take cognisance of significant developments in the 
maritime industry and the commercial world. Though not a convention or a treaty, the YAR 
represent one area of maritime law where uniformity has been achieved to a great extent 
towards driving maritime commerce. Despite objections to certain provisions of the YAR, the 
Rules continue to serve a useful purpose as a risk and loss distribution system. As noted by 
leading commentators, the YAR ‘continue to perform a useful function in patrolling between 
two important borders that lie between matters that form part of the shipowner’s reasonable 
obligations to carry out the contracted voyage and the losses and expenses that arise in 
exceptional circumstances and property and liability insurers as their differing responsibilities 
meet and sometimes merge, in the context of a serious casualty.’
1104
 
However, the continued effectiveness and attractiveness of the YAR as a casualty 
management system depends on its robustness and ability to adapt to prevailing 
circumstances in the market and in the maritime industry in order to continuously ensure a 
measure of equitable balance of the interest of all interested parties in the general average 
system. For the system to continue to enjoy the acceptance of all interested parties it must not 
be perceived as a system that tilts in favour of any interest and places the bulk of the burden 
of general average on one interest group. In echoing this sentiment, Cornah cautions that 
‘however successful in the past, general average and the YAR must earn their place in the 
future on the basis of practical merit and relevance to modern trade.’
1105
 The Rules must not 
only be abreast of prevailing commercial realities through a systematic review but must 
epitomise such commercial realities. Taylor aptly notes that ‘the systematic re-examination of 
the Rules is crucial so that account can be taken of current changes, current attitudes, current 
case law, current legislation and indeed insurance current attitudes and policy forms.’
1106
 
Such a holistic re-examination of the Rules will ensure that the Rules are examined taking 
cognisance of all factors that relate to general average which affect the various interested 
parties.  
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The current process initiated by the CMI towards a general review of the Rules on 
general average must be based on current commercial realities and developments in the 
maritime industry for it to culminate in the adoption of a set of YAR that will gain 
widespread acceptance and use in the industry. To achieve the desired result in the current 
amendment process, cogent concerns raised by all interested parties about the general average 
system and the YAR should be examined and compromises reached by parties on the issues 
that are raised towards reaching a consensus that will ensure increased uniformity in the 
general average system. As noted by Schumacher: 
 
‘… the codes which regulate man’s social and economic conduct do not arrive full-
blown, nor do they “just happen”. Such codes – and the York-Antwerp Rules are among 
them – are the distillation of the thoughts of dedicated men and the accord they represent 
is reached through the process of reason, negotiation and compromise to achieve that 
which may not be perfect, but which blends principles and practices in such a way as to 




Thus, to achieve an effective general average system the need for collaboration and 
consultations amongst the various interest groups is of the essence for the realisation of a 
general average system that will balance their interests. Interested parties in the general 
average system, instead of regarding themselves as opposing interests, should regard 
themselves as ‘general average partners’ with the task of providing a system that will 
effectively drive global commerce and at the same time take cognisance of their varied 
interests. As noted by Wigmore, ‘what is needed is more self-sacrifice among the interests 
concerned (ie more enlightened self-interest).’
1108





 and General Average Absorption Clauses
1111
 are having a positive impact in 
the reduction of general average situations and the adjustment of uneconomic general average 
claims, the YAR should provide an enabling framework that complements these efforts by 
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the maritime industry. This should be the over-arching aim of all involved in the general 
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